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A SEARCH FOR THE CAUSAL FACTORS OF CHINESE FOREIGN POLICY RESTRUCTURING

by

Hansheng Chen

A Dissertation Presented in Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements for the Degree
Doctor of Philosophy

ARIZONA STATE UNIVERSITY

August 1997

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ABSTRACT

This project examines the causes of three major changes in Chinese foreign policy since the founding of the People's Republic of China. These changes include the Sino-Soviet split, the Sino-American rapprochement and China's adoption of the independent foreign policy. Recent developments in foreign policy theory suggest multiple sources of foreign policy restructuring. This study found thirteen reasons for Chinese foreign policy restructuring: the Soviet-American détente, the Sino-Soviet ideological dispute, different estimations of general war, the Great Leap Forward, and Mao's dialectical world view caused the Sino-Soviet split; the Soviet threat plus American retrenchment, Chinese domestic factionalism, Mao's reformulated theory of intermediate zone, and economic considerations contributed to the Sino-American rapprochement; the Taiwan problem, changes in trilateral relations, economic considerations, and Deng's pragmatism led to China's adoption of an independent foreign policy. The study of the causal factors of Chinese foreign policy restructuring is supplemented by a content analysis of *Beijing Review* for selected years. The majority of the causal factors identified in this project are confirmed by the text in *Beijing Review*. This project also finds a general pattern for Chinese foreign policy restructuring, which identifies strategic changes and

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leaders' personality as two stable factors, ideology as a declining factor, and economic considerations as a rising factor.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER		Page
1	INTRODUCTION	1
	A Theoretical Guideline	1
	A Historical Base	3
	Potential Contributions	4
	Organization	5
2	THEORETICAL REVIEW: FROM LEVELS OF ANALYSIS TO FOREIGN POLICY RESTRUCTURING	9
	Analysis at System Level	9
	Analysis at Unit Level	12
	Analysis at Individual Level	17
	Limitations of Level-of-Analysis Explanation	20
	Foreign Policy Restructuring Analysis	20
	Defining Foreign Policy Restructuring	23
	Regime and Foreign Policy Restructuring	25
	Sources of Foreign Policy Restructuring	27
	Some Consensus	29
3	SINOLOGY AND CHINESE FOREIGN POLICY RESTRUCTURING	31
	Sinology and Chinese Foreign Policy Study	31
	Three Major Changes in Chinese Foreign Policy	35
	Why a Change is Restructuring	45

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CHAPTER Page

4 CASE ONE: SINO-SOVIET SPLIT 53

Causal Factor I: The Soviet-US Détente 55

Causal Factor II: Ideological Dispute 62

Causal Factor III: Different Estimations of General War 68

Causal Factor IV: The Great Leap Forward 74

Causal Factor V: Mao's Dialectical World View 80

5 CASE TWO: SINO-AMERICAN RAPPROCHEMENT 87

Causal Factor I: Soviet Threat and US Retrenchment 91

Causal Factor II: Chinese Domestic Factionalism 96

Causal Factor III: Mao's Reformulated Theory 104

Causal Factor IV: Economic Considerations 112

6 CASE THREE: INDEPENDENT FOREIGN POLICY 116

Causal Factor I: Taiwan Problem 118

Causal Factor II: The Change in Trilateral Relations 123

Causal Factor III: Economic Considerations 127

Causal Factor IV: Deng's Pragmatism 134

7 CHINA'S VIEW OF RESTRUCTURING 138

The Choice of Beijing Review and the Years 138

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CHAPTER Page

China's View of the Sino-Soviet Split 140

China's View of the Sino-American Rapprochement 144

China's View of Independent Foreign Policy 147

Explanations for the Unconfirmed Factors 149

8 CONCLUSION 152

Causal Factors for Chinese Restructuring 152

A Pattern of Chinese Restructuring 154

Some Contributions 159

REFERENCES 161

APPENDIX

A ARTICULATED FACTORS IN 1963 *BEIJING REVIEW* 175

B ARTICULATED FACTORS IN 1972 *BEIJING REVIEW* 196

C ARTICULATED FACTORS IN 1982 *BEIJING REVIEW* 210

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

China's foreign policy has experienced several dramatic changes since the founding of the People's Republic in 1949. China abandoned its initial policy of Sino-Soviet alliance and became involved in a serious dispute with the Soviet Union in the 1960s. During the 1970s, facing an increasingly aggressive Soviet Union, China moved to reconciliation with the United States to form a "united front" against the USSR. Again, in the early 1980s, China restructured its pro-US and anti-Soviet policy into an independent foreign policy emphasizing equal distance from the two superpowers. Since the end of the Second World War, no other major powers in the world have changed their foreign policies so frequently and drastically. In some sense, it can be argued that no other major power's foreign policy shifts have had a deeper and more extensive impact on the world power equilibrium than that of the PRC. Therefore, the importance of research on the causal factors of these Chinese foreign policy changes is obvious.

A Theoretical Guideline

There is a long-standing scholarly debate on the sources of foreign policy. Theory building in the past few

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decades has displayed a Hegelian dialectical evolution. The dominant neorealist theory explains foreign policy at the system level and predicts that states respond mechanically to changes in the system structure. While the internal features of states have been generally ignored, explanatory power is placed in states' external environments. Unsatisfied with realist and neorealist treatments of states' internal situations as a "black box", scholars began to search for sources of foreign policy within states. A variety of causal factors, such as national character, regime types, societal attributes, leaders' world views and personality, have all been examined.

The "behavioral revolution" in social science during the 1970s significantly influenced the methodologies used by the new school of foreign policy studies. Although resulting in remarkable academic achievements, scientific inquiry about middle range problems in foreign policy ignores the grand theory that is necessary for studying broad topics such as foreign policy change. Thus, foreign policy restructuring theory was proposed in the early 1980s to fill this gap. The focus of the new theory is major changes in a state's foreign policy. Unlike the early theories focusing on the determinants of general foreign policy, the dependent variable of foreign policy restructuring theory is the wholesale and fundamental alteration of a state's pattern of

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foreign relations.

In some sense, foreign policy restructuring theory can be seen as a counter to the early "behavioral revolution". It brings back the broad pictures and general patterns of foreign policy and once again emphasizes the importance of comprehensive understanding in foreign policy studies. Thus, in the past few decades, the development of foreign policy theory has completed a Hegelian thesis, antithesis, and synthesis evolution. As far as the study on causal factors of foreign policy change is concerned, the important achievement produced by this theoretical evolution is a kind of scholarly consensus that recognizes the existence of multiple sources for foreign policy restructuring.

A Historical Base

Another relevant academic development for this study is the progress of a discipline that can be broadly classified as Sinology. This involves works of historians, research by Chinese foreign policy analysts and reports from China watchers and experts. Not quite incidentally, this broad discipline in the past few decades has experienced an evolution similar to that in foreign policy theory. During the 1960s, because of the constraint of limited information about the PRC, Sinologists were satisfied with research at a high level of generality. Influenced by the "behavioral revolution" and encouraged by a Chinese "open door" policy,

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Sinologists from the late 1970s employed more sophisticated methodologies to study micro-level problems in China. During the 1980s, however, Sinology changed once again in favor of the broad picture and general patterns in understanding changes in Chinese foreign policy.

Using the above "multiple-source" approach as a theoretical guideline and Sinologist studies as a historical base, this project examines three case studies to explain the three major changes in Chinese foreign policy. The "multiple-source" approach here refers to the scholarly consensus produced by the theoretical evolution that recognizes the diversified determinants of foreign policy restructuring.

Potential Contributions

While employing foreign policy theories to study Chinese foreign policy change is not an entirely new project, previous research only applied either level-of-analysis or restructuring theory to a particular change in the PRC's foreign policy. For example, Shambaugh (1994) uses level-of-analysis to study Sino-American rapprochement. Robinson (1982) and Jian (1996) employ restructuring theory to examine either China's decision on "independent foreign policy" or China's early relations with the two superpowers. A common shortcoming of these studies is that they are confined to a short period of history, and thus fail to

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discover a general pattern for China's foreign policy restructuring. The current research not only employs both level-of-analysis and restructuring theory as guidelines, but also extends the time span of examination to cover all three major Chinese foreign policy changes. Thus a more general Chinese foreign policy restructuring pattern can be generated.

Moreover, the longer examination, which consists of three case studies, is followed by an analysis of the text of *Beijing Review* to assess the Chinese government view on the reasons for these foreign policy changes. This effort adds inside information to the outsiders' research. A Chinese government view can be seen as a "confession" by the decision-makers of Chinese foreign policy, and thus provides a valuable supplemental perspective to scholarly studies. Finally, since the previous research noted above is largely based on secondary materials, an analysis of the text of *Beijing Review* also provides some primary data to the studies of Chinese foreign policy.

Organization

Chapter Two reviews foreign policy theory development from level of analysis to restructuring. This development has moved in a Hegelian dialectical circle, which marches from a macro-level analysis to a micro-level analysis, and then returns to a more sophisticated macro-level analysis.

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Through this movement, a significant conclusion has been reached that emphasizes the importance of multiple perspectives in studying the sources of foreign policy restructuring. This "multiple-perspective" or "multiple-source" approach is taken as a theoretical guideline in this research.

Chapter Three reviews the development of Sinology. The Sinologists' studies provide this research with a historical base on which the three case studies on Chinese foreign policy changes can be placed. This chapter also briefly reviews the three changes in Chinese foreign policy, and explains why these changes constitute foreign policy restructuring.

Chapter Four presents the first case study: the Sino-Soviet split. This case study identifies five factors, Soviet-US détente, Sino-Soviet ideological dispute, different estimations of general war, Chinese Great Leap Forward and Mao's worldview, as the sources of the first Chinese foreign policy restructuring.

Chapter Five focuses on the second case study: the Sino-American rapprochement. This study finds four major sources for the rapprochement on China's part. They are the perceived Soviet threat plus US retrenchment, Chinese domestic factionalism, Mao's intermediate zone and three worlds theories, and Chinese economic considerations.

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Chapter Six involves the third case study: the PRC's independent foreign policy. Four factors are discovered by the third study as the sources of the most recent Chinese foreign policy change. These causal factors include Taiwan problems, changes in Sino-Soviet-American trilateral relations, Chinese economic considerations and Deng's pragmatism.

Chapter Seven provides an analysis of the text of *Beijing Review*. As an official publication, *Beijing Review* is chosen to represent the Chinese government view on the foreign policy changes. The majority of the causal factors identified by the three case studies are confirmed by the text in *Beijing Review*. A further analysis of these "confirmed" factors immediately follows. There are also causal factors that are identified by the case studies but cannot be confirmed by the text in *Beijing Review*. This chapter also explains these "unconfirmed" factors in the context of Chinese domestic politics.

Chapter Eight provides a conclusion where all the causal factors in Chinese foreign policy restructuring are clustered into different categories. Two "stable" categories involve those factors that are consistently present in all three Chinese foreign policy changes. A "rising" category and a "declining" one include those factors that demonstrate two opposite patterns in the three stages of Chinese foreign

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policy. A further "sporadic" category gathers the remaining factors whose presence and absence in Chinese foreign policy changes are somewhat irregular.

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CHAPTER 2

THEORETICAL REVIEW: FROM LEVELS OF ANALYSIS TO FOREIGN POLICY RESTRUCTURING

Students of international relations suggest a variety of sources to explain a state's foreign policy. Causal factors include power distribution, geopolitics, national character, societal attributes, bureaucratic politics, ideology, personality and so on. Within each theory, there are further explanations. Under the national character argument, for example, Japanese compulsiveness was attributed to their experience of hundreds of years of authoritarian rule (Haring 1953, 382). Under the same category, some scholar even went so far as to argue that the Russian tradition of tightly wrapping babies during the first nine months led to early frustration, which in turn was responsible for Russian aggressiveness (Gorer and Rickman 1962, 94-104).

Analysis at System Level

Despite the diversity of explanations, foreign policy theories, by and large, can be classified into three levels of analysis: system, unit, and individual, with system including both structure and interaction, unit focusing on the state and potentially any group designated as an actor within a state,

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and individual referring to political decision-makers (Buzan 1995).[1]

The best-known, system-level theory is realism, of which the basic assumptions include anarchy, distribution of power, national interest, security dilemma, and Realpolitik. For realists, world politics is a struggle for power and survival. They argue that human nature and societies are both imperfect and imperfectible, and thus conflict is an inherent danger. Given this reality, they contend that states should protect their national interests by maximizing their power defined in political and military terms. Realism links international politics to a Darwinian process of natural selection. States failing to adapt to changes in the global distribution of power will soon find their basic values and their sovereignty are at risk (Morgenthau 1967, 5-25).

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[1] Level of analysis has a significant impact on the general theory of international relations. Three scholars, Kenneth Waltz, Morton Kaplan and David Singer, are particularly important in the debate over level of analysis. Following their debate, most international relations scholars accept at least three levels: system, state and individual. Although many suggest that the levels can be further subdivided, into the bureaucratic level between individual and state, process level between state and system, or structure and interaction capacity within the system level, most scholars agree that the three-level classification is inclusive and useful.

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Neorealists, such as Kenneth Waltz (1979), develop realism into a more structural determinist or system-based theory. Waltz defines the international system as composed of a structure and interacting units. He divides the structure into three tiers. The first tier concerns the arrangement of the units. It can be either anarchy or hierarchy (absence or presence of a world government). The second tier refers to differences among units by function. Different states should act differently. But under anarchy this tier is not important because all states are "like units", and they all act according to the same "laws". The third tier is the distribution of capabilities across units. This tier concerns the question of polarity: how many great powers does the system contain? The main purpose of Waltz's theory is to explain why different units behave similarly under anarchy.

For neorealists, state behavior is best explained at the system level. Under the structure of anarchy and a given power distribution, they argue, states behave predictably despite the wills of their decision-makers. From their structural analysis, "balance of power" policies reflect the structural constraints rather than states' free choice, and they emerge virtually independently of the wills of political leaders. According to Kaplan (1957, 686), for example, states under a multipolar system are all subject to the following rules:

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increase power but negotiate with opponents rather than fight; fight rather than fail to increase power; stop fighting rather than eliminate a major actor; oppose any state or alliance which possess disproportionate power; permit defeated actors to reenter the system.

The system level of analysis has been frequently criticized as ignoring the micro level of analysis and producing a "black box" concept of national actors. Critics contend that the system level of analysis tends to exaggerate the impact of the system upon national actors and discount the impact of national actors on the system. Moreover, a system level of analysis assumes that all states are such homogeneous units that they are all guided by the same foreign policy operational codes, under which all statesmen think and act in terms of national interest defined as power. However, just as individuals differ in what they regard as pleasure and pain, states may differ in what they consider to be national interest. Therefore, it is wrong to ignore the unit level of analysis and the domestic differences existing across the national actors (Singer 1961, 22-23).

Analysis at Unit Level

Recognizing the limitation of the analysis at the system level, scholars have sought analyses at more micro levels, trying to open up the "black box" concept, and suggest more

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complex procedure for examining foreign policies. For scholars who seek to explain states' behavior at the unit or state level, Rosenau's (1966) "pre-theories" article is an early effort. In his article, Rosenau explores the possibility of studying states' "internal influences on external behavior". He contends that the most important factors accounting for a state's foreign policy is its nation type, and nations can be distinguished by their size, economics and politics.

Thus, among large, rich and open states, Rosenau predicts, societal influences such as major value orientations are expected to be most strongly associated with variations in foreign policy. By contrast, among small, poor and closed states, individual characteristics, such as decisionmakers' values, personalities and experiences, are expected to have the strongest influences on foreign policies.

Within unit level of analysis, much attention has been directed to the relationship between the type of regime and foreign policy. It is hypothesized that differences in regimes among nations and changes in regimes within nations are important variables determining the pattern of foreign policy. Moreover, it is argued that changes in the internal power structure of the same regime can also affect foreign policy output (Salmore and Salmore 1978, 110).

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Scholars focusing on regime differences disagree with each other on the question about which type of regime is more peaceful. Some propound a "democratic peace" thesis, which states that democracies are inherently more peaceful when they deal with another democracy (Russett 1993).[2] Others contend that imperialism by nature is more aggressive, and thus the existence of imperialism is the true source of the inevitability of war (Lenin 1965). Still others argue that totalitarian states are more willing and able to initiate war because they can mobilize great military power, better exploit situations, and engage in war without the approval of the people (Buchan 1968, 21-24). More recent research also finds that countries experiencing a transitional phase from authoritarian regimes to democracy are more war-prone than both democracies and autocracies (Mansfield and Snyder 1995).

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[2] "Democratic peace" can be explained by two models: normative and structural. The normative explanation argues that democratic culture, which permits peaceful resolution of conflicts within a country, can apply across national boundaries toward other democratic states. The structural explanation argues that domestic checks and balances can slow decisions on war. When one democratic state perceives another democratic state to be reluctant to fight, it will not fear a surprise attack, and thus need not launch a preemptive strike. Therefore, democracies are more likely to settle their disputes short of war.

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Despite their differences, these scholars share one thing in common: that the type of regime makes a difference in a nation's foreign policy pattern.

In unit level analysis, some scholars treat national character, societal attributes, and bureaucratic politics as independent variables. For national character argument, international behavior can be better understood by looking at various attributes of the broad domestic society. Because decision-makers are products of the societies in which they live, they generally share the values and cultures prevailing in the broad societal setting. Foreign policies thus are often products of a nation's past experiences or accepted political beliefs and ideologies that come to exist over many years. These beliefs, either derived from national traditions or political ideologies, can influence the formulation and conduct of foreign policy in a variety of ways. A state's belief system, for example, helps determine its foreign policy agenda. It can serve as a prism through which decision makers view reality. The belief system of a state also places certain constraints on the range of foreign policy options. Decision makers will find it politically difficult to choose an option far from what is generally conceived as compatible with the belief system of their constituents or supporting interest groups.

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Bureaucrats are also said to have major influences on foreign policy output. Political leaders must depend on the professional bureaucracy for advice and cooperation in developing and implementing foreign policy. It is the bureaucracy that collects the relevant information and makes decisions at each level as to what information and which issues will rise to the next level of decision making. Bureaucracy is also crucial in executing foreign policy. Through strategies of delaying or even sabotage, foreign policies can be resisted by bureaucracy in the process of implementation. This "bureaucratic politics" model, however, is based on the experiences in democratic states. In authoritarian states, on the contrary, it is generally believed that foreign policies are decided by a few leaders who are largely free from the influences of bureaucracies (Skidmore 1994; Volgy and Schwarz 1994).

The most extensively researched linkage between societal situation and international behavior involves arguments that political leaders tend to engage in external conflict in order to divert attention from internal problems. It is said that Louis Napoleon continued the Crimean War partly to deflect discontent at home, and Ali Bhutto of Pakistan engaged in war with India in 1971 for the same reason. Studies also show that developing countries are more likely than developed nations to

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become involved in external conflict in order to divert attention from domestic problems (Feierabend and Feierabend 1969). By contrast, states that have a stable political system are said to be less likely to externalize domestic discontent into external conflict (Maoz and Russett 1992).

Analysis at Individual Level

The most micro level of analysis is certainly the individual level that focuses on foreign policy decision makers. As early as the 1950s, Snyder, Bruck and Sapin (1969) proposed a decisionmaking approach to study foreign policy. They argue that human decisionmaking is central in understanding the foreign policy of a state, although the human decisionmaking process should be understood in an organizational context and under the influences of internal and external settings. Snyder and his colleagues contend that a state should be defined as its official decisionmakers, because state action is the action taken by those who act in the name of the state. Therefore, the key determinant of the foreign policy is the "situation" or "reality" interpreted by the state's decisionmakers.

This individual approach has been developed by many scholars. Some scholars argue that decisionmakers' personalities, backgrounds, prejudices and ideas all make a difference in their foreign policy decisionmaking. For

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example, Hermann's (1980, 8) research suggests that leaders who are more nationalistic, distrustful of others, high in need for power and low in conceptual complexity are more aggressive. In contrast, leaders who are high in need for affiliation, high in conceptual complexity, trusting of others, low in nationalism are more conciliatory. Similarly, Alexander George (1981) argues that certain features of Woodrow Wilson's personality, derived from his childhood experiences with his strict parents, affected his dealing with the members of the US Senate, and thus partly explained the failure of the Senate to approve US membership in the League of Nations. Other scholars contend that decision makers are subject to psychological distortions that can lead to misperceptions, such as wishful thinking, selective information and analogical reasoning. For example, Khong (1992, 51) argues that analogical reasoning derived from limited cognitive capacities had a major influence on President Johnson's decisions regarding the Vietnam War. He says that Johnson's crucial decisions on the Vietnam War in 1965 were all affected by the wrong historical analogies such as "Munich Lessons" and "Korean Lessons". Still other scholars stress the importance of leaders' physical health on decisionmaking. Weinstein (1978) argues that Wilson's deteriorating health affected his attitude toward the US

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Senate. Similarly, some scholars state that in February 1945, Franklin Roosevelt's blood pressure was an astronomical 260/150 and he was suffering from chest pains. Thus, they argue, poor health affected Roosevelt's ability to handle the complex diplomatic issues and to negotiate effectively with Stalin at the Yalta Conference (Rourke 1993, 125).

While early research on individuals examined decision makers' traits in political biographies that depend on psychoanalytic theory, later studies focused more systematically on the relationship between leaders' personalities and foreign policies. Some researchers study decision makers' operational codes, which are composed of political leaders' philosophical and instrumental beliefs about political reality.[3] The operational code is seen as setting the boundaries within which a political leader can act. Other research focuses on content analysis of speeches and interviews with decision makers. They explore the relationship between personality and foreign policy by studying the verbal output of political leaders (Hermann 1978, 54-55).

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[3] Philosophical beliefs are leaders' fundamental assumptions about the nature of politics; instrumental beliefs refer to leaders' beliefs about proper styles and strategies to deal with "reality" as viewed through the philosophical beliefs.

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Limitations of Level-of-Analysis Explanation

Although the three levels of analysis as a research tool are useful for simple and clear-cut classification, one should not assume that these neat categories can be applied without conceptual and operational problems. As in any categorizing, three-level analysis is also arbitrary. The overlap of ideas and concepts in different categories sometimes produces inter-category interplay of independent variables. For example, national characters and societal attributes (variables at the unit level) can shape the ideology and belief systems, which in turn, can affect political leaders' world views (an individual level variable). Therefore, it is necessary to pay attention to variable interaction across levels of analysis.

Moreover, it is also wrong to treat one particular level as always the primary unit of analysis, because, more often than not, multiple-level influences generally produce foreign policy outputs. Therefore, as Wendt (1987) points out, a better theory should take neither human agents nor social structures always as primary units, because social structures and human agents are theoretically interdependent, and thus are codetermined and mutually constituted.

Foreign Policy Restructuring Analysis

Despite the dynamics of earlier theory building noted above, foreign policy change as a dependent variable was

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largely neglected by scholars of international relations and foreign policy before the 1980s (Holsti 1982; Rosati, Sampson and Hagan 1994). During the 1960s and 1970s, foreign policy research was generally concerned with identifying the external and internal determinants of foreign policies. Ironically, one of the crucial reasons for the neglect of foreign policy change was deeply rooted in the development of the three-level analyses. Following such early efforts of opening up the "black box" of national decision-making represented by Rosenau's (1966) pretheory and Snyder's (1969) study of decision-making, scholars in the next two decades focused on promoting the scientific inquiry of international relations and foreign policy. The major preoccupations during these decades were to develop middle range theory by studying specific problems, exploring limited phenomena, proposing hypotheses, and especially obtaining data to test these hypotheses. Therefore, as Gilpin (1981, 5) observes, one of the unfortunate consequences of the rise of behaviorism was the abandonment of grand theory that was crucial for any general theory of international change. Although resulting in impressive academic accomplishments, the behaviorist middle range approach diverted attention away from broad theoretical problems such as foreign policy change.

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Foreign policy restructuring as a major topic was proposed to change this situation. Gilpin and Rosenau can be seen as two forerunners in this effort. Gilpin's (1981, 10-13) dependent variable is change in international relations. His major argument is that international changes result from political actors' efforts to serve their own interests. The underlying dynamic of international and foreign policy change is the differential growth of power among states based on political, economic, and technological developments. Based on the distribution of power, states are all engaged in cost-benefit calculations to decide either to change or not change the international system.

The concept of political adaptation is associated with Rosenau's (1981) work. Rosenau treats political phenomena as forms of human adaptation. He argues that political organisms are always experiencing both continuities and changes; and changes are the responses of political organisms to internal developments and external circumstances. Thus, a state's foreign policy is a device for that state to adapt to changes in its environment. Changes in foreign policy, according to Rosenau, are most likely to occur when developments at home generate new needs or developments abroad produce potential threats to essential state structures.

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Defining Foreign Policy Restructuring

The topic of foreign policy change receives more attention in the writings of Kal Holsti, Kjell Goldmann, Charles Hermann and Jerel Rosati. The concept of foreign policy restructuring was first proposed and clearly defined by Kal Holsti (1982, 2-3) who differentiates two kinds of foreign policy changes. The first is a slow and incremental change which Holsti labels as normal foreign policy change. This kind of change usually has low linkages among different sectors. For example, a change in a state's foreign aid policy may not be accompanied by a change in the foreign trade policy. The second is a dramatic, wholesale and fundamental alteration of a state's pattern of external relations. This kind of change usually takes place quickly, proceeds non-incrementally, and influences different sectors. It is only the second kind of change that can be called "foreign policy restructuring".[4]

Historically, typical examples of foreign policy restructuring include the famous "renversement d'alliance" of 1756, the reversal of its policy of non-involvement in

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[4] Another similar definition was given by Thomas Volgy and John Schwarz (1994. 25). They defined foreign policy restructuring as "a major, comprehensive change in foreign policy orientation of a nation, over a relatively short period of time, as manifested through behavioral changes in a nation's interactions with other actors in international politics."

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European quarrels by the United States during World War I, and the Soviet Union's signature on the Non-Aggression Treaty with Hitler's Germany in 1939. While security considerations dominated calculations in all these early examples of foreign policy restructuring, the examples of post-World War II foreign policy restructuring, according to Holsti, are much more complex. Although military and security issues are still crucial determinants, many examples of postwar foreign policy restructuring have multiple causes, such as the social consequences of modernization, economic dependence, ideological conflicts, xenophobia, neo-colonialism and nationalism.

Hermann (1990) further clarifies and illustrates the definition of foreign policy change. He maintains that there are four graduated levels of change: adjustment change, program change, goal change and international orientation change.[5] These four changes are illustrated by US policy toward Vietnam at different times. The increase in US military assistance to South Vietnam during the early 1960s can be seen as an example of adjustment change. The introduction of US

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[5] Adjustment changes are changes of effort or scope, but not of means and ends. Program changes are changes of the means but not the ends. Goal changes refer to the changes of ends. International orientation changes involve basic shifts in the actor's international role and activities.

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combat forces in 1965 can be defined as a program change. Goal change took place when the US decided to accept the outcome of the South Vietnam's defeat. Finally the international orientation change occurred when the US backed away from using large-scale force in conducting its foreign policy after the Vietnam War.

Major foreign policy redirection involves only the last three forms of change: change in means, in ends or in overall orientation. Among these three changes, international orientation change is the most extreme one involving "dramatic changes in both words and deeds in multiple issue areas with respect to the actor's relationship with external entities. Typically, reorientation involves shifts in alignment with other nations or major changes of role within an alignment" (Hermann 1990, 6).

Regime and Foreign Policy Restructuring

Certain types of states or regimes may be more likely to experience foreign policy restructuring. One argument is based on the system level assumption which contends that states respond to changes in their international environment. Sensitivities to international changes, however, differ from state to state. Hegemonic states, due to their broad power, are less susceptible to external constraints, and thus are less responsive to international changes. In other words,

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powerful states can postpone adaptation; and the more powerful they are, the longer it can be postponed. By contrast, smaller states can not afford the delay and thus are more responsive to international changes (Skidmore 1994, 50).

Domestically, foreign policy restructuring occurs more easily in personalistic regimes where foreign policies are decided by a single leader or a small ruling coalition. In these authoritarian regimes foreign policies are formulated and implemented largely free from the interference of complex bureaucracies and other social forces. By contrast, democratic states are characterized by shared authority and lack of autonomy from social influences.[6] Thus, an authoritarian and personalistic state can more easily conduct a consistent, rational, and appropriate foreign policy restructuring to serve its national interests (Skidmore 1994, 52; Volgy and Schwarz 1994, 28-29).

Another variable related to foreign policy restructuring is economic development. Wealthy states are said to be more satisfied with the status quo and thus are less likely to initiate a fundamental reorientation in their foreign policy.

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[6] In the United States, even Henry Kissinger in his years serving as both presidential national security advisor and secretary of state often felt frustration in dealing with bureaucracies when he wanted to fundamentally restructure the course of US foreign policy.

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Poorer countries, on the contrary, receive little benefit from the international status quo and thus are more willing to take risks to fundamentally restructure their foreign policies. For examples, the three richest states in Western Europe restructured their foreign policies roughly twice every two decades, while nations in Latin America conducted foreign policy restructuring at least four times during the same period (Volgy and Schwarz 1994, 31).[7]

Sources of Foreign Policy Restructuring

As to causal factors, Holsti (1982, 14) identifies external, domestic, background historical and cultural variables as the major sources of foreign policy restructuring. Much attention seems to be paid by Holsti to non-military external threats such as economic dependency and cultural conflict. He argues that the progress of transportation and communication causes concerns in some nations that their societies might be absorbed or destroyed by an influx of cultural "pollution" through excessive contact with foreigners. "While a nationalist response to asymmetrical culture contacts is hardly new in history", Holsti points out,

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[7] It is noteworthy that scholars engaged in recent research on foreign policy restructuring still use the same independent variables proposed by James Rosenau three decades ago, when he maintained that states could be distinguished by their size, economics and politics.

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"the scope of external penetration today is multiplied greatly by technology... Communications--particularly when they go predominately in one direction--may create fear rather than mutual understanding" (1982, 202).[8]

Looking at the intervening variables in the causal path of foreign policy restructuring, Goldmann (1988) asks the question: what makes a nation more or less sensitive to pressure for foreign policy changes? Goldmann identifies leaders' ideas, domestic power composition and balance as important factors influencing a nation's foreign policy change.[9] To synthesize all the direct and indirect causes of change identified by both Holsti and Goldmann, Hermann (1990, 11-12) classifies all sources into four categories: leader

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[8] This argument was echoed by Samuel Huntington (1993) during the post-Cold War era. Huntington maintains that technology facilitates the interactions of different peoples, which in turn intensifies the awareness of civilization differences and thus the cultural conflict. These arguments seem to be confirmed by the behavior of the Chinese government during the early post-Cold War years, when the "anti-bourgeoisie liberalization" and "anti-peaceful evolution" campaigns were initiated.

[9] Goldmann's independent variable is foreign policy stabilizers, which determine whether an input from the sources of policy change will finally initiate a process of adaptation.

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driven, bureaucratic advocacy, domestic restructuring, and external shock.[10]

Some Consensus

Despite the diversity of causal explanations, a kind of scholarly consensus has been achieved among researchers of foreign policy restructuring in recent years, that is, multicausal explanations are necessary in studying foreign policy change. Through the review of both the developments of the level-of-analysis and the foreign policy restructuring theories, it seems that there is an increasing recognition of a complex interplay of international, governmental, societal and individual sources of foreign policy. Instead of emphasizing only one particular approach, multiple perspectives should be integrated to explore the multilevel sources and to determine what and how the combined factors

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[10] Leader driven change results from an effort made by a political decision maker. Leaders' learning process and reconceptualization are important in this kind of change. Bureaucratic advocacy refers to the situation in which a group within the government advocates redirection. Domestic restructuring means that a segment of a society whose support is crucial for the regime becomes an agent of change. External shock is produced by dramatic changes, initiatives and events in the external environment.

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influence the foreign policy restructuring (Hagan and Rosati 1994, 269-78; Rosati, Sampson and Hagan 1994, 18-19).[11]

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[11] As a matter of fact, researchers of foreign policy restructuring see their work as a new contribution to the level-of-analysis and agent-structure debates. They argue that their work has produced a "sharp clarity" about the fact that agents and structures are fundamentally intertwined entities.

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CHAPTER 3

SINOLOGY AND CHINESE FOREIGN POLICY RESTRUCTURING

A study of contemporary Chinese foreign policy cannot be properly conducted without first reviewing a broad discipline called Sinology. This discipline involves Chinese foreign policy analyses, China watchers' observations, historical studies and journalistic reports. Coinciding with the development of the three levels of analysis, the trend of Chinese foreign policy study in the West has also moved from macro to micro levels.

Sinology and Chinese Foreign Policy Study

During the 1960s, Western researchers could only study contemporary China at a distance, and the sources of information available for foreign sinologists were largely limited to the official Chinese press. As a result, research on Chinese foreign policy during this decade was dominated by three schools: the Western realist paradigm, Chinese cultural analysis, and Mao's communist ideology argument (Yu 1994, 236-239).

The realist paradigm assumes that Chinese political leaders, like their counterparts in the Western countries, are engaged in cost-benefit calculations based on a rational

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model. Thus, policies shift as fundamental changes in China's external environment occur. Even during the early years of the history of the People's Republic, according to this paradigm, Chinese leaders had frequently downplayed the importance of communist ideology to serve China's national interests. As a matter of fact, what had dominated Chinese leaders' minds and shaped Beijing's foreign policy since the middle 1950s was China's troubled relations with the Soviet Union, an ideologically fraternal state (Scalapino 1974, 352-353). For these scholars, China's foreign policy reflects the shift in the balance of power between the superpowers and the bipolar structure in the postwar years. Events such as US-Soviet détente, the Soviet occupation of Czechoslovakia and the Soviet advance in the third world are all important determinants of Chinese Foreign policy (Ross and Godwin 1993, 144).

The Chinese cultural analysis was adopted by the traditionalists who were mostly historians. These scholars argue that the understanding of China's past, especially its traditional relations with foreign countries, is the yardstick to explore current Chinese foreign policy. In other words, the foreign policy of the People's Republic of China can be basically explained by China's experience with the outside world, and be traced back to traditional Sino-centrism such as

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the "middle kingdom" syndrome. Thus, it is argued that the political leaders of the PRC are anxious to play a "world leadership" role. Like the Meiji leaders in 19th century Japan, Chinese leaders want to avenge China's past humiliations imposed by the Western powers. Their goal is to develop China into a "rich country-strong soldiery" so that China can be treated by the rest of the world on equal terms (Scalapino 1974, 349). Related to the traditional culture school is Mao's communist ideology argument. It is argued that Mao's thought was influenced by both Chinese traditional culture and modern Marxism. Thus, Mao's version of Marxism differed from orthodox Marxist-Leninist ideology. It is this unique Maoist approach that defines the pattern of Chinese foreign policy. This brand of foreign policy was characterized by concepts and tactics such as "people's war" and "united front" (Yu 1994, 237-238).

During the 1970s, influenced by the "cultural revolution" and Chinese domestic power struggle, Western scholars began to focus on the divisions within the Chinese leadership. Scholars in this school identified factionalism among Chinese decision makers as the major explanatory variable in foreign policy. They assumed that competing groups in domestic politics would differ in foreign policy as well. This fractionalist school during the 1970s promoted a view of China that was much more

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complex than that advocated by the unitary-actor approach during the preceding decade.

China's political changes in the post-Mao era and its policy of opening to the outside world made new sources of information available during the 1980s. For the first time social science methods, such as field research, were feasible in China. The possibility of gaining deeper understanding of the structures and operations of Chinese bureaucratic organizations gave rise to an institutional approach. Scholars of this school argue that Chinese foreign policy can not be understood without grasping the broad picture of Chinese foreign policy institutions and processes. Scholars of this school examine not only the top level elite, but also the middle-level and grass-roots institutions to untangle the web of Chinese foreign policy decisionmaking (Barnett 1985).

A major shortcoming of early research on Chinese foreign policy is its high level of generality. Influenced by the "behavioral revolution" in social science, later research moved in the direction of micro-level analysis. More "scientific approaches" such as content analysis, field research, and aggregate elite data collection are employed. More "hypotheses", "models" and "variables" have been proposed in the study of Chinese foreign policy. But these greater empirical efforts and theoretical sophistication, according to

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one top sinologist, are not achieved without cost. When China watchers are engaged in micro-level analysis, they often lose a comprehensive understanding of the broad patterns of foreign policy changes. Thus, attention has once again been paid to the external structural variables in the study of Chinese foreign policy after 1980, and since then the behavioral revolution of the 1970s has been challenged by a structural counterrevolution in China Studies (Harding 1993, 28).

Three Major Changes in Chinese Foreign Policy

Most Sinologists agree that China has experienced three fundamental foreign policy changes since the founding of the PRC in 1949 (Holsti 1982; Robinson 1982; Zhu 1989). During the 1960s, China suddenly abandoned its earlier pro-Soviet foreign policy and challenged both the United States and the Soviet Union simultaneously. The 1970s saw China moving toward reconciliation with the United States to oppose an increasingly aggressive Soviet Union. Since the early 1980s, China has pursued an "independent foreign policy" which emphasizes "equal distance" relations with the US and the former Soviet Union. These three foreign policy changes will be labeled later as "Sino-Soviet split", "Sino-American rapprochement" and "independent foreign policy" respectively, and be fully examined in this research.

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The Sino-Soviet relations during the 1950s was characterized as a political and strategic alliance. Beijing during this period adopted a "leaning to one side" pro-Soviet and anti-American foreign policy. This Sino-Soviet political honeymoon also witnessed close economic and cultural relations between the two states.

The source of the Sino-Soviet split is usually traced back to Khrushchev's speeches at the CPSU's 20th party congress in 1956.[1] In his speeches, Khrushchev challenged three hitherto basic tenets of orthodox communist doctrine. First, according to Lenin, peace between communist and capitalist states was merely the temporary situation of not being at war. The peaceful state would cease when the proper time for a revolutionary war arrived. Khrushchev challenged this Lininist principle by claiming that "peaceful co-existence" with capitalist states was not a consideration of expediency, but a cornerstone of Soviet foreign policy.[2]

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[1] The split certainly has root in even earlier years, which can be traced back to the Soviet stance in the Chinese civil war and Mao's troubled relations with Stalin.

[2] Khrushchev gave two reasons to support his revisionist policy: first, nuclear war would be unprecedently destructive; second, the world socialist camp became strong enough to prevent an imperialist war. It seems that

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Second, Lenin preached that capitalism could be overthrown and proletariat dictatorship established only through armed struggle, such as revolutionary or national liberation wars. Khrushchev challenged this theory by proposing a "peaceful transition" thesis. Since war was not inevitable under modern circumstances, the transition from capitalism to socialism should not be necessarily associated with civil war and violence. Instead, socialism could be better realized through a "parliamentary road". Neither of Khrushchev's new policies, however, were accepted by Chinese leaders. Mao and his associates saw Khrushchev's speeches as a betrayal of Lenin's teachings on wars and imperialism. Beijing was afraid that the peaceful foreign policy with the capitalist world would be pursued at the expense of cooperation among socialist countries and Soviet assistance to the revolutionary struggle of the oppressed nations (Low 1987, 15).

Third, before Khrushchev's "secret speech", Stalin was generally accepted as the great leader of the whole world socialist camp. In his speech, Khrushchev denounced Stalin for his personality cult and his treatment of the party and agriculture. Although Mao had had difficult relations with

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while the first reason reflected a real concern, the second was only rhetoric.

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Stalin for long time, he saw Khrushchev's attack on Stalin as a potential threat to communist regimes in general and his personal status at home in particular.[3]

After the 20th congress, Khrushchev tried to seek Beijing's acceptance of his new policies through both persuasion and coercion. When all these tactics failed, however, the Soviets took an unprecedented step to punish China by canceling a promised nuclear weapons program in 1959 and all other military and economic assistance to China in the summer of 1960. Khrushchev's punishment came at a moment when the Chinese economy was already damaged by the failure of the Great Leap Forward. The sudden withdrawal of Soviet scientists and specialists certainly struck an additional blow at China's already shaken industry and agriculture. It is conceivable that Chinese leaders were deeply upset by the plight caused by this economic dependency on the Soviet Union.

The following years saw Beijing and Moscow move further apart. The Sino-Indian border war of 1962, the Cuban Missile Crisis of the same year, and the 1963 treaty banning atmospheric nuclear weapons test all widened the Sino-Soviet

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[3] China's view on this issue was expressed in a well-known article of the *People's Daily*, "On the Historical Experience of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat", on April 5, 1956. Stalin was described in this article as a great man with minor weakness (Low 1987, 16).

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rift.[4] In January 1963, China for the first time attacked Khrushchev openly by name. Open polemics were taking place on both sides by February that year (Low 1987, 21; Quested 1984, 129).[5] Between December 15, 1962 and March 8, 1963, the *People's Daily* and *Red Flag*, both the most important official publications of the Chinese communist party, successively published seven major articles on the Sino-Soviet dispute. An explosive war of words had formally started in publications on both sides since then, and thus publicized the Sino-Soviet rift to the whole world.

The Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 and the subsequent Brezhnev doctrine in the same year were perceived by China as an alarming signal. According to the Brezhnev doctrine, the Soviet Union was entitled to militarily intervene in any other socialist country in the name of protecting the interest of whole "socialist community". The

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[4] The Soviet stance on the Sino-India border clash, for examples, was perceived by Beijing as a nasty neutrality, which virtually betrayed the fraternal relations among socialist states. Similarly, Soviet signature on the Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty was interpreted by China as an attempt to prevent China from developing its own nuclear weapons (Levine 1968).

[5] Both the Soviet Union and China attempted to veil their dispute from the eyes of outsiders before that. They used Albania and Yugoslavia as stalking horses for direct attacks on each other.

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thesis of "limited sovereignty" in the Brezhnev doctrine was sharply criticized by China.[6] Sino-Soviet relations further deteriorated as their dispute became militarized in the late 1960s. On March 2, 1969, the Sino-Soviet rift reached a climax in a large border clash on a disputed island in the Ussuri River. The heavy Soviet casualties led Moscow to later retaliate by attacking the Northwestern region of China. These bloody occurrences resulted in massive military deployments on both sides of their shared border.

Around the time when China and the Soviet Union were involved in the border conflict, Sino-American rapprochement began. China's overture to the United States first came in a late November 1968 Foreign Ministry spokesman's statement calling for renewed ambassadorial talks with the United States once the Nixon administration took power in 1969. Beijing's "Ping-Pong diplomacy" and the subsequent Henry Kissinger secret visit to China in 1971 initiated the official dialogue between Beijing and Washington.

The Sino-American détente culminated in President Nixon's visit to China on February 21, 1972 and then the signing of

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[6] China's first reaction came in Chou Enlai's speech at the Rumanian Embassy in Beijing, where Chou compared the Soviet invasion with Hitler's aggression against Czechoslovakia during World War II. China's denunciation of the Soviet Union had never taken such sharp and serious form.

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the joint Sino-American communiqué in Shanghai the same month. In the communiqué, guidelines were established to gradually decrease tension on the Taiwan issue and to develop trade and cultural contact between China and the US. Moreover, both China and the US expressed in the communiqué a common interest in opposing any state seeking to establish "hegemony" (a code word for the Soviet Union) in the Asia-Pacific region (Solomon 1981, 2). Nixon's visit to China was described as "a week that changed the world", and thus transformed the world power equilibrium in general and the Asian political landscape in particular.[7]

Six years later the formal process of normalizing Sino-American relations was completed. Hua Guofeng, then the Chinese communist Chairman, and American President Jimmy Carter announced on December 15, 1978 that the two countries would establish diplomatic relations on January 1, 1979. In mid-January 1979, Chinese paramount leader Deng Xiaoping visited Washington to celebrate the full normalization of Sino-American relations. During his stay in the US, Deng

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[7] It is said that a triangular relationship among the U.S., the Soviet and China was established since then. However, at least during the early and middle 1970s, the U.S. was the only power that enjoyed the pivotal position dealing with both the Soviet and China, while the latter two had a tense relationship with each other.

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repeatedly warned the West of the dangers of Soviet expansionism, and hinted that China would teach Vietnam, Moscow's ally, a "lesson" because of Hanoi's occupation of Cambodia, a PRC ally at the time.

China further developed its pro-West foreign policy by opposing Soviet expansionism in the next few years. When the Soviet invaded Afghanistan in January 1980 and thus stiffened Western resolve to combat Soviet expansion, Deng openly called for a united front of the US, Japan, Western Europe and China to oppose Soviet expansion. As a response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, military and security cooperation between China and the US was developed, and the Carter administration began to permit transfers of military hardware such as nonlethal technology and defense materials to China.

The Sino-Soviet rapprochement and Chinese "independent foreign policy" can be dated as far back as April 3, 1979, when Beijing informed Moscow of its decision not to renew the 1950 security treaty and simultaneously offered normalization talks. A few years later, in March 1982, Brezhnev made a speech at Tashkent, which was generally regarded as an important step in the process of Sino-Soviet détente. In the main portion of his speech, Brezhnev stressed that the Soviet Union had never regarded as normal the state of animosity and alienation between China and the USSR and there would never be

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any threat to China from the Soviet Union. After Brezhnev's speech, both the Soviet Union and China agreed in April to expand trade by 45% for the following year. In August 1982, a leading Chinese expert on Soviet affairs, Yu Hongliang, visited Moscow for the first time in many years (Su 1989, 110-111).

Given the new situation of Sino-Soviet rapprochement, at the 12th Chinese Communist Congress in 1982, Hu Yaobang, then the General Secretary of the Party, signaled China's interest in pursuing better relations with Moscow by proclaiming an "independent peaceful foreign policy". The new situation permitted China to adopt a foreign policy of equal distance between the US and the Soviet Union.

Despite the gradual improvement in relations between China and the Soviet Union, further Sino-Soviet normalization was impeded by the so-called "three obstacles".[8] In March 1985, Li Peng, then the Vice-Premier of China, went to Moscow to attend the funeral of Konstantin Chernenko. Meeting with

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[8] The removal of the "three obstacles" was insisted by Beijing as a precondition for normalizing Sino-Soviet relations. They included withdrawal of a substantial number of Soviet troops from the Sino-Soviet and Sino-Mongolian borders; termination of Soviet support for Vietnam's occupation of Cambodia; and withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan.

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the new Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev, Li expressed China's desire for major improvement in Sino-Soviet relations.

A significant breakthrough in Sino-Soviet relations occurred in July 1986 when Gorbachev delivered a landmark speech in Vladivostok that broke far more new ground than had Brezhnev's Tashkent speech. Gorbachev indicated that he would pull some Soviet troops from Afghanistan and Mongolia and wished to discuss the reduction of force levels along the Sino-Soviet border.[9] In October 1986, Igor Rogachev, Soviet deputy foreign minister and head of the Department of Far Eastern and Asian Affairs, arrived in Beijing and declared that he was ready to discuss any question of interest to both sides.

The improvement of Sino-Soviet relations accelerated when the Soviet Union reduced its military build-up on China's borders, and destroyed intermediate and short-range nuclear missiles (including SS-20s) in the Soviet Far East as a part of the December 1987 INF agreement. At the end of 1987, Deng Xiaoping publicly expressed his interest in having a Sino-Soviet summit with Gorbachev. Deng's suggestion elicited a

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[9] Specifically, Gorbachev made three concessions to China in his speech: withdrawal of six regiments from Afghanistan by the end of 1986; discussion of reduction of force levels along the Sino-Soviet border; withdrawal of some Soviet troops from Mongolia.

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swift and favorable response from Gorbachev. In spring 1988, the Soviets finally began to withdraw troops from Afghanistan following a UN-sponsored agreement (Su, 114-115). Sino-Soviet normalization was fully realized when Gorbachev paid a state visit to China in May 1989.

Why a Change is Restructuring

Conceptually, China should be classified as a regime in which foreign policy restructuring is more likely to occur. In most foreign policy restructuring literature, a state's responsiveness to the pressure for changes is associated with three variables: power status, economics and politics.[10] Although China has been considered as a fairly powerful state, especially in terms of its population and military strength, its overall power status is far from a hegemonic state that can manipulate world affairs and is largely free from external constraints. Rather, China is a middle power that is arguably more sensitive to changes in the external environment. Economically, China can hardly be seen as a rich country that is usually considered to be satisfied with the status quo. Politically, China is a typical personalistic state where the power of foreign policy decisionmaking is concentrated in a

[10] See theoretical review in Chapter Two.

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single leader or a few elite, and thus is said to be free from any interference by the public or other social groups.[11]

Now the question that should be addressed is whether the three changes in China are examples of foreign policy restructuring. That is, do those changes represent a fundamental and wholesale reorientation in China's foreign policy, being implemented in multiple dimensions and completed over a relatively short period of time?

Many researchers believe that the three major changes in Chinese foreign policy, namely "Sino-Soviet split", "Sino-American rapprochement", and "independent foreign policy", are indeed examples of foreign policy restructuring (Holsti 1982; Jian 1996; Robinson 1982). The Sino-Soviet split has long been regarded as a typical example of foreign policy restructuring. Its public revelation constituted a "diplomatic shock" to the rest of the world during the early 1960s. Within a few years, relations between the two communist giants had been completely restructured, from a relationship of the fraternal alliance to one of ideological enemy. The ideological dispute escalated

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[11] See Michael H. Hunt, 1996, The Genesis of Chinese Communist Foreign Policy (Chapter 7) London: Columbia University Press; K.J. Holsti, 1982, "Restructuring Foreign Policy: A Comparative Analysis," in Why Nations Realign: Foreign Policy Restructuring in the Postwar World, ed. K.J. Holsti, London: George Allen & Unwin.

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into an armed border clash in the next few years, and one (China) started to perceive the other (USSR) as the number one threat to its very survival.

The Sino-Soviet conflict was by no means confined to the political field. Actually, the conflict affected every aspect of relations between the two states. During the 1950s, almost all the major industrial projects in China were financially sponsored and technically supported by the Soviet Union. Some 10,800 Russian experts worked in China. Roughly 6,000-7,000 Chinese students received college or graduate education and another 38,000 obtained further training in Russia. By the end of 1960, China had received US $2,250 million in credits and aid from the Soviets. China maintained trade relations almost exclusively with the Soviet Union and its Eastern European bloc, and in 1960 over half of China's trade was with the Soviet Union (Quested 1984, 124-125). China also maintained close cultural and social relations with the USSR. Various delegations visited the Soviet Union and large numbers of books, periodicals and media materials were exchanged with Moscow.

During the 1960s, influenced by the political dispute between China and the Soviet Union, China's overall relations with the Soviet and Eastern European countries were dramatically changed (with the exception of Albania and

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Roumania). The number of economic and cultural treaties with the Soviet Union and Eastern European countries declined precipitously. Chinese students were no longer sent to the Soviet Union and Soviet books and periodicals stopped flowing into China. Soviet diplomats were restricted and Soviet delegations and tourists suddenly became unwelcome in China. As a symbol of the drastic shift in relations, the Sino-Soviet Friendship Society in China, an association with 100 million members in 1950s, was entirely shut down (Robinson 1982, 143-144).

Nixon's visit to China and finally the Sino-American normalization were also accompanied by a fundamental change in overall relations between China and the West. The late 1970s saw China completing this shift of alignment. Now Washington claimed that a "secure and strong" China was in the interest of the United States, and China repeatedly called to establish a "united front" against the Soviet Union.[12] Beijing and

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[12] The U.S. policy toward China was best reflected in Vice President Mondale's speech deliverd at Beijing University, where he said that "any nation which seeks to weaken or isolate China in world affairs assumes a stance counter to American interests" (Solomon 1981, 3). China's effort to create a "united front" was reflected in its insistence on including an anti-hegemony clause in the normalization statement whenever it established diplomatic relations with a Western country in 1970s.

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Washington began to coordinate their policies on a variety of international issues, such as military conflicts in Indochina and Afghanistan. The US exported military technology to China, and China agreed to establish a joint intelligence surveillance facility in Western China to monitor Soviet missile tests.

Sino-American strategic relations also spilled over to other fields. Economic exchanges between China and the US, which hardly existed a decade earlier, had reached nearly $5 billion a year by 1980. While 60,000 Americans visited China in 1980, Chinese students and scholars in the early 1980s were sent to American universities and research institutions for the first time since the founding of the PRC. Joint agreements on research in science, technology and culture were signed between China and the US and other Western countries (Solomon 1981, 3). Another telling indicator of the change was the frequency of official visits to the US by Chinese leaders. The number of official delegations from China increased so rapidly that by 1980 the US State Department gave up the effort to even count them (Robinson 1982, 153-154).

Similarly, the "independent foreign policy" also affected overall Chinese foreign relations. First, China restructured its strategic relations with the two superpowers by moving away from its pro-US. and anti-Soviet position to an "equal

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distance" one. By declaring that it would not ally with any states or group of states, China actually abandoned its former de facto alliance with the West in confrontation with the Soviet Union. Second, China started to de-emphasize its anti-Soviet stance in its relations with third states, and thus dramatically improved relations between China and Eastern European countries. By the same token, China also reduced its emphasis on relations with the West and started to cultivate good relations with various countries, especially relations with countries on China's periphery. Third, economic issues started to assume importance in China's foreign policy. China declared that the top priority of its foreign policy would be given to the creation of a peaceful international environment favorable to its economic development. In other words, the primary goal of China's foreign policy now is to serve the interests of the "four modernizations" program.[13] For the first time since the founding of the PRC, China's strategy-centered and outside-in driven foreign policy has been

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[13] The four modernizations program was first proposed by Chou Enlai in 1974, which referred to an effort to modernize Chinese industry, agriculture, science-technology, and the military by the year of 2000. This ambitious goal was revised by Deng Xiaoping during the early 1980s, when he defined the goal as US $800 GNP per capita.

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replaced by an economy-centered and inside-out driven one (Hu 1995).

Clearly, the three major changes in China are typical examples of foreign policy restructuring. First, they all fundamentally altered China's foreign relations and were all accompanied with shifts of alignment. Second, they all affected China's overall relations with a large number of states. In other words, the three changes all significantly influenced China's political, strategic, economic and cultural relations with either the whole Western world or the whole Eastern bloc. Finally, all three changes were completed in a reasonably short period of time.

What are the determinants of these fundamental changes in Chinese foreign policy? As both the development of foreign policy theory (reviewed in Chapter Two) and the history of foreign policy sinology suggest, there is a complex interplay of international, governmental, ideological and individual sources of foreign policy. To identify sources of a state's foreign policy restructuring, researchers should integrate multiple perspectives to determine how the combined factors influence the final output. With these theoretical guidelines in mind, the next three chapters will use "Sino-Soviet split", "Sino-American rapprochement" and "independent foreign policy"

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as three case studies to identify the sources of Chinese foreign policy restructuring.

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CHAPTER 4

CASE ONE: SINO-SOVIET SPLIT

The People's Republic of China was founded on October 1, 1949. This newborn Republic was quickly recognized by the Soviet Union and its Eastern European satellites. At the eve of the establishment of the People's Republic, Mao Zedong declared that the top foreign policy goal of the new China was to develop good relations with the Soviet Union, the socialist "elder brother". Mao's declaration was widely regarded as the beginning of China's "leaning-to-one-side" foreign policy during the 1950s.[1]

To exemplify the "leaning-to-one-side" policy, Mao personally led an official delegation to visit Moscow in December 1949, immediately following the founding of the PRC.

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[1] This policy was first propound by Mao in the famous article "On the people's democratic dictatorship", where he wrote: "The forty years' experience of Sun Yat-sen and the twenty-eight years' experience of the communist party have taught us to lean to one side, and we are firmly convinced that in order to win victory and consolidate it we must lean to one side. In the light of the experiences accumulated in these forty years and these twenty-eight years, all Chinese without exception must lean either to the side of imperialism or to the side of socialism" (Nakajima 1987, 264).

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This was the first time that Mao had ever made a trip abroad.[2] In February 1950, as a result of Mao's historical trip, China and the Soviet Union signed a "Treaty of Friendship, Alliance, and Mutual Assistance". Article one of the treaty stated that in case of "aggression and violation of the peace on the part of Japan or any other states which should unite with Japan, directly or indirectly, in acts of aggression", China and the Soviet Union would provide assistance to each other with all the means at their disposal (Levine 1968, 35). This statement, unmistakably, was aimed against the US.

Beside the political and military treaty, a number of economic agreements were also signed between China and the Soviet Union. Based on these agreements, China initiated an economic development program on the Soviet model. The period

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[2] Mao was unhappy about this trip. He had difficult negotiations with Stalin that kept him in Moscow for two months. When he recalled the Sino-Soviet summit later, Mao said: "Our opinions differed from Stalin's. We wanted to sign a Sino-Soviet Treaty but he wouldn't. We wanted the Chinese Changchun Railway but he wouldn't return it. However, one can pull the meat out of the tiger's mouth after all" (Nakajima 1987, 269). Finally, China did obtain some concessions from the Soviet Union in Moscow, which included the return of the Changchun Railway to China and the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Port Arthur by the end of 1952.

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of the early 1950s was marked by an enormous increase in cultural, economic and technical exchanges between Moscow and Beijing. This close relationship was reinforced by an agreement signed by Khrushchev, Stalin's successor, in 1954. The new agreement provided China with further Soviet credit, construction of railroads as well as greater exchange of scientific information and technical personnel (Low 1976, 60).

Despite the seemingly solid foundation of the alliance, the close relationship between China and the Soviet Union proved much shorter than the thirty-year long "treaty" anticipated. Within a few years during the early 1960s, the Sino-Soviet alliance irreversibly declined and finally collapsed. Given this surprising development and the impact that the demise of the alliance had on the world power equilibrium, the cause of the Sino-Soviet split for decades had been a popular topic puzzling students of Chinese foreign policy.

Causal Factor I: The Soviet-US Détente

From the realist national security perspective, the Sino-Soviet split during the 1960s was influenced by Soviet activities on the Chinese periphery, Moscow's reluctance to support China as a loyal ally, and, worst of all, an unexpected US-Soviet détente, which was perceived by Beijing

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as a serious challenge to its national interest, despite the apparent ideological affinity between China and the Soviet Union.

After Stalin's death, Stalin's successor Khrushchev introduced significant changes in Soviet foreign policy. Encouraged by the growing power of the Soviet Union, Khrushchev began to pursue a more aggressive foreign policy in the third world to advance Soviet influence. Stalin had paid relatively little attention to the rising independent states in the developing world. For him, all non-communists were anathema anyway. But Khrushchev was determined to conduct a more flexible policy there, trying to use political influence acquired by economic and military aid to bring radical, albeit non-communist, leaders like Nasser, Sukarno, and Nehru over to his side. By the middle 1950s, however, China was also beginning to move into the same Third World by political and economic means. As a matter of fact, at the Bandung conference in 1955, Zhou Enlai scored a great success for China by his subtle diplomacy and moderation. Khrushchev was not willing to give these Third World countries to the Chinese as a sphere of influence. As a result, India, the largest developing state except for China, bordering on both the Soviet Union and China and trying to keep good relations with them both, became the

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most important area of Sino-Soviet geopolitical conflict in Asia (Griffith 1971).

Another major factor that contributed to the Sino-Soviet split was Moscow's reluctance to wholeheartedly support Beijing in its dispute with other nations. During the late 1950s, China desperately needed the Soviet Union to balance the US military presence in East Asia. The USSR, however, acted very cautiously to avoid a direct confrontation with the US over such issues as the Taiwan Strait Crisis. In fact, Moscow's refusal to give Beijing vigorous support was the primary reason for China's abandoning its attempt at "liberating Taiwan" during 1958 (Low 1976, 89). Thus, China felt betrayed by the USSR and suspected that the Soviets were no longer a loyal ally.

The most crucial reason for the Sino-Soviet rift, however, was Khrushchev's effort to establish a cooperative relationship with the US, particularly with respect to nuclear arms. During the late 1950s, there was increasing strategic association between the USSR and the US at a time when the United States was still pursuing a hard line against China. China's overtures towards the United States had come to naught. The United States had unilaterally downgraded the ambassadorial talks with China at Geneva. On June 28, 1957,

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Dulles, then the American Secretary of State, delivered an important speech on US foreign policy toward China in San Francisco, in which he declared that the US government would do whatever it could to contribute to the passing of the communist regime in China (Yahuda 1983, 33).

It was against this background that the Soviet Union began to seek détente with the US. On September 15, 1959, Khrushchev arrived in New York to start his visit to the United States. His journey was climaxed by three days of secret talks with President Eisenhower at Camp David. The Soviet press described Khrushchev's visit as opening up "wonderful opportunities" in the relationship between the USSR and the US, and ensuring "peaceful coexistence" between the two states.

Immediately following his visit to the US, Khrushchev flew to Beijing to brief the Chinese leaders about his talk with Eisenhower. During his visit to Beijing, Khrushchev repeatedly emphasized the importance of peaceful co-existence, his confidence in President Eisenhower, and the optimistic prospect of a rapprochement between the Soviet Union the United States. He also asserted a Soviet interest in ensuring peace throughout the world and achieving a complete and universal disarmament agreement with the West. Because of

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China's cold attitude toward this meeting, there was even no joint communiqué issued. Moreover, on October 4, 1959, the very day when Khrushchev finished his visit and departed from Beijing, the Chinese Foreign Minister publicly called upon peoples all over the world to engage in "an unrelenting fight against United States imperialism" (Low 1976, 104).

On January 14, 1960, Khrushchev made another major speech in which he announced an imminent cut of one-third in the Soviet Union's ground forces, and reiterated his interest in "general and complete disarmament" (Hinton 1966, 136). If Khrushchev's early declaration of "peaceful coexistence" with the West might be interpreted as a tactical policy, he, nevertheless, seemed to offer substantial concessions to the capitalist camp in this speech. Later developments between the USSR and the US on issues such as the Cuban Missile Crisis and the subsequent signing of the Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty all further suggested that Khrushchev was definitely pursuing détente policy with the US.

The week-long confrontation of the Cuban Missile Crisis occurred in October 1962. One month before the crisis the Soviets began to deploy medium-range guided missiles in Cuba, which was soon discovered by US photographic reconnaissance in mid-October. On October 22 President Kennedy ordered a

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"quarantine" of all offensive weapons entering Cuba. Under US military pressure, Khrushchev retreated. The Soviet ships reversed course en route and turned away from Cuba. Finally, when it became increasingly clear that the United States might invade Cuba to remove the Soviet missiles, Khrushchev agreed to withdraw all missiles in return for a US promise not to invade Cuba.

The Cuban Missile Crisis initially decreased the Sino-Soviet dispute. China even issued a government statement pledging support for the Soviet action. But after Khrushchev's pull back, the Chinese and Soviet ideological and propaganda conflict once again sharpened: with Moscow emphasizing the necessity of avoiding a nuclear war and Beijing insisting on the inherent aggressiveness of US imperialism and the priority of revolutionary struggle over fear of war. China accused the Soviet Union of "adventurism" for deploying missiles in Cuba in the first place and "capitulationism" for later withdrawing them under US pressure (Whiting 1987, 521). Thus, while Khrushchev might have increased his reputation in the Soviet Union and both Eastern and Western European countries for his compromise, his retreat in the Cuban Crisis in China's eyes only confirmed what China had been warning for years, that is,

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Khrushchev's capitulationism toward the West at the expense of the interests of revolutionary peoples all over the world.

The Cuban Crisis, nevertheless, became a major watershed in Soviet foreign policy. By the mid-1963, Khrushchev had determined to sign a partial nuclear test ban treaty with the West as a part of his general effort to ease East-West tension. The Cuban Missile Crisis and the consequent fear of a nuclear collision thus led both the United States and the Soviet Union to share a common interest in improving their bilateral relations in the area of nuclear arms control. The signing of the Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty in the summer of 1963 began a new era in Soviet-American relations in which talks of limiting nuclear weapons and arms control became important elements.[3] However, this Soviet-American détente effectively shattered the alliance between China and the Soviet Union. Beijing believed that the Test Ban Treaty was an act of American-Soviet collusion to monopolize nuclear weapons and

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[3] In fact, there was a double-negotiation taking place in Moscow in July 1963. One was a Sino-Soviet negotiation concerning the ideological dispute between the two states. The other was the Soviet negotiation with Britain and the US over the test ban treaty and proliferation of nuclear weapons. The former negotiation finished with an indefinite adjournment while the latter generated a successful conclusion.

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prevent China from developing its own. Therefore, China regarded Khrushchev's signature on the Test Ban Treaty as a betrayal of the spirit of the Sino-Soviet alliance, and thereafter China saw both the US and the Soviet Union as equally dangerous to its national interest.[4]

Causal Factor II: Ideological Dispute

Another major reason for the Sino-Soviet split was the ideological dispute taking place during the late 1950s and the early 1960s between the Chinese and Soviet parties. The Sino-Soviet alliance during the early years was influenced by a common ideology and bound together by a shared goal to realize world communism. Following Zagoria (1962, 8), China and the Soviet Union belonged to "the same church, whose Bible is the Communist Manifesto and whose holy books include the works of Marx, Engels, Lenin, Stalin and Mao". Both China and the Soviet Union saw the world from a perspective different from

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[4] China's feeling towards the treaty was demonstrated in a *People's Daily* editorial, which stated: "It is most obvious that the triparties is aimed at tying hands. The US representatives to the Moscow talks has said publicly that the United States, Britain and the Soviet Union were able to arrive at an agreement, because they could work together to prevent China getting a nuclear capability. This is a US-Soviet alliance against China pure and simple" (Yahuda 1983, 34).

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the non-communist world. They viewed reality through a shared prism of class struggle, imperialist oppression, capitalist crisis, national liberation, just and unjust wars, and the inevitable triumph of communism throughout the world.[5]

As for foreign policy, the shared ideology is based on Marxism-Leninism which put heavy emphasis on Lenin's theory of imperialism and the inevitability of war. According to this theory, war is the product of the system of exploitation of man by man, and as long as imperialism exists there will be wars of aggression. The major theses of this revolutionary ideology include the following: the world is divided into two hostile camps that reflect the reality of class struggle in contemporary society; the socialist camp is engaged in a world-wide struggle against imperialism that will eventually

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[5] The shared belief was best demonstrated by the eight "general laws" articulated in the 1957 Communist Parties' Declaration. These eight "laws" are: first, proletarian revolution resulting in the establishment of dictatorship of proletariat; second, an alliance between workers and peasants; third, an abolition of capitalist ownership; fourth, a planned development of socialist economy; fifth, a socialist revolution in the field of culture and ideology; sixth, elimination of national oppression; seventh, a defense of the achievements of socialism; eighth, proletarian internationalism (Zagoria 1962).

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lead to the victory of socialism; relations between socialist states are based on a common Marxist identity rather than temporary interests; socialist states can form coalitions with non-socialist states on the basis of shared opposition to imperialism.

The Sino-Soviet split to some extent can be attributed to an ideological dispute that was provoked by Khrushchev's speeches at the CPSU's Twentieth Congress in 1956.[6] In the congress, Khrushchev launched a two-pronged program, the policy of so-called de-Stalinization and peaceful coexistence. Both policies had significant domestic and foreign implications. They had the effect of a bombshell in the Soviet Union, shocked the communist world to its foundation, and also influenced adversely Sino-Soviet relations.

The policy of de-Stalinization refers to Khrushchev's secret speech in the twentieth congress, where he denounced Stalin for his cult of personality and his crimes against members of the Party. Before Khrushchev's speech, Stalin was a larger-than-life figure in the international communist

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[6] According to one sociometric study, ideological dispute became increasingly salient in Sino-Soviet relations after 1956. While 7.7% of the overall disagreement between the two states involved ideological issues before 1956, the percentage increased to 62% after 1956 (Toma 1968).

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movement who commanded adulation. In the CPSU congress, however, Khrushchev suddenly denied Stalin's positive role without any previous consultation with the other communist parties. At the beginning of the CPSU congress, Zhou Enlai, the Chinese delegate to the congress, still mentioned Stalin favorably by saying that the CPSU was "created by Lenin and reared by Stalin and his close comrades-in-arms" (Low 1976, 72). Ten days later, however, the man who "reared" the CPSU was ruthlessly denounced by the General Secretary of the CPSU.[7]

After Khrushchev's speech, a de-Stalinization movement was launched in the Soviet Union. *Pravda* publicly attacked the cult of the individual and Stalin's error in encouraging it. Chinese leaders disagreed with the Soviets on this issue. The Chinese view was expressed in a *People's Daily* article "On the Historical Experience of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat". The author of the article, while admitting that Stalin did exaggerate his own role and imposed his individual authority over the collective leadership, insisted that revolutionary

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[7] The Chinese leaders either did not know the impending de-Stalinization, or tried to make a last-minute effort to impede Khrushchev's denunciation of Stalin.

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leaders played a major role in history and praised Stalin as an outstanding Marxist-Leninist fighter (Low 1976).

The Chinese effort to counterbalance or limit de-Stalinization had two purposes. First, Beijing anticipated that Khrushchev's attack on Stalin would open a Pandora's box and create general doubt about the legitimacy of the communist system. Thus, Beijing wanted to limit the attack on Stalin so that it could not be expanded into a general critique of socialism. Second, Khrushchev's attack on Stalin had an anti-Maoist implication. It went directly against the glorification and deification of Mao in China and thus could not be tolerated by Mao and his associates [8]

More important, in the case of "foreign policy", was Khrushchev's articulation at the same Congress of three new axioms: "peaceful coexistence", "peaceful transition" and the possibility of avoiding war with the West. According to Khrushchev, war between socialist and imperialist states was not inevitable, and peaceful coexistence between socialism and

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[8] The Soviets actually accused Mao of his cult of personality. They said that Mao's works had been published in more than 380 million copies in China while no Chinese really read the works of Marx and Engels. Chinese were told to keep Mao's works in three places: at home, in the pocket and at one's place of work (Low 1976, 74).

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capitalism should be a fundamental principle and enduring condition rather than a tactical expedient. Khrushchev rejected the Marxist-Leninist dogma that wars were inevitable as long as capitalism survived. Since war could be avoided, the transition from world capitalism to communism could also be realized through a peaceful rather than violent process.

These views, later labeled as Khrushchevism, were regarded by Chinese leaders as a betrayal of the revolutionary spirit of Marxism-Leninism and sharply criticized by Beijing. China claimed that Khrushchev's speech actually questioned the continued validity of Lenin's correct teaching on imperialism and on war and peace. In the Chinese view, Khrushchev distorted Lenin's correct principle of peaceful co-existence between countries with different systems. China asserted that Leninists should treat peace between socialist and capitalist states as a temporary situation. The peaceful state should cease when the proper time for a revolutionary war came. Beijing was also concerned that Khrushchev's pursuit of a peaceful foreign policy with the capitalist world would be at the expense of mutual assistance among socialist countries as well as assistance to the revolutionary struggle of the oppressed nations. Thus, Chinese government, under Mao's leadership, insisted that the foreign policies of all

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communist states should be guided by orthodox Marxist ideology rather than the revisionist Khrushchevism (Levine 1968; Zagoria 1962).

Causal Factor III: Different Estimations of General War

The Sino-Soviet ideological dispute during the 1950s seemed to focus on issues such as the nature of the present era, the nature of "imperialism", the nature of "war and peace", and the implications of nuclear weapons. But the underlying reason for the Sino-Soviet ideological divergence was deeply rooted in their different estimations of the possibility of the breakout of a general war. The different reactions of China and the Soviet Union to one event is particularly telling here.

On October 4, 1957, the Soviet Union launched the first artificial satellite, Sputnik, into orbit. This scientific achievement in space symbolized the Soviet ability to match that of the US in the field of strategic nuclear weapons. To some the launch of Sputnik even created a "missile gap" that was in favor of the Soviet Union. Recognizing that the successful launch was more a symbolic achievement, Soviet propaganda was relatively moderate. By contrast, Mao interpreted this event as a symbol that demonstrated "the East Wind prevailing over the West Wind", and insisted that Moscow

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take psychological advantage of Sputnik to act more aggressively against the US "paper tiger" (Whiting 1987, 482).

Thus, while Moscow, through the development of its own nuclear and space technologies, recognized the serious consequences of a general war, and subsequently insisted the necessity and possibility of avoiding it, China wanted Soviet military achievements to serve the goal of world revolutionary struggle. Beijing believed that the Soviet breakthrough in military technology imposed inhibitions on the conduct of the imperialist world, and, at the same time, created opportunities for the socialist commonwealth to adopt a more assertive policy. In addition to the task of defending communist interests in Europe and Far East, the new Soviet military build-up, in the Chinese view, should support the national liberation movement throughout the world. In other words, China believed that the socialist bloc should take advantage of the favorable situation of the late 1950s to pursue a policy of "brinkmanship" in selected areas under the cover of the Soviet nuclear shield.[9]

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[9] The different views were also demonstrated in the Moscow Conference of Communist Parties, where Khrushchev's assumption that "the forces of peace have so grown that there is a real possibility of averting wars" was

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Now the question is why should China be more assertive than the Soviet Union during the late 1950s? This is the place where the factor of socioeconomic development comes into play. It should be remembered that during the late 1950s China was still a predominantly agricultural state. Its limited military capability constrained it as a regional power with little diplomatic maneuverability. Thus, as a dissatisfied power for whom "revolution" was the only available weapon, China found it difficult to conceive the possibility of eliminating war from the life of mankind when the US "imperialism" was still deployed around its immediate periphery, especially when Taiwan, a Chinese territory, was still occupied by the Nationalists under US protection.

By contrast, the Soviet Union by the late 1950s had developed into a industrialized state and had become a major nuclear power. It was far less vulnerable to military or economic pressure from the West. The Soviet Union, compared to China, was a satisfied power with no territorial claims such as Taiwan. With the control of a large and stable buffer zone in Eastern Europe, the superpower status of the Soviet Union

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challenged by Mao's warning that "so long as imperialism exists there will always be soil for aggressive wars" (Whiting 1987).

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was generally accepted by the world community. Thus, the USSR was more likely to see its conflict with the US as a peaceful competition between two equal contenders.

According to one analysis, the Sino-Soviet divergence actually did not focus on the possibility of avoiding wars, but on the likelihood of general war caused by a local war through the process of escalation. China held that as long as "imperialism" existed, local (not general) war was inevitable. But, in the Chinese view, local war was less likely to escalate into general war as the Soviets believed. This Sino-Soviet divergence was caused by a "differential threshold" in favor of China vis-à-vis the Soviet Union during the late 1950s. Quite ironically, this "differential threshold" was created because of China's relative backwardness in terms of socioeconomic development as well as military strength (Hinton 1966, 160-163).

Since the Soviet Union was a major nuclear power and the main competitor of the US, the strategic striking power of the US was overwhelmingly targeted on the USSR. Given the US preoccupation with the Soviet Union, China during the late 1950s could challenge the US with relatively low risk. Thus, the concept of "differential threshold" referred to the fact that, while dealing with the US, there were things that China

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could undertake but the Soviet Union could not duplicate safely. For example, China could shell Quemoy in 1958 without US nuclear retaliation. But if the Soviet Union would take a similar action, the danger of a general war would be much greater.

This "differential threshold" was certainly a result of the US conviction that a major war against China could either provoke Soviet retaliation or leave Moscow free to advance elsewhere. Thus, a major war against China would be a wrong war, a war at the wrong place, at the wrong time, and with the wrong enemy. Obviously this was a conflict that the US desperately wanted to avoid given the lesson it received from the Korea War. Thus, it was the "differential threshold" that produced the divergent Sino-Soviet views on the nature of "imperialism", "war and peace", and especially on the possibility of the general war. It was quite natural that, from the different positions, Khrushchev should see the US as subjectively less aggressive but objectively more dangerous, while Mao saw the US as subjectively more aggressive but objectively less dangerous.

To teach Khrushchev a lesson about how to deal with US imperialism, China once again raised the call for liberation

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of Taiwan in 1958.[10] Alarmed at the unexpected situation in the Taiwan Straits, Khrushchev flew to Beijing for discussions with the Chinese leaders. Apparently having difficulty in solving their disagreement, the final Sino-Soviet communiqué said nothing about the Taiwan issue. A few days after Khrushchev's departure, however, the *People's Daily* published an editorial entitled "Only Through Resolute Struggle May Peace Be Defended".[11] To practice the "resolute struggle", on

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[10] The international context of the Taiwan Straits issue involved a crisis taking place in the Middle East a month before, where Khrushchev failed to live up to China's hard-line against "Western imperialism". China was particularly unhappy with Khrushchev's agreement to solve the Middle East crisis within the framework of the Security Council of the United Nations, where Taiwan rather than the PRC could participate (Hinton 1972, 90).

[11] To support Mao's view of countering Western "brinkmanship", the editorial said: "Some soft-hearted advocates of peace even naively believe that in order to relax tension at all costs the enemy must not be provoked. They dared not denounce the war provokers, they are unwilling to trace the responsibility of war and danger and to differentiate between right and wrong on the issue of war and peace. Some groundlessly conclude that peace can be gained only when there is no armed resistance against the attacks of the imperialists and colonialists and when there is no bitter struggle against them" (Zagoria 1962, 204).

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August 23, 1958, China began the shelling of Quemoy and thus started the Taiwan Straits Crisis.

Immediately following the crisis, in October 1958, China republished Mao's earlier writing "Imperialists and All Reactionaries are Paper Tigers". In the article, Mao repeatedly warned those people who failed to correctly assess the forces of revolution and the forces of reaction, and who stood in awe of imperialism and overestimated the strength of the enemy. At the core of the article was Mao's underemphasis of the possibility of an all-out war, and his belief of the feasibility of a more assertive policy against the West (Zagoria 1962, 217-221). Chinese propaganda both before and after the Taiwan Straits Crisis seemed to confirm the following suggestion, that is, by challenging the US-Taiwan alliance, China wanted to teach Khrushchev a lesson that "imperialism" was not as dangerous as he thought.

Causal Factor IV: The Great Leap Forward

One crucial issue that provoked the Sino-Soviet dispute in the late 1950s was China's initiative of the Great Leap Forward. This unprecedented domestic policy in China was not only unwelcomed in the Soviet Union, but was perceived by Moscow as a serious challenge to its leadership in the world communist movement.

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The Great Leap Forward was initiated by the Chinese leaders to mobilize the whole country for rapid modernization. The term "Great Leap Forward" was first coined by Liu Shaoqi in a speech delivered on November 6, 1957. In his speech on the first five-year economic plan, Liu described two ways of economic development: one was a quicker and better way, the other was slower and inefficient. Liu declared that the Central Committee of the party had decided to adopt the quicker alternative and reject the slow way of development (Levine 1968, 82).

Choosing the quicker and better way, the Chinese leaders plunged China into a bizarre and utopian scheme of economic development. The Great Leap Forward employed the "Three Red Banners" as a way of construction of socialism. The "Three Red Banners" involved rapid industrial development in cities, the creation of People's Commune in the rural area, and the "everyone a soldier" movement in the whole country. Driven by a combination of revolutionary ardor and national pride, the Chinese leadership under Mao assumed that the PRC could overcome all obstacles on the road of economic development and social progress by political mobilization and the ideological zeal of the millions of its people.

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Encouraged by the initially positive response from the local officials and public, an enlarged session of the Politburo of the Chinese communist party passed a resolution concerning the establishment of the People's Communes on August 29, 1958. The resolution announced that the People's Communes were basic social units of communist society, which would "accelerate socialist construction, complete the building of socialism ahead of time, and carry out the gradual transition to communism... It seems that the attainment of communism in China is no longer a remote future event. We should actively use the form of the people's communes to explore the practical road to transition to communism" (Zagoria 1962, 97). At one time it seemed the Chinese leaders were obsessed with the ideas of the Great Leap Forward and People's Communes. *People's Daily* declared that China was marching forward so fast that even eighty and ninety-year-old people would live to see the advent of communism. One Chinese leader was reported to have predicted that in about three years Chinese people would live a happy life, disposing of an abundance of food and clothing (Floyd 1963, 63).

The absurdity of the Great Leap Forward was exemplified by the free supply system in the rural places and the attempt to make steel in thousands of primitive, "back-yard" furnaces

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in cities.[12] The economic consequences of these follies were certainly disastrous. The Soviet Union first gave the Great Leap Forward scant attention. Soon, however, they steadily mounted their criticism. In the Soviet view, the excessive Chinese production goals were not supported by sound economic calculations. Khrushchev accused China of attempting to skip the stage of building socialism and denounced the Chinese model of equalitarian communism.[13] Thus, while the Great Leap Forward was hailed in China as not only a major event in Chinese history but a creation with world significance, it evoked open criticism from the Soviet Union. The Soviet denunciation, in turn, raised Chinese objection to Soviet interference in China's internal affairs and the public humiliation from an ally (Whiting 1987, 484-501).

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[12] Everything should be shared equally and everyone should give his or her labor freely in Communes. The members of the Communes worked together on the collectively owned land and had free meals in a public dining hall. In 1958, about 500 million Chinese peasants were reorganized into the Communes, a system based on the principle of "to each according to your need".

[13] As early as 1958, Khrushchev was reported to have told US Senator Humphrey that the Chinese Communes were "old-fashioned" and "reactionary" (Floyd 1963, 64).

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Why did the Chinese leadership adopt such an economically irrational policy, and why should Chinese domestic policy affect Sino-Soviet relations and contribute to the friction in their alliance? With the advantage of hindsight, it is clear that the Great Leap Forward was a logical choice by the Chinese leadership after the failure of the Hundred Flowers and subsequent Anti-Rightist campaigns in 1957.[14] The political differences that surfaced in the two campaigns convinced the CCP that a new energetic campaign to educate the population in the verities of Marxism and the righteousness of the rule of the communist party was necessary and urgent (Mu 1962). The Great Leap Forward was such a campaign that attempted to reconfirm the political legitimacy of the CCP by economic miracle.[15]

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[14] Initially the Hundred Flowers campaign was to encourage Chinese intellectuals to express themselves and expose the problems of the party bureaucracy. But soon the CCP found that the party could not control the momentum of free expression and that the criticism of the bureaucracy went beyond criticism of individual officials to criticism of the political system itself. These unexpected consequences forced the CCP to stop the Hundred Flowers campaign by launching an "Anti-Rightist" counterattack (Goldman 1987).

[15] The economic consequence of this new campaign was certainly a great leap backward rather than forward. But a more far-reaching political consequence

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The Great Leap Forward inevitably exacerbated the Sino-Soviet dispute. First, during the Great Leap Forward movement, the Chinese leaders virtually declared that they were not merely leaping forward in industry and agriculture, but were leaping forward in social and political development: they were leaping into communism by a short-cut! This claim was a serious challenge to Soviet primacy in the communist camp. If China could turn a backward society devastated by war into a communist paradise in less than ten years, then how could the Soviets, with all their industrial development in the past forty years, justify their slowness on the same journey to communism? Thus, the Great Leap Forward impaled the Soviets on a painful dilemma: the Great Leap Forward would be a threat to Soviet authority and prestige in the communist world if it succeeded, and it would be a danger to the world communist cause if it failed. Second, the spirit of the Great Leap Forward also spilled over into Chinese foreign policy. The belief that China could overcome any obstacle by sheer will power affected Beijing's foreign policy decision-making. The Great Leap Forward radicalized the CCP's domestic policy, and

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of the campaign was to split the CCP leadership. It caused Mao's resignation of the Chairmanship of the PRC and prepared the conflict later

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the domestic radicalization, in turn, caused adventures in Chinese foreign policies (Robinson 1982). China's attack on Quemoy in 1958 and its border conflict with India in 1959 could be both seen as a result of the radicalization of Chinese foreign policy. These examples of radicalization in turn all generated Soviet dissatisfaction with the PRC's international behavior.

Causal Factor V: Mao's Dialectical World View

It is arguable that the Chinese leaders' beliefs, world views and personalities to a great extent account for the Sino-Soviet split during the late 1950s. In this respect, Mao certainly occupies the central position in understanding the whole story. In China, neither the government bureaucracy nor any opponents within the party had ever dominated foreign policy decision-making. Mao always had his way and always made the final decision in all major changes in PRC foreign policy (Holsti 1982; Hunt 1996).[16]

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fully manifested in the Cultural Revolution (Lieberthal 1987).

[16] Mao's dominance in the CCP derived from a commanding personal confidence, and was reinforced by myth-making party propaganda. Mao was also respected by his colleagues as a man of many talents, such as Chinese literati, Marxist theoretician, great leader and military genius. Since the founding of the PRC, Mao had increasingly been seen as the indispensable

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Thus, Mao's personal preference would be an important determinant in the Sino-Soviet dispute. It has long been said that there were a personal antipathy and a public rivalry between Mao and Khrushchev in the international communist movement. Mao's wife was reported to have told some foreign visitors about Mao's dislike of Khrushchev because of the latter's poor table manners and his rude political style, such as the shoe-pounding at the United Nations (Hinton 1966, 154-155).

But Mao's decision on the Sino-Soviet dispute must be rooted much deeper than his personal dislike of Khrushchev's table manners. While individual personalities and beliefs are relevant in Chinese foreign policy decision-making, it should be remembered that these beliefs were shaped in a particularly historic setting and were influenced by a kind of Chinese "collective memory". Almost all modern Chinese political leaders, Mao included, shared a collective memory which was derived from China's century-long humiliation imposed by Western and other imperialist powers.

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and unchallengeable leader in the party. As his stature grew and deference toward him deepened, Mao more and more easily won acceptance for his policies among the party leadership.

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Due to the humiliation China suffered in its modern history, a particularly strong sense of nationalism developed from the middle nineteenth century to impel Chinese leaders to build a powerful nation-state, a state independent of outside powers and strong enough to restore China's sovereignty lost since 1840 (Sutter, p. 3). Since the pre-Communist history of modern China was essentially one of weakness, humiliation, and failure, and it was in this atmosphere that the Communist leadership grew up, it would be understandable that leaders like Mao would be particularly sensitive to issues such as Chinese sovereignty and possible foreign penetration. Mao, like many other Chinese leaders, believe that China's national sovereignty must be respected absolutely and China, as a traditionally great nation, deserves a central position in international affairs.

Even in his early revolutionary career, Mao had never unconditionally accepted any directions from Moscow, the capital of the international communist movement. When Soviet policy seemed to impede CCP domestic goals, priority was always given to the Chinese party's agenda. For example, Mao had never wholeheartedly embraced the Comintern's anti-imperialist creed. Any global anti-imperialist policies would become self-defeating in China if they served Soviet interests

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without simultaneously advancing those of the CCP's. Thus, even before the establishment of the People's Republic, Chinese leaders had demonstrated that their global commitment to the international communist movement was highly self-interested opportunism (Hunt 1996, 212-215).[17]

By saying that Mao is a nationalist does not necessarily mean that he is not a Marxist at the same time. Compared to many of his colleagues, Mao appeared actually more like an orthodox Marxist.[18] To understand the apparent contradiction in Mao's character, one has to realize that the basic trait of Mao's thought is a continuing process of restless and dialectical struggle. At the core of Mao's philosophy is the "law of contradiction", which drives social progress and thus occupies a central position in Mao's world view (Kim 1980; Schurmann 1968). "Contradiction" in Mao's philosophy refers to "pairs of opposites" coexisting in social reality and in men's minds. There were many examples of such "pairs of opposites",

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[17] This was partly derived from the CCP's early experience in the 1920s and 1930s, when the Chinese party paid a high price for following Moscow's directions in the civil war.

[18] To some extent, the power struggle leading to the Cultural Revolution was caused by the conflict between Mao's orthodox Marxist view and the more pragmatic view shared by most of his colleagues

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red versus expert or mass versus leadership, that guided Mao's thought when he was handling China's domestic policies. In China's international relations, what drove Mao's thought was another "pair of opposites": nationalism and internationalism.[19] Now to understand Mao's decision on the conflict with the Soviet Union, the central question is why during the later 1950s and the early 1960s Mao's restless thought should evolve toward a direction in favor of nationalism.

One suggestion is that Mao's nationalist mood, quite ironically, was irritated by the seemingly flourishing Sino-Soviet relations (Goldstein 1994). After Stalin's death, his successors seemed eager to co-ordinate global foreign policy with Beijing. Moscow called for Chinese participation in talks on the Berlin question. With Soviet support, China participated in the Geneva meetings on Indochina in 1954 (Dallin 1961; Mayer 1957). The economic relationship seemed to flourish alongside the strategic cooperation. Stalin's successors initiated a comprehensive technology transfer to

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[19] Nationalism here is defined as Mao's sensitivity to encroachments on China's sovereignty and any foreign penetration, and internationalism is based on Mao's commitment and loyalty to the world socialist camp centered in Moscow.

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support China's economic development. Along with the rapid development of the bilateral relationship, however, came a change in the alliance structure. Sino-Soviet relations had become more institutionalized under the new Soviet leaders than during Stalin's years. China was involved in more programs of the Council of Mutual Economic Assistance, and Soviet advisers became more active in the decision processes of Chinese economic and political institutions. The institutionalized alliance fostered by Stalin's successors created direct contacts between related departments, ministries and other organizations of the two states. This trend gradually concerned Mao during the later 1950s. What alarmed him was that the close relationship had given the Soviets some leverage in Chinese domestic politics and driven China into a situation of political, economic as well as psychological dependency.[20]

The leadership vacuum in the communist movement created by Stalin's death and Khrushchev's de-Stalinization just provided an additional reason and gave more confidence to Mao

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[20] As to the Soviet psychological influence on China, Mao warned: "We had been slaves far too long and felt inferior to others in every respect...Some real effort is needed on this problem, to raise the self-confidence of our people" (Goldstein 1994, 241)

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to seek a unique way to construct Chinese socialism. Since the middle 1950s, Mao had increasingly emphasized the importance of developing a Chinese economy based on Chinese experience and resources. Now "self-reliance" once again became the major policy and foreign assistance the secondary aim. The Great Leap Forward, an event contributing to the Sino-Soviet split, was just a result of Mao's effort to find a different and self-reliant way of socialist construction.

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CHAPTER 5

CASE TWO: SINO-AMERICAN RAPPROCHEMENT

During the early 1960s the Soviet Union began to strengthen its deployments along the Sino-Soviet border. In 1964 the tension along the border increased to the extent that formal attention from both sides was required. In February 1964 both China and the Soviet Union agreed to discuss the border issues at the deputy foreign minister level. But these talks were soon suspended partly due to the fall of Khrushchev and partly because of Mao's speech that there were unresolved territory issues between the Soviet Union and China (Hinton 1971, 16-18). In 1967, one year after the Cultural Revolution took place in China, the Sino-Soviet border incidents reached a new high that led both sides to respond by increasing their border forces. The most crucial step taken by Moscow was the Soviet military buildup on Mongolian soil. By November 1967 several Soviet divisions had occupied permanent bases in Mongolia, a country which shares a long common border with China. In response, China redployed its forces and sent several divisions from the Fujian military region to the Soviet-Mongolian border (Chang 1986, 30; Robinson 1991, 257).

The augmentation of Soviet forces along the Chinese border was coupled with Moscow's readiness to use them,

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initially through more aggressive border patrolling. The invasion of Czechoslovakia by the USSR in 1968 and the subsequent articulation of the concept of "limited sovereignty" by the Brezhnev Doctrine created the potential for Soviet intimidation or punitive military attack on China, possibly directed against China's infant nuclear weapon facilities. In the aftermath of the Czechoslovakia invasion, Chinese leaders began to call the Soviet Union a "social-imperialist" state, that is, socialist in name but imperialist in deeds. Sino-Soviet relations further deteriorated as their dispute became militarized during the late 1960s. On March 2, 1969, the Sino-Soviet rift reached a climax in a large border clash on a disputed island in the Ussuri River.

Around the time when China and the Soviet Union were involved in the border military conflict, Sino-American rapprochement began. China's overture to the United States first came in a late November 1968 Foreign Ministry spokesman's statement calling for renewed ambassadorial talks with the United States once the Nixon administration took power in 1969. In December 1970, Mao told Edgar Snow, an American journalist who had known Mao for many years, that China would admit Americans from the left, middle and right wings to visit China. Mao also claimed that he would be happy to talk with President Nixon if he would visit China, either

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as a tourist or as a President. Throughout the course of 1971, in interviews with several foreign visitors, including an American group of academics, Zhou Enlai claimed that the Taiwan issue should not constitute an insurmountable difficulty to the relaxation of tensions between China and the US. Moreover, Zhou also indicated China's intention for direct negotiations with Taiwan in order to reunify the island with China through peaceful means (Camilleri 1980, 119). The policy of promoting Sino-American contact gained further impetus during the next year. Beijing's "Ping-Pong diplomacy" and the subsequent Henry Kissinger secret visit to China in 1971 initiated the official dialogue between Beijing and Washington.[1]

The Sino-American détente culminated in President Nixon's visit to China on February 21, 1972 and then the signing of the joint Sino-American communiqué in Shanghai the same month. In the communiqué, guidelines were established to gradually decrease tension in the Taiwan Straits and to develop trade

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[1] Before Kissinger's visit, French, Romanian and Pakistan governments all served as communication channels between Beijing and Washington. It was Pakistan's "Yahya Channel" that finally conveyed Zhou Enlai's invitation to Nixon. Kissinger later called this message "the most important communication that has come to an American President since the end of World War II" (Chang 32).

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and cultural contact between China and the US. Moreover, both China and the US expressed in the communiqué a common interest in opposing any state seeking "hegemony" (a code word for the Soviet Union) in the Asia-Pacific region. Nixon's visit to China was described as "a week that changed the world", and thus transformed the world power equilibrium in general and the Asian political landscape in particular (Solomon 1981).

The full Sino-American diplomatic relationship was later completed during Carter's administration. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia further galvanized the strategic rationale for Sino-American relations. The political leaders in both nations held nearly identical perceptions of global strategic trends. Beijing and Washington began to coordinate their military and security policies, and a de facto Sino-American alliance was soon established. Within a few years, the Sino-American relationship had been totally restructured, from fatal enemies to friends sharing many common interests in world politics. This drastic change, like the Sino-Soviet split a decade ago, generated wide interest among the students of Chinese foreign policy to find out the causal factors of this Chinese foreign policy restructuring.

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Causal Factor I: Soviet Threat and US Retrenchment

It is widely recognized that the Chinese perception of an immediate Soviet threat was primary in stimulating the Sino-American rapprochement of 1971-2 (Garver 1982; Pollack 1991; Robinson 1991; Shambaugh 1994; Sutter 1986; Yahuda 1983). In the late 1960s, the Soviet military build-up coupled with its pursuit of political influence around China became the focal point of Chinese security concern. By the end of 1968, the Soviet border troops around China had been augmented to thirty highly modernized divisions. At the same time, Soviet forces stationed near Mongolia's China border was also reinforced (Yahuda 1983, 37).

Moreover, during 1968 and 1969 Soviet Asian policy entered a vigorous and expansive stage. Moscow began unfolding a multifaceted program designed to expand Soviet influence in Asia. The Soviet efforts included the expansion of naval force in the Pacific and Indian Oceans; the suggestion of regional economic cooperation with the Southeast Asian countries; the establishment of a close relationship with India; and, worst of all, the preparation of an Asian Security System excluding Chinese participation. The aim of the Soviet policy was obviously to draw the countries on China's periphery into an arrangement designed to encircle China and minimize Chinese influence in Asia. What bedeviled Chinese leaders even more at

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that time, however, was the Soviet action in Eastern Europe. The Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968 and Moscow's subsequent announcement of the Brezhnev doctrine of limited sovereignty forced China to view the recent expanded Soviet military presence on the Chinese periphery in a more ominous light.

One year later, in August 1969, the military conflict along the Sino-Soviet frontier reached a climax as the largest border clash between the two countries on record resulted in a serious Chinese military defeat and was followed by Soviet warnings about possible preventive strikes against China.[2] The first two Sino-Soviet military conflicts all took place on a small island called Zhenbao by China and Damansky by USSR. The island lies on the western side of the main channel of the Ussuri River. The Soviet Union contends that the Sino-Soviet boundary runs along the west bank of the river, and consequently the Zhenbao-Damansky island is Soviet territory.

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[2] Sino-Soviet border differences have a long history, tracing back to the first treaties between Russia and China in the seventeenth century. In the post-1949 period, however, the border issue was purposely overlooked and easily managed until the overall Sino-Soviet relations changed during the late 1950s. After the Sino-Soviet split, all the residual border problems reemerged and border disputes became an easy expression of the deteriorated political relations (An, 1973).

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China, however, claims that the boundary follows the main channel of the river, and thus the island is Chinese territory. On March 2, 1969, Chinese troops ambushed a Soviet patrol on the island. The heavy Soviet casualties led Moscow to retaliate on the same location on March 15, and undertake another military attack on China's Northwestern region later.

The militarization of the border dispute and the possibility of a Soviet surgical strike against the Chinese nuclear establishment forced Chinese leaders to focus their attention on the question of how to deal effectively with the Soviet military threat. China's strategy against the Soviet Union was both bilateral and global. Bilaterally, China used a mix of military preparations and tactical political moves to keep the Soviets from attacking it. Globally, China's strategy focused on developing an international united front designed to halt Soviet expansion. The United States, as the most important international counterweight to Soviet hegemony, now appeared attractive in Chinese calculations. Because opposing the Soviet Union now had priority, China sought to develop positive relations with the United States, its former adversary (Chu, p. 22).

At the time the Soviet Union became an obvious and urgent threat to China's security, the US began to reevaluate its Asian policy and came to the conclusion that its power and

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commitments were over-extended in Asia. The changes in US policy in Vietnam and the subsequent withdrawal of US forces from Indochina were the most visible aspect of the US retrenchment. The change of US Asian policy was best demonstrated in the Nixon Doctrine, which required the Asian non-communist regimes to carry the burden for sustaining themselves against local insurgencies. According to the Nixon Doctrine, The US ground forces would no longer be committed to conduct US foreign policy in such area as Vietnam, and the Vietnam problem should be solved through a "Vietnamization" alternative. In the Chinese view, this signaled that America was now on the defensive and its traditional Asian policy since the end of the Second World War had come to an end.

Once the United States, under the Nixon Doctrine, seemed determined to withdraw its forces from Vietnam and change its past policy of containing China in Asia, and thereby end a perceived threat to China's national security, China was prepared to start the process of Sino-American rapprochement.[3]

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[3] Nixon's overtures to China came as early as 1967. In an article published in *Foreign Affairs*, Nixon questioned the validity of traditional US policy of containment and isolation toward China. He wrote: "Any American policy toward Asia must come urgently to grips with the reality of China.....Taking the long view, we simply can not afford to leave China forever outside the family of nations, there to nurture its fantasies,

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Thus, China's willingness to improve Sino-American relations was stimulated by Soviet military pressure from the North and American overtures from the South.

By the early 1970s, China clearly realized that the Soviet military threat and political intimidation would remain the predominant Chinese foreign policy concern for the foreseeable future. On the contrary, the United States represented less of a military threat as it pulled back forces from around China's eastern and southern borders. As long as it remained strongly opposed to the USSR, the United States would be an effective source of international leverage helping China offset Soviet pressure. Thus, the opposition to Soviet expansionism in general and compatible views on Asian balance of power in particular constituted the common ground on which a closer Sino-American relationship could be established.

Therefore, China's normalization with the United States perfectly fit the realist balance of power framework. It can be regarded as a typical example of classical balance of power politics triumphing over ideology. Following Levine (1989, 90): "The historic Sino-American reconciliation of the 1970s was brought about by sober-minded Chinese and US practitioners

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cherish its hate and threaten its neighbors. There is no place on this small planet for a billion of its potentially most able people to live in

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of realpolitic who discerned the advantage of forming a de facto strategic partnership in their parallel competition against the Soviet Union". The fact that China lacked the power in dealing with the Soviet Union alone coupled with the American need for an ally against the USSR after its withdrawal from Vietnam created the fundamental rationale motivating the Sino-American rapprochement.

Causal Factor II: Chinese Domestic Factionalism

The Sino-Soviet border clash and the subsequent Sino-American rapprochement all took place at the time when China experienced its most unstable period since 1949. The Cultural Revolution which started in 1966 caused a national upheaval in China and virtually left the country in a situation of chaos for several years. Factional strife within the communist party was so fierce during this period that different political groups literally fought for their survival. Thus, the major change in Chinese foreign policy during the Cultural Revolution can not be fully understood without being examined within the context of domestic politics and leadership power struggle.

The most drastic political change during the early stage of the Cultural Revolution was the downfall of Liu Shaoqi and

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angry isolation" (Nixon 1967, 121-123).

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the promotion of Lin Biao to the number two position in the CCP. Lin served for a long time as China's Defense Minister and was well-known for his radical political views on both domestic and international issues. In 1965, a year before the Cultural Revolution, Lin published his controversial "Long Live the Victory of People's War", where he tried to apply Chinese experience in the civil war to an international setting. He contended that the basic experience derived from Chinese revolution was the "people's war" which emphasized the importance of encircling the city by the countryside. In the coming world revolution, Lin claimed, the same guideline should be applied and the developing countries (the world countryside) could encircle the developed countries (the world city) in an armed struggle. If the developing countries were ripe for revolution, China would serve as a "bastion of socialism" and "center of world revolution", where the peoples in the Third World could obtain moral support and military experience in Mao-style protracted guerrilla war (Hinton 1971, 19; O'Leary 1980, 39).

In Chinese foreign policy, Lin advocated a "dual adversary" strategy against both the United States and the Soviet Union simultaneously. In his report to the 9th CCP Congress in 1969, Lin repeatedly warned of the dangers imposed by the Soviet Union on China's national security. But, at the

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same time, he insisted that US imperialism was the principal enemy of world revolution. China's only reliable allies, according to Lin, were proletariat and revolutionary people, or genuine Marxist-Leninist parties and organizations all over the world. People of the Third World such as Vietnam, Laos, Burma, Indonesia and Palestine, the students and black masses in the US who were discontented with the ruling class, and the laboring people of the USSR seeking the overthrow of the Soviet revisionist leadership were all regarded as the sources of world revolution and should be attracted into the "united front" against the "dual adversary", the US and the USSR (Camilleri 1980, 136).

Lin had good political as well as institutional reasons to advocate the "dual adversary" approach in China's foreign policy. Institutionally, Lin had been the Chinese Defense Minister since the middle 1950s. During the latter half of the 1960s, he was able to convince the CCP leaders to allocate more and more resources for military expenditure because of military pressure along Chinese southern and northern borders by both the US and the USSR. It was estimated that between 1965 and 1971 the increase in Chinese defense spending averaged 10% per year (Pollack 1991, 416). This rapid increase became even more remarkable while taking account of the economic dislocation caused by the political chaos during the

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Cultural Revolution. Although Lin would not necessarily welcome the continuation of the military pressure imposed by the US and the USSR around Chinese borders, the PLA was nevertheless the major beneficiary of the "dual adversary" approach confronting both Washington and Moscow.

Politically, during the early 1970s, there was clearly tension between government bureaucrats led by Zhou Enlai and the military under Lin Biao over that which institution, the government or the army, should govern the country during the Cultural Revolution. Lin's power was dramatically expanded during the early stage of the Cultural Revolution. He and his close subordinates quickly achieved total predominance atop the military command structure, virtually supplanting the other surviving marshals and generals in the design and execution of Chinese defense affairs.[4] Moreover, with Lin's designation in the 1969 party constitution as successor to Mao and the simultaneous enhancement of the PLA's power in the 9th CCP Central Committee, the army led by Lin started to take

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[4] As a matter of fact, at one time during the Cultural Revolution the People's Liberation Army was described as created by Chairman Mao and directly commanded by Lin Biao. The idea of "directly commanding" caused Mao's suspicions of Lin's ambitions, and Mao reportedly questioned this idea later by asking why the creator of the army could not directly command the army.

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over many national and local civilian administrations as a result of the political chaos. To preserve the political fruits of the Cultural Revolution, Lin and his associates had to consolidate the new administrative structures. Therefore, they opposed any structural change that could restore the power of the government apparatus and the disgraced old bureaucrats, because the rebuilding of government power damaged in the Cultural Revolution could only serve the interests of Zhou Enlai and his allies, and call into question Lin Biao's authority as a political leader of the whole nation. To consolidate his political power at home, Lin needed a radical foreign policy which emphasized external threats so that Lin and his military associates could appear indispensable to the regime.[5] Lin's stake in maintaining the "dual adversary" approach, thus, was his long-term political survival. It was natural for Lin and his allies to see any moderate foreign policy, such as the five principles of peaceful coexistence and especially the overtures to the

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[5] Lin was suspected to be the man who ordered the ambush of a Soviet patrol unit that led to the Sino-Soviet border clash in 1969. After the Sino-Soviet border negotiations were resumed, Lin promulgated General Order No. 1 to create the tension again and virtually place the entire Chinese army on alert without Mao's approval. These actions, quite ironically, caused Mao's suspicion of Lin and finally led to Lin's collapse (Robinson 1991).

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United States advocated by Zhou Enlai, as a part of the campaign undermining their political power and challenging the new status quo that emerged from the Cultural Revolution (Pollack 1991; Yahuda 1978).

Immediately following the bloody border conflict with the Soviet Union, Zhou Enlai initiated a reassessment of Chinese strategic and foreign policies.[6] As a result of the reassessment, Zhou concluded that China needed to modify the radical "dual adversary" approach in its foreign policy and adopt a more moderate strategy to buy time and deal more effectively with the danger imposed by the Soviet Union. The major arguments proposed by Zhou Enlai included that the Soviet military buildup in Asia plus the announcement of the Brezhnev Doctrine had demonstrated that an aggressive USSR was the number one threat to China. The Sino-Soviet border clash provided additional evidence for this argument. By contrast, in Zhou's view, the United States had not been a direct threat to China's security for many years. Even in the Vietnam War,

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[6] Zhou's reassessment was based on the reports generated by a special forum composed of four PLA marshals disgraced by Lin Biao. At this forum, Chen Yi, one of the PLA marshals and minister of foreign affairs, made the judgement that contention between the US and USSR remained paramount, and thus the possibility of a US-Soviet joint action against China was minimal (Pollack 1991, 411).

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China and the US were able to avoid direct military confrontation, and the US would become less dangerous after its withdrawal from China's periphery. According to Sutter (1986, 17), Zhou's proposition was designed to achieve the domestic objective of his group and undermine Lin's power in the government. The most important goals of Zhou's scheme included the reduction of military spending, the restoration of the civilian control of the PLA, reinstatement of the government bureaucracy, raising his political prestige and restraining the power of his radical rival.[7]

Zhou's moderate foreign policy was based on the idea of the "Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence".[8] These principles was regarded as the guideline for China to establish peaceful relations with non-communist nations. In their National Day speeches of October 1969, Zhou emphasized these five principles as the base of Chinese foreign policy

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[7] Zhou's moderate foreign policy, especially his overture to the US, was firmly opposed by Lin's group. Actually, due to this strong opposition, Zhou's early initiative to restore the ambassadorial talks with the United States in February 1969 was soon reversed.

[8] The five principles include mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual non-aggression, non-interference in each others' internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence.

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but Lin totally omitted any mention of them.[9] The struggle between Zhou and Lin over Chinese foreign policy was further demonstrated by Huang Yongsheng, Chief of General Staff of the PLA and an important member of Lin's group, at a rally in Pynongyang, where he stated that China's relation with the US on the basis of the five principles was out of the question due to the US military presence in Taiwan and the Taiwan Straits. Huang's statement was widely regarded as an effort made by Lin's group to counter the suggestion of a Sino-American rapprochement advocated by Zhou Enlai (O'Leary 1980, 52). Huang's statement, however, was soon dismissed by Zhou Enlai in an interview with a foreign guest as not reflecting China's foreign policy priority that emphasized a closer Sino-American relationship (Pallock 1991, 415).

Zhou's pro-US foreign policy gradually got the upper-hand with Mao's public endorsement of this approach, and the opposition was finally silenced with Lin's death and the purge of his associates in the Chinese military.[10] A milestone of

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[9] Lin also declared in one speech that: "We have no common language with the imperialists, revisionists, and reactionaries. We must draw a clear line of demarcation with them, wage a struggle against them and oppose them; we must not join with them in their evil deeds" (Pollack 1991, 418)

[10] Lin was excluded from the whole process of the Sino-American rapprochement even before he died in an air crash following the failure of

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Zhou's moderate foreign policy was reached at the 10th CPP Congress. In his report to the Congress, Zhou offered a lengthy rationale for China's rapprochement with the United States and its tough opposition to the Soviet Union. The rationale of the new foreign policy was based on his judgment of the relationship between the two superpowers. While Lin Biao, in his report to the 9th CCP Congress, stressed the collusion between the US and USSR to support his "dual adversary" strategy, Zhou emphasized the contention in the relationship of the two superpowers and thus provided a rationale for his pro-US policy (Levine 1980, 45; Sutter 1986, 25).

Causal Factor III: Mao's Reformulated Theory

The domestic factionalism factor was closely interconnected with individual personality factors in determining the Sino-American rapprochement in the early 1970s. Zhou Enlai's pro-US approach might not have won the foreign policy debate without Mao's support. Thus, as in the case of the Sino-Soviet dispute a decade earlier, Mao's

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an alleged coup. Zhou's first invitation to Kissinger for a secret visit mentioned only Mao's approval without Lin's name. This was unusual during the Cultural Revolution. When Kissinger presented gifts for the Chinese leaders, Zhou again omitted Lin's name from Chinese leaders thanking Kissinger for the gifts (Pollack 1991, 418).

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preference again occupied the central position in understanding Chinese foreign policy restructuring.[11]

To evaluate Mao's role in the Sino-American rapprochement, attention should be again paid to the dynamics of his dialectical thought which emphasized "contradiction" (i.e. "pairs of opposites") as an epistemological as well as ontological principle.[12] By the early 1970s, Mao no longer accepted the standard Marxist division of the world into two camps of capitalism and socialism. Instead he began to emphasize the conflict between small-medium-sized states and superpowers as the major "contradiction" in world politics (Levine 1980; Yahuda 1978). Mao's terminology of superpower was used to refer to a state's hegemonic behavior. The essential characteristics of a superpower were defined in a

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[11] Mao was still given credit for his personal contribution to the Chinese foreign policy change by the CCP leaders after his death. In fact, only security and foreign affairs remain exceptions where Mao's reputation is untarnished in post-Mao China. As the June 1981 resolution on Party history pointed out: "In (Mao's) later years, he still remained alert to safeguarding the security of our country, stood up to the pressure of the social imperialists, pursued a correct foreign policy, firmly supported the just struggles of all peoples, outlined the correct strategy of the three worlds and advanced the important principle that China would never seek hegemony" (Pollack 1991, 405).

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behavioral terms as a power which tried to subject other countries to its aggression, interference and control. This behavioral analysis differed in important respects from the conventional Marxist approach stressing a state's domestic mode of production as the source of its international behavior. Thus, during the early 1970s, Mao's restless thought completed another dialectical evolution. This time the major "contradiction" was identified by a unique Maoist approach outside both the classic Marxist analysis of the political economy and Western realist analysis of state capabilities.

The new Maoist approach was based on the analysis of an important concept, the "intermediate zone". According to Mao, there were two intermediate zones in the contemporary world. The first intermediate zone refers to the third world and the second intermediate zone includes all the developed countries except the US and the USSR. The original idea of the intermediate zone comes from Mao's early speech describing a range of countries sandwiched politically, and sometimes geographically, between the socialist and capitalist camps.[13]

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[12] See Mao's dialectical world view in Chapter 4.

[13] Intermediate zone was initially conceptualized by Mao in an interview with an American journalist, Anna Louise Strong, in 1946, where Mao predicted that the US would not be able to attack the Soviet Union unless it could first subjugate a large number of countries in the "intermediate

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During the middle 1960s, however, Mao reformulated the old concept of the intermediate zone in accordance with the changing character of world politics. What caused Mao's reformulation were international events such as the Sino-Soviet dispute, the split of the socialist bloc, and inter-capitalist rivalry manifested in the Franco-American relationship. Now the revival of the vast intermediate zone included all the non-superpower countries, notably both European countries and Japan, which could be attracted into a world anti-hegemonic united front.[14]

Based on the new definition of the intermediate zone, Mao came to two important conclusions during the early 1970s. First, Mao proposed a three worlds theory. According to Mao, the US and the USSR (the superpowers) constituted the first world which sought to extend their control over the rest of

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zone" between the US and the USSR. These countries were largely colonial and semi-colonial countries that belonged' to neither capitalist nor socialist camps (O'leary 1980,181).

[14] In Mao's view, the Soviet Union was rebuffed in the Eastern European bloc. The USSR was not obeyed in Romania and Poland, and Moscow was half supported and half rejected in Cuba. Meanwhile, the US was opposed by the majority of the people in Japan and by De Gaulle in France. Thus, Mao observed, many important capitalist states displayed anti-US tendencies and

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the states. The ceaseless striving by the two superpowers for hegemony threatened the interests of all the other states and the security of the world. The smaller developed countries (the second intermediate zone) formed the second world where the ruling classes, either capitalists or non-genuine Marxists, were subjected to the control, intervention and bullying of the two superpowers. Because of the dual character of these countries, they could be mobilized into the anti-hegemonic united front. All the developing countries (the first intermediate zone) formed the third world, with which China identified itself. Among the third world countries no further distinction would be drawn between the progressive and reactionary governments. What Mao emphasized here were the common historical experience and the common current agenda that bounded all these countries. According to the Maoist view, all the developing countries shared a history of colonialist oppression and exploitation, and currently they all shared a common problem of seeking economic development. These countries by nature were anti-hegemonic forces.

Second, Mao increasingly saw the United States as a declining power in the rivalry between the two superpowers.

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many socialist states anti-Soviet tendencies in the same manner as Third World countries (O'Leary 1980, 183).

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The US declining status was demonstrated by its domestic opposition to the Vietnam War, its willingness to withdraw from Asia, an independent role played by Western Europe and the dollar crisis during the late 1960s. By contrast, in Mao's view, the Soviet Union became increasingly aggressive and began to emerge as an expansionist imperialist power after its invasion of Czechoslovakia and the announcement of the Brezhnev Doctrine. Given the Maoist behavioral definition of superpower as a hegemony that wanted to subject, control and intervene in other states, a defensive United States was naturally perceived as less aggressive and less dangerous, and thus could be invited to join the united front against the common enemy, an ambitious and expansionist USSR (Camilleri 1980, 137).

These two judgments provided the rationale for China to form an extensive alliance against the Soviet Union. While still criticizing the United States on international economic issues such as the law of sea and resource allocation problems, the focus of Chinese foreign policy shifted to encourage a loose coalition, including the United States and the countries of the second and third worlds, in opposition to the expansion of the Soviet Union. Regionally, China began to improve its relations with the governments which were previously seen by Beijing as reactionary regimes. Special

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efforts were made to normalize relations with countries around China's periphery, such as the ASEAN states in Southeast Asia. Globally, China no longer opposed the US naval forces in the Western Pacific and the Indian Ocean, the US bases in the Philippines and the US-Japanese strategic alliance. China also expressed its concern about the power balance in Europe and publicly support a stronger NATO and EEC (Levine 1980, 46).

It is noteworthy that Mao's drastic change of view in the early 1970s, according to some scholars, can be explained by his Marxist ideology (O'Leary 1980, 70-86). They argue that Mao's conclusion on the US decline was derived from his belief about the nature of imperialism. Similarly, the Soviet Union was seen as particularly dangerous and deceptive because Soviet social-imperialism was covered by a facade of supporting "revolutionary war" and "national liberation". Thus, for these scholars, the Sino-American rapprochement was a revolutionary tactic used by Mao to exploit inter-imperialist rivalries. The strongest evidence of this argument was found in Zhou Enlai's report to the 10th CCP Congress, where Zhou, using Leninist terminology, addressed the necessity of distinguishing two different compromises with

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imperialism, one made by genuine revolutionists and one by revisionists.[15]

To explain Mao's decision on the Sino-American rapprochement by Marxist ideology, however, is a weak, if not farfetched, argument. Because at the core of Mao's changed view during the early 1970s was the redefinition of the intermediate zone and the proposition of the three worlds category. Obviously, these reformulated theories were the products of a unique Maoist approach and totally outside the domain of conventional Marxist analysis. Moreover, Zhou's Leninist terms about the distinction between the two compromises could be better interpreted as a relatively convenient instrument with which the Chinese leaders could demonstrate their revolutionary credentials. Given the decades-long history of Marxist propaganda in China, the Chinese leaders simply could not afford to lose the revolutionary image of its foreign policy. Therefore, it was

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[15] In his speech, Zhou Enlai stated that: "We should point out here that necessary compromises between revolutionary countries and imperialist countries must be distinguished from collusion and compromise between Soviet revisionism and US imperialism..... One must learn to distinguish between a man who gave bandits money and firearms in order to lessen the damage they can do and a man who gave bandits money and firearms in order to share in the loot" (O'Leary 1980, 81).

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both logical and necessary for Beijing to employ some Marxist rhetoric as an inexpensive way to conceal the emerging contradiction between its diplomatic action and the official ideological doctrine. Zhou's speech on the issue of compromise, thus, was an effort to meet Chinese domestic needs rather than a revelation of the genuine reasons for the Sino-American rapprochement.

Causal Factor IV: Economic Considerations

The need for economic development was another factor contributing to the Sino-American reconciliation. When the anarchy caused by the early stages of the Cultural Revolution came to an end in the early 1970s, Chinese internal policy began to increasingly focus on economic development. Given the deteriorated relations between China and the Soviet Union, Chinese leaders surely recognized that modernization programs could be realized only through closer economic relations with the West. Only through the United Sates, Japan and Western European nations could China get access to the market, technology, managerial expertise, and financial resources that were crucial for the Chinese economic development.

The United States appeared particularly attractive in this respect because it occupied the two opposite ends of the spectrum of technological sophistication that could be offered to meet Chinese economic goals. At the one end, the US was a

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major exporter of agricultural products that could meet the tremendous demand generated by the huge Chinese population. At the other end, the US had the most advanced technology that could meet China's ambitious modernization programs (Hinton 1976, 32-33). Given the politically motivated embargo imposed by the US government that prevented its citizens from doing business with the PRC, any Sino-American economic exchange required first a political détente between the two countries.

In 1969, the Nixon administration signaled American willingness to improve Sino-American relations by gradually reducing trade restrictions on China.[16] The US initiative opened a realistic prospect for Sino-US economic cooperation. In the Shanghai communiqué issued at Nixon's visit, economic exchange was mentioned as a reason for the Sino-American détente.[17] The amount of Sino-American trade increased so fast

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[16] Nixon's decision on the reduction of trade restriction on China was primarily motivated by his global strategic considerations. But the decision to relax trade barriers was also a product of the long time lobby by some segments of the US business community that jealously witnessed China's switching three-quarters of its foreign trade from the Soviet bloc to Western Europe and Japan during the 1960s (Cohen 1974,46).

[17] The Shanghai communiqué stated that: "Both sides view bilateral trade as another area from which benefit can be derived, and agreed that economic relations based on equality and mutual benefit are in the interest of the

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following Nixon's visit that it exceeded most experts' expectation. Trade increased from zero in 1970, a year before the Ping-Pong diplomacy stunned the world, to about $800 million in 1973, a year after Nixon's historic visit to China (Cohen 1974, 47; Lubman 1978, 201).

The Chinese desire to obtain Western technology was also rooted in the economic model China adopted during the mid-1960s. Up to the time of Nixon's visit, China had experimented with three different economic models as guideline for its development. The first was essentially the Soviet model which emphasized centralized planning and heavy industry. The second model, formed during the Great Leap Forward, was characterized by decentralization, a reversed pattern that gave priority to agriculture and light industry, and greater emphasis on political mobilization and revolutionary spirit in economic construction. During the mid-1960s, China adopted a third economic model which employed a strategy called "walking on two legs". The "first leg" included most local industrialization using primarily low and intermediate technologies. This task, in Chinese leaders' view, could be accomplished through the traditional self-reliant strategy

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peoples of the two countries. They agreed to facilitate the progressive development of trade between their two countries" (Solomon 1981, 300).

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based primarily on domestic resources. The "second leg" referred to industrialization in a few selected fields, where advanced modern technologies were virtually indispensable. It was with respect to the "second leg" that Western technologies were attractive and welcomed in the eyes of Chinese leaders (Slyke 1978, 148-156).[18]

Economic considerations in the Sino-American rapprochement, however, should not be exaggerated. Given Mao's self-reliant preference and his concern about China's economic dependence on any foreign country, economic cooperation between China and the West during the Mao era remained limited. Foreign consumer goods were forbidden in the Chinese domestic market. Commercial loans and direct investment were taboo (Jian 1996, 70). Thus, economic cooperation with the West never became the focal point of Chinese foreign policy under Mao's leadership. Compared with the strategic and security considerations, the economic factor was of secondary importance in the process of Sino-American normalization.

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[18] After Nixon's visit, China started its large import of machinery, equipment and whole plants from the Western countries. Between 1972 and 1975, China signed contracts for more than $2.6 billion of whole plants and for more than $2 billion of machinery and equipment, exceeding all such purchases of the previous decade (Lubman 1978, 195).

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CHAPTER 6

CASE THREE: INDEPENDENT FOREIGN POLICY

At the 12th CCP congress in September 1982 the Chinese leadership declared that China would adopt a new foreign policy known as the "independent foreign policy of peace". This announcement marked the end of the anti-Soviet and pro-US foreign policy pursued by China throughout the 1970s. The major thesis of this new policy was that China would not ally with either superpower and would keep an equal distance between the US and the USSR. As Hu Yaobang, then the General Secretary of CCP, pointed out at the party congress that China would never attach itself to any big power or group of powers, and would never yield to pressure from any big power in its foreign policies (Harding 1984, 198).

Another major thesis of the new policy was that China's foreign policy would become more issue-based and China would independently determine its positions and policies on different international issues. For example, China would oppose the US policy in South Africa, Central America and the Middle East, but at the same time oppose the Soviet Union on Afghanistan and Cambodia. In other words, in the former area, China's policy would be closer to that of the Soviet Union. But on the latter, China would hold an

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identical view with the US. Thus, Chinese foreign policy during the 1980s was characterized by moving away from the US towards an independent position from which China could flirt, negotiate and balance the two superpowers, and finally extract concessions from both the US and the USSR (Dittmer 1992, 219-220).

China's decision on this independent foreign policy interacted with a new dynamic of Sino-Soviet rapprochement, which can be traced back to Brezhnev's Tashkent speech in March 1982. In his speech, Brezhnev stressed that the Soviet Union had never regarded the state of animosity and alienation between China and the USSR as normal, and there would never be any threat to China from the Soviet Union.

Mikhail Gorbachev provided the additional leverage China required to establish its new independent foreign policy. Gorvachev's landmark speech in Vladivostok offered unmistakable geopolitical concessions to the Chinese. Gorbachev indicated that he would pull some Soviet troops from Afghanistan and Mongolia and wished to discuss the reduction of force levels along the Sino-Soviet border with Chinese leaders. The Soviet leader also expressed a readiness to participate in confidence-building arrangements and discussions with China on territorial issue. The Soviet

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Union later gradually moved to accept China's interpretation of the Sino-Soviet boundary along the Amur River. One particularly symbolic concession made by the Soviet Union was its acknowledging China's sole right over Zhengbao-Damensky island, where the initial Sino-Soviet military border clash took place in 1969 (Huan 1989, 103).

The improvement of Sino-Soviet relations accelerated when the Soviet Union reduced its military build-up on China's borders, and destroyed intermediate and short-range nuclear missiles (including SS-20s) in the Soviet Far East as part of the December 1987 INF agreement. At the end of 1987, Deng Xiaoping publicly expressed his interest in having a Sino-Soviet summit with Gorbachev. The process of the Sino-Soviet normalization reached a climax in Gorbachev's state visit to China in May 1989.

Causal Factor I: Taiwan Problem

The immediate cause of the new restructuring in Chinese foreign policy was the reemergence of the Taiwan problem to complicate the relationship between Beijing and Washington. According to Harry Harding (1984, 160), among the numerous hypotheses that had been provided to explain the Chinese foreign policy reorientation during the early 1980s, the widespread view was that China's unhappiness with Reagan's

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policy toward Taiwan contributed to the Chinese reassessment of its foreign policy.

Comment made by at first Presidential candidate and later President Ronald Reagan on China and Taiwan obviously offended Chinese leaders and offered a major impetus for them to reconsider their foreign policy approach.[1] Chinese leaders suspected the Reagan administration wanted to upgrade American relations with Taiwan, and thus follow what was tantamount to a two-Chinas policy. Moreover, Beijing was disappointed that neither the normalization of Sino-American relations, nor the announcement of the policy of peaceful reunification of Taiwan with the mainland had persuaded Taiwan leadership to negotiate with Beijing over the future of the island. Reagan's speeches, in the Chinese view, were no different than encouraging the Taiwan leaders to continue their current non-negotiation policy, or in the worst case, even encouraging the forces in the island that advocated an independent Taiwan. Thus, although China needed the US support to resist and check Soviet power, Beijing could not keep silent on issues where China's sovereignty and

1 Chinese criticism targeted Reagan's call for a resumption of official ties between the US and Taiwan, Reagan's intention to base the US policy toward Taiwan on the US Taiwan Relations Act, and the US continuation of selling weapons to Taiwan.

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territorial integration were on stake. Therefore, Chinese leaders had no choice but to react strongly to what they perceived as Reagan's two-Chinas policy.

Chinese leadership was afraid that without China's strong reaction to Reagan's policy, the US might take China for granted because Beijing was perceived to be looking to Washington for help in its confrontation with the Soviet Union. Thus, on June 14, 1980, for the first time over ten years, a *People's Daily* article publicly criticized the US policy toward Taiwan. A week later, a *Xinhua* commentator article again called on the US to stop its arms sale to Taiwan. China complained repeatedly that the US was trying to treat China as a "card" in the American confrontation with the Soviet Union, and that the US regarded China as a junior partner that had no alternative but to accept US Asian policy. In the wake of the vice presidential candidate George Bush's visit to China, Beijing warned of "grave retrogression" in the Sino-American relationship if Reagan's campaign promise over Taiwan would be fulfilled after his inauguration (Sutter 1986, 140). The strongest warning on the possible retrogression in Sino-American relations came from Deng Xiaoping's comment in an interview with a Hong

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Kong journalist, where Deng said that China was prepared for Sino-American relations to retrogress to a pre-1972 level, the year Nixon opened China's door.[2]

After Reagan took power in the White House, China's complaints began to focus on the issue of US arms sales to Taiwan. Chinese media stated that the US arms sales to Taiwan were equivalent to a de facto revitalization of the US-Taiwan mutual defense treaty and thus severely violated China's sovereignty. A *Xinhua* commentary warned that any one who thought China would swallow the "bitter pill" of Taiwan problem because of China's weak position in confrontation with the Soviet Union should remember the Sino-Soviet split during the early 1960s when the Chinese demonstrated their determination to fight against bullying and defended China's independence and sovereignty. Under pressure from Chinese government, the Reagan administration made a series of concessions to ease Chinese complaints, including the promise of not selling the F-X fighter to Taiwan and a reiteration of the "one China" policy. After difficult

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2 Deng stated that: "The United States thinks that China is seeking its favor. In fact, China is not seeking any country's favor.....China hopes that Sino-American relations will further develop rather than retrogress. However, this should not be one-sided.....It is nothing serious even if the United States causes a retrogression in Sino-American relations. If worst comes to worst and the relations retrogress to those

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negotiations, the US and China finally signed a joint communiqué on August 17, 1982 that placed qualitative and quantitative limits on US arms sales to Taiwan (Sutter 1986, 142-143).[3]

The rationale behind the Chinese foreign policy reorientation, however, was more complex than its anger over the US arms sales to Taiwan. As a matter of fact, the US arms sale to Taiwan had never ceased since the Sino-American normalization. Immediately following the establishment of diplomatic relations with Beijing in January 1979, the Carter administration clearly stated that such arms sales would continue. Now why didn't Chinese leaders press this matter earlier? Or, in more general terms, why the Taiwan issue, which had been described by Mao as a "small issue" during Nixon's visit to Beijing in 1972, suddenly became larger and important in the Sino-American relationship during 1981-82?[4] These questions have to be addressed in a

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prior to 1972, China will not collapse.....The Chinese people will never bow and scrape for help" (Pollack 1991, 463).

3 The Communiqué states that "The United States does not seek to carry out a long-term policy of arms sales to Taiwan, that its arms sales will not exceed, either in qualitative or quantitative terms, the level of those supplied in recent years..... and that it intends to reduce gradually its sales of arms to Taiwan, leading over a period of time to a final resolution" (Pollack 1991, 465).

4 Mao would not permit the Taiwan problem to impede the process of Sino-American rapprochement. According to Kissinger (1997, 44), Mao said immediately when he met Nixon that "the issue of Taiwan is not important. The issue of international relations is the important one".

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context that reflects the changes in the international environment. By 1981, the shift of the international balance of power had led the Chinese leadership to calculate that significant changes had taken place in the Sino-Soviet-American trilateral relationship, and China's bargaining position vis-à-vis the US had been substantially improved. Based on this new assessment, Chinese leaders recognized that China's room for maneuver had increased, and thus they tried to exploit what they saw as a favorable situation.

Causal Factor II: The Change in Trilateral Relations

During the early 1980s, the power of the Soviet Union was seen by China to be substantially diminished because of its stagnant economy at home and its Adventurist policies abroad. Such a weakened Soviet Union was no longer perceived as a major threat to China. On the other hand, the United States was engaged in a substantial military build-up, and was said to have regained its self-confidence under Reagan's presidency. Moreover, the troubled relations between China and the US over Taiwan were further complicated by the Reagan administration policy that downgraded China's strategic importance in its confrontation with the Soviet Union. The dominant perception within the Reagan administration regarded China as a regional rather than a

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global power.[5] By contrast, during the early 1980s the Soviet leaders began to signal their willingness to improve Sino-Soviet relations. The Soviet overtures appeared particularly attractive because they were offered at a time when Sino-American relations began to sour.

Now in China's view, Soviet assertiveness in Asia had been significantly counterbalanced by the substantial increase in US military spending under Reagan's leadership. Moreover, the Soviet threat was perceived as primarily global and directed mainly against the United States and Western Europe. China was a target of secondary importance. In other words, China began to see the Soviet Union as less dangerous and its threat less imminent than it had been in earlier years. Thus, the change of situation in the international environment during the early 1980s moved China from a pro-US to a more independent foreign policy.

From one perspective, China's adoption of an independent foreign policy was motivated by its desire to occupy the "pivot" position in the trilateral relations. For the first time since the founding of the PRC the change in

5 In the view of the Reagan administration, Tokyo was a more valuable asset than Beijing for Washington's global strategy because of Japan's immense wealth, strategic location and its generally more sophisticated infrastructure (Tow 1994, 138).

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the global situation offered China the prospect for amity with both superpowers while the latter contended with each other (Dittmer 1992, 217).[6] The new situation was primarily the result of Soviet overstretch in South Asia. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan not only gave impetus to the US military buildup to counterbalance the Soviet advance, but also caused a net drain on the Soviet economy that placed increasing constraints on Soviet rearmament. Moscow's failure to suppress the 15 million Afghans made the prospect of attacking the 1 billion Chinese even more daunting. Thus, quite ironically, the very success of the Soviet effort to encircle China bogged the USSR in an endless protracted war and led China into a more secure position (Garver 1989, 120).

The threatening momentum that the Soviet Union had established in the mid-1970s thus began to fade in the early 1980s. Internationally, Soviet capabilities could not match its hegemonic ambitions. There was an increasingly effective resistance to the Soviet occupation in Afghanistan and a growing Soviet diplomatic isolation in the world community.

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6 The "pivot" is defined as a position where the occupant of the position is in amity with the other two players while the latter are in enmity with each other in a triangle game. The US occupied the "pivot" when the strategic triangularity was shaped in the early 1970s. But the

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A more resolute US policy toward the Soviet Union made the prospect of a new détente between the two superpowers quite remote. The demand of economic assistance from Vietnam and Cuba, and the reemergence of challenges to Communist rule in Eastern Europe made the socialist camp an increasingly unsustainable empire for the Soviet Union. Domestically, an aged and ossified leadership structure, continued economic stagnation, excessive military expenditures and diminished access to Western economic and technological assistance all contributed to a dim prospects for long-term Soviet ambitions.

Under such circumstances, there seemed fewer and fewer reasons for China to worry about a direct Soviet military threat. The USSR was increasingly perceived as a beleaguered and enfeebled power, and its military became less likely to embark on global conquest. Based on the new shift in the global balance of power, Chinese top strategic specialist Huan Xiang concluded that Soviet military power had been undermined, and the US and the USSR had reached an essential strategic parity. In the third world, the strategic positions of the two superpowers had been reversed, and the

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Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the election of Reagan totally reversed the triangle configuration.

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US now became more offensive. Thus, China regarded the two superpowers as imposing equal hegemonic threats to the world (Shambaugh 1994, 204).

Given the dramatic changes in the international environment in the 1980s, Chinese leaders began to question the wisdom of alignment with the United States against the Soviet Union. The Chinese "united front" policy against the USSR in the 1970s was based on the estimation of an immediate Soviet threat to Chinese security. The new reality of a weak Soviet Union and a revitalized United States undermined the rationale for a pro-US and anti-Soviet policy. Thus, the perceived changes in China's external environment constituted an important determinant in Beijing's decision to restructure its foreign policy in the 1980s.

Causal Factor III: Economic Considerations

Another factor that determined Chinese foreign policy restructuring in the 1980s was the need for economic development. The rise of the leadership represented by Deng Xiaoping and his associates opened a new era in China. The major agenda proposed by Deng's group was a shift in China's priority away from Mao's political mobilization to economic modernization. For Deng and his colleagues, economic

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development and the improvement of the material standard of living of the Chinese people was not only the best way to realize their dream of a powerful and prosperous China, but also an urgent task through which they could rebuild the legitimacy of the communist rule in China. Deng certainly understood that economic development would determine the success or failure of his leadership. Unlike Mao, who could base his leadership claim on the success of the Chinese communist revolution, Deng and his associates had to base their legitimacy on the results of economic development. With his legitimacy in mind, Deng advocated an unprecedented shift in China's top priority from Mao's revolutionary politics to economic modernization.

Deng's economic reform, however, would not be confined to Chinese domestic politics. It spilled over into foreign policy as well. More specifically, the new domestic economic development agenda restructured Chinese foreign policy in two ways. The first was Beijing's desire for a peaceful and stable external environment to serve China's long-term development needs. A peaceful environment could protect China's modernization effort from being disrupted by unwanted external disturbances and could ease external pressure so that China could transfer more resources from

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military spending to domestic construction. In keeping with this objective, China adopted what could be described as a policy of omni-directional peaceful coexistence. Beijing tried to improve ties with all countries, including its traditional adversaries such as governments formerly regarded as "reactionary" or "revisionist". No longer was China a revolutionary force that supported insurgencies against the ruling class. In other words, China became much more willing to support the international status quo.

The second outcome of the emphasis on economic development was the expansion of China's foreign economic contacts. Opening to the outside world constituted the cornerstone of Chinese foreign policy in the 1980s. The Chinese leaders recognized that the success of their modernization effort depended on continued integration with the international economic system. Because only through the international economic interactions could China obtain the trade, foreign investment, access to advanced technology and managerial expertise that were all crucial for the Chinese economy. Thus, following Garver (1989, 116), China's foreign policy since the early 1980s has "been driven by the imperative of economic development associated with the four modernizations. The most important of these imperatives can

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be summarized with two words: technology and peace".

Now economic cooperation with Hong Kong and Taiwan became the main channel connecting the two islands with mainland China. Economic exchange preceded diplomatic contact between China and South Korea. Similarly, economic considerations were also an important impetus accelerating the rapprochement between China and the Soviet Union (Naughton 1994, 66).

Chinese strategic alignment with the United States at a time of rapid deterioration of Soviet-US relations under Reagan's presidency was extremely provocative to the Soviet Union. To continue such an anti-Soviet alignment would be conducive to higher Soviet pressure on the Chinese border and thus necessitate more resources for the Chinese military. This was surely counterproductive to the new goal of Chinese foreign policy. To create an environment conducive to economic development mandated that Beijing distance itself from the United States and establish a more balanced relationship with the two superpowers. Thus, China began to downgrade the single-minded anti-Soviet themes and emphasize independence in its foreign policy in the early

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1980s.[7]

Sino-Soviet normalization also had more positive economic implications. While China probably could not obtain from the Soviet Union and its Eastern European bloc the most advanced technology, they did offer low and medium technology which was in some sense even more appropriate for Chinese economic development. Labor-intensive Soviet "low tech" machinery, compared with US "high-tech" equipment, was more suitable to create jobs for China's huge population. To assimilate and diffuse imported technology had proved to be a difficult task in all developing countries. Soviet "low-tech" equipment enjoyed an advantage because the educational level of many Chinese job seekers was quite low. To master and maintain the Soviet equipment, compared with its more sophisticated US counterparts, would be relatively easier. Soviet "low-tech" was also considerably cheaper than US "high-tech". Soviet advisers and engineers were cheaper for Beijing to hire than Western personnel, and Chinese workers could obtain technical training in the Soviet Union at a lower costs. Moreover, there was complementarity between the

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7 To demonstrate China's new position, Chinese Foreign Minister Huang Hua told the UN Secretary-General in August 1982 that "China will never cling to any superpowers. China will never play the 'US Card' against the Soviet Union, nor the 'Soviet card' against the United States. We

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Chinese and Soviet economies. China's light industrial and agricultural products could be traded for Soviet developed heavy industrial machinery. Given the similar economic structure and institutional arrangements, barter trade was much easier to conduct between China and the Soviet Union. This means that China could develop trade with the Soviet Union without drawing on its valuable foreign currency reserves. Finally, many of China's large state-owned enterprises were initially established with Soviet technical support in the 1950s. These enterprises were equipped with old Soviet machines and adaptable to a new generation of Soviet equipment (Garver 1989).

Since Chinese foreign policy was restructured in 1982, not surprisingly, China and the Soviet Union have signed a number of trade agreements. In 1987 Sino-Soviet trade reached US$ 2.9 billion and in 1988 exceeded $3.5 billion. Moscow also provided technical assistance to help Beijing upgrade 156 industrial enterprises whose technology was imported from the Soviet Union during the 1950s. In December 1988, the USSR even made a long-term loan to the local government in Xingjiang, a Chinese province located in the

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will also not allow anyone to play the 'Chinese card'" (Pollack 1991, 467).

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strategically important area along the Sino-Soviet border (Huan 1989, 104).

While increasing economic cooperation with the Soviet Union and its Eastern European bloc, China continued to place higher priority on maintaining its economic relations with the West. China repeatedly declared that the shifts in Sino-Soviet relations should not come at the expense of relations with the United States and the other Western countries. As a matter of fact, although China maintained political and strategic distance from the US, it made every effort to establish even closer economic relations with the West. China's independent foreign policy, then, created a duality in relations with the West. At the political level, China dissociated itself from the earlier de facto strategic alliance with the US. But this divergence did not affect Beijing's economic cooperation with the West. It has been argued that China maintained its military cooperation with the US since 1982 mainly to guarantee its access to US technology and markets (Garver 1989, 122).[8] Thus, as Harding

8 China's attitude toward military cooperation with the West in the 1980s was ambivalent. For example, China postponed the first US naval visit to Chinese ports. When the visit finally occurred under US pressure, Chinese media was ordered to give it low key treatment. China also downplayed the significance of the joint naval exercise by PLA worships and the US Pacific Fleet in January 1986 by saying that "The

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(1984, 200) points out, since 1982 "China's foreign policy has been marked by a separation of politics and economics", so that China can balance its relations with the two superpowers and satisfy its dual need of sustaining access to US technology and soliciting Soviet support for its modernization.

Causal Factor IV: Deng's Pragmatism

The Chinese independent foreign policy with its priority given to economic development was closely associated with Deng Xiaoping's leadership. It was widely recognized that Deng had been the architect of Chinese foreign policy since 1978 when he came to power after Mao's death (Shambaugh 1994; Yahuda 1995). Deng wielded executive authority and set the terms for the conduct of relations with the two superpowers. No initiative could be undertaken in Chinese foreign policy without Deng's endorsement. Thus, Deng inevitably left his personal imprint on the making of post-Mao foreign policy.

Deng's foreign policy was characterized by his pragmatism.[9] Unlike Mao, Deng dramatically downplayed the

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ships just passed each other and exchanged greetings" (Garver 1989, 121-122).

9 Deng's pragmatism was shaped in his childhood. Unlike Mao, whose rebellious life started first with his defiance of his father, Deng was

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role of ideology in foreign policy making. For Mao, the world was governed by "contradiction", and Chinese foreign policy was always guided by the identified primary "contradiction" of the contemporary world. Thus, the contradiction between the capitalist and socialist camps determined China's pro-Soviet policy in the 1950s, and the contradiction between the superpowers and small-medium-sized states justified a Chinese "united front" against the "social imperialist" Soviet Union in the 1970s. Compared with his earlier views on socialist revolution and national liberation, Mao's "three worlds" and "intermediate zone" theories in the 1970s were much deideologized. However, the stamp of ideology could still be easily found in Mao's foreign policy even in the later years of his life. For example, his three worlds theory treated the third world states as morally superior to the superpowers because they were naturally progressive and anti-hegemonic. Mao also defined Soviet "social imperialism" as the most dangerous enemy and subsequently endorsed a single-minded anti-Soviet foreign policy.

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overwhelmingly influenced by his father, a wealthy landlord and entrepreneur holding pragmatist philosophy himself in daily life. When Deng grew up, his pragmatist view became so dominant that he joined the communist movement without adopting a dogmatic attitude to any Marxist doctrines (Yang 1995).

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To abandon Maoist ideology in Chinese foreign policy, Deng fundamentally restructured the anti-Soviet policy into an independent and non-ideological one, where neither the United States nor the Soviet Union was as a rule described as an imperialist power. By following an independent line, China shared common views with the United States on some issues, but kept closer to the Soviet Union on others. In essence, the adoption of the independent approach meant that Deng's pragmatism had replaced any ideological principles as the linchpin of Chinese foreign policy. China would no longer establish relations with countries on the basis of their political systems and ideologies. On contrary, Beijing would determine its position on international issues according to Chinese national interests.[10]

Under the guideline of Deng's pragmatism, the new independent foreign policy enabled China to take a more flexible position on a variety of international issues. Recognizing that exporting revolution was not productive for Chinese economic development, China began cultivating good

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10 Deng favored an issue- and time-specific approach. The famous saying that reflects his fundamental philosophy is, "It doesn't matter whether a cat is black or white, so long as it catches mice". But when Deng's colleague Bo Yibo asked him what he really meant by saying that, Deng replied that it made no difference how to interpret it because the statement was from the 1960s and not transferable to the current situation (Goodman 1995, 3-4).

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state-to-state relations with countries around its periphery. As early as 1978, Deng already stated explicitly that China would stop assisting communist insurgent parties in Southeast Asia. This soon brought an end to China's remaining material support for revolutionary movements in the world (Yahuda 1995, 147). In terms of economic relations with the outside world, China not only accepted other countries' capitalism, but also established capitalist-like "special economic zones" for its own coast cities. The new policy enabled China to separate economic interests from political differences and develop commercial relations with all countries regardless whether they had diplomatic relations with China. One particular example of China's independent and pragmatic diplomacy that troubled the Sino-American relations was China's arms sales to the Middle East. Arms sales were previously condemned by China as typical imperialist behavior. But under Deng's pragmatism, they became normal business that China would conduct at any corner in the world as long as it could make profit. Thus Chinese foreign policy under Deng's pragmatism was characterized by a non-ideological pursuit for Chinese national interests that were increasingly defined in economic terms.

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CHAPTER 7

CHINA'S VIEW OF RESTRUCTURING

It is appropriate to also examine the causal factors in foreign policy restructuring from the perspective of the Chinese government. This kind of research can be done through a systematic analysis of some Chinese publications. Compared with their Western counterparts, Chinese publications enjoy a unique advantage in this study, because they, as the official voice of the regime, are supposed to loyally and accurately reflect the view of the government. As Chang (1989, 27) points out, publications in China offer official interpretations of events and reflect the agenda of governmental policy.

The Choice of *Beijing Review* and the Years

Beijing Review is chosen to represent these official publications in China. There are two reasons for this choice. First, according to empirical research, among the six major news sources in the People's Republic of China, *Beijing Review* and *Beijing Radio Foreign Services* (*BRFS*) give the most attention to China's foreign relations (Bobrow, Chan and Kringen 1979, 197-198). Compared with the voice messages of *BRFS*, the advantage of *Beijing Review* for this research is obvious, since the print media are

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routinely saved by libraries, making them easily accessible for analysis. By contrast, tapes of a Chinese radio station are seldom available. Second, according to many Sinologists, *Beijing Review* is "an accurate and reliable indicator of official Chinese foreign policy perceptions" (Dillon, Burton and Soderlund 1977, 456). In terms of reflecting the governmental views, *Beijing Review* is an ideal selection that can be used to explore the official articulation of the rationale behind government decisions in foreign policy, because *Beijing Review* is an authoritative national news weekly sponsored by the Chinese central government.

Three years, 1963, 1972 and 1982, have been selected for this study. These are the years when the three major changes in Chinese foreign policy took place. 1963 was the watershed year which witnessed the Sino-Soviet dispute moving toward an open break. Although there had been disharmony between the Chinese and Soviet leaders in earlier years, which can be traced back to the 20th CPSU congress in 1956, it was not openly publicized until 1963. As a matter of fact, there is a scholarly consensus that regards 1963 as the year when the Sino-Soviet open dispute broke out (Griffith 1964; Levine 1968; Low 1976; Quested 1984). Given the fact that no information about the Sino-Soviet dispute would be released in a Party-controlled publication as long as the dispute was kept a political secret, the selection of

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the year when the open dispute broke out seems appropriate. 1972 is selected because it was the year when the late US President Richard Nixon paid his historic visit to China, signed the Shanghai Communiqué, and thus began the process of Sino-American rapprochement. Similarly, 1982 is chosen because it was in September that year that the new Chinese "independent foreign policy" was formally adopted by the 12th Party Congress. The fundamental rationale of these selections is that in the years when the foreign policy changes took place, there must be something carried in the official publications, in this case *Beijing Review*, to explain and defend the new policies. Thus, these articulations can be used to examine the Chinese government views on the foreign policy restructuring. The examination focuses on any text in *Beijing Review* concerning Chinese foreign relations with the US and the USSR.

China's View of the Sino-Soviet Split

The Sino-Soviet split, according to the case study in Chapter Four, can be attributed to five major factors: the Soviet-US détente, the ideological dispute, different estimations of general war, the Great Leap Forward, and Mao's world view.

According to the 1963 *Beijing Review*, China's concern about the Soviet-US détente focused on the possibility that the all-round cooperation between the US and USSR would be

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achieved at China's expense. By quoting articles in the American press, China expressed its concern about the emergence of a reversal of alliance and the redivision of the world. Particular concern was expressed about the partial nuclear test ban treaty and China's right to develop its own nuclear capabilities. China complained that the Soviet leaders had colluded with the US in this respect long before they signed the nuclear test ban treaty. On June 20, 1959, China claimed, the Soviet Union informed China that it could not honor the agreement on offering China a sample of an atomic bomb and the relevant data concerning the manufacture of nuclear weapons. China saw this betrayal as a gift that the Soviet leaders presented to the US at the eve of the 1959 Soviet-US summit. The Soviet signature on the partial nuclear test ban treaty finally confirmed Chinese suspicion that a Soviet-US alliance trying to prevent China from developing its own nuclear weapons had emerged.[1]

Ideological dispute played an important role in the Sino-Soviet split. China's focus in the dispute was on three issues: de-Stalinization, peaceful transition and peaceful coexistence. The Chinese government insisted that Stalin's mistakes, compared to his contributions to the world revolution, were only secondary. China also worried that Khrushchev's complete denunciation of Stalin would defame the whole socialist system, the "proletarian dictatorship",

[1] See "The Soviet-US Détente" in Appendix A.

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and the international communist movement.

China did not oppose peaceful transition and peaceful coexistence in principle, as long as these two propositions were understood in the orthodox Marxist framework. For a genuine Marxist, China argued, peaceful transition from capitalism to socialism should be taken as an exception rather than a rule, because the condition for it to happen was rare and there was no precedent for peaceful transition in history.

By contrast, peaceful coexistence did exist in contemporary international relations. In the Chinese view, the application of peaceful coexistence in foreign policies could buy time for the socialist camp to develop its economy. But the policy of peaceful coexistence could only maintain the international status quo. It would not change the world capitalist system. Thus, the realization of world communism depended on class struggle and national liberation movements. For Marxists, peaceful coexistence was only the means but not the end. it should not replace the life-and-death revolution in communist movements, and it should not become, as Khrushchev advocated, the "general line" of the foreign policy of the socialist countries.[2]

Another important difference between China and the Soviet Union was caused by different estimations of the possibility of general war. China denounced the Soviet view

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that any local war in the nuclear era was dangerous because it might spark off a destructive conflagration and eliminate a greater part of mankind. In the Chinese view, this concern not only reflected the Soviet leaders' anti-Marxist capitulationism, but was also disproved by the facts of history since the end of World War II. China claimed that the US was not able to use nuclear weapons to prevent its allies from being defeated in China, Korea, Vietnam and Cuba. On the contrary, revolutions in these countries had been victorious and had greatly undermined the strength of the capitalist camp.

In the Chinese view, there were two reasons that prevented the US from using nuclear weapons and becoming involved in a general war. First, it would be politically difficult for any US politician to use nuclear weapons in a local war. Truman once threatened to use atomic bombs on the Korean battlefield.[3] But his threat immediately raised domestic protests as well as opposition from European and Asian allies. Second, massive destructiveness made nuclear weapons difficult to use in a local guerrilla war. Because in the so-called revolutionary civil wars and national liberation wars, the fighting was often at close range. The use of unclear weapons could only destroy both sides in the

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[2] See "Ideological Dispute" in Appendix A.

[3] *Beijing Review* attributes this threat to President Truman. In fact, it was General Eisenhower who made this threat when he was a candidate for President in 1952.

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battlefields. Therefore, in the nuclear era, Lenin's preaching of revolution and war was still valid. Because revolutionary local war would not lead to general war, but had definitely restrained Western forces and weakened world capitalism in piecemeal fashion.[4]

Beijing Review also briefly mentioned the Great Leap Forward as a source of Sino-Soviet dispute. China complained that Khrushchev publicly called China's people's communes as reactionary and expressed Beijing's dissatisfaction about the Soviet interference in China's domestic policy.[5]

China's View of Sino-American Rapprochement

The Sino-American rapprochement, according to the case study in Chapter Five, can be attributed to four major factors: Soviet threat plus US retrenchment, Chinese domestic factionalism, Mao's reformulated theory, and economic considerations.

The overwhelming majority of the *People's Daily* articles and the Chinese UN representative's speeches published in 1972 *Beijing Review* was devoted to the condemnation of Soviet expansionism. Particular attention was paid to Soviet activities in the South Asian subcontinent and the Indian Ocean. China saw the Soviet support to India in its conflict with Pakistan as a serious Soviet effort to infiltrate into the region of the Indian

[4] See "The Possibility of the General War" in Appendix A.

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Ocean and South Asia. China warned that Soviet expansionists knew no bounds. Today they could expand their "security boundaries" to the Indian Ocean, the next day they would push them further to the Pacific and the Atlantic.

In China's eyes, Soviet expansionism in the South Asian subcontinent was just a part of its global effort to contend for world hegemony. In Soviet global expansion, two events particularly bedeviled the Chinese leaders. One was the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia and the other was the Soviet deployment in Mongolia. In several occasions in the 1972 UN General Assembly Sessions, Chinese representatives recalled the Soviet surprising strike against Czechoslovakia and repeatedly required Soviet withdrawal from Mongolia.

It seems that in 1972 China was also concerned about the possibility of a Soviet nuclear attack against China. In the UN debate on the issue of world disarmament, China opposed any proposal initiated by the Soviet Union. China declared in the UN that China, as a nuclear state, will at no time and in no circumstances be the first to use nuclear weapons, and challenged the Soviet Union to make the same statement. China claimed that all the Soviet proposals on disarmament were schemes of sham relaxation of tension but real arms expansion. In the Chinese view, before any plan on world disarmament could be seriously discussed, concrete steps should be taken to create the preconditions for such

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[5] See "The Great Leap Forward" in Appendix A.

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discussion. One of the most important preconditions was a Soviet commitment that it would not be the first to use nuclear weapons, especially against non-nuclear states and states with few nuclear weapons. These requirements seem to reveal a real Chinese concern in 1972 about a Soviet preemptive or first nuclear strike against China.

The 1972 *Beijing Review* also revealed a Chinese perception of US decline. In the Chinese view, during the early 1970s, the US had exhausted its resources both physically and morally. This US decline was a result of the US overstretch as a self-appointed world "gendarme". The heavy financial load resulting from the US overstretch was further worsened by the US domestic economy in the early 1970s, which experienced successive years of deficit, inflation, and decline in gold reserves. Taking advantage of the US difficulty, Western European countries and Japan started to challenge the US, and thus increased the tension of competition within imperialism and further weakened the US position in the world. This Chinese perception of general US decline influenced China's interpretation of US policy around China's periphery.[6]

The influence of Mao's intermediate zone and three worlds theories was also clearly articulated in the 1972 *Beijing Review*. China saw the "united front" against

[6] See "Soviet Threat and US Decline" in Appendix B.

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hegemony formed by the medium-sized and small countries as the most important trend in the 1970s. Abandoning the Marxist class analysis, China expressed sympathy for the European countries' concern about peace and security. China warned that the Soviet Union was creating a false impression of détente in Europe, and repeatedly reminded the European countries of a possible surprise Soviet strike. As for the third world countries, China emphasized the common history and experience and claimed that China was the natural friend of the third world.[7]

China's View of Independent Foreign Policy

The Chinese Independent Foreign Policy, according to the case study in Chapter Six, can be attributed to four major factors: Taiwan problem, the change in trilateral relations, economic considerations, and Deng's pragmatism.

US arms sales to Taiwan were taken very seriously in all the concerned articles published in 1982 *Beijing Review*. All the articles contended that no country that had diplomatic relations with PRC should sell weapons to Taiwan. Any country selling arms to Taiwan was encroaching upon China's sovereignty and interfered in China's internal affairs. *Beijing Review* articles warned that the PRC had fought for many years to protect its sovereignty, and China's independence was obtained at the price of blood and

[7] See "Mao's Three Worlds Theory" in Appendix B.

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lives. Any violation of China's sovereignty would seriously hurt China's national feeling and thus would never be accommodated.

China claimed that it would solve the Taiwan problem peacefully. But China foresaw that the prospect of peaceful unification would be minimal unless Taiwan's independence could be deterred. Based on this judgment, China regarded any improvement of Taiwan's defense capability as counterproductive to peaceful unification. Thus, when the US insisted on a peaceful settlement of the Taiwan problem as the precondition of ending US arms sales, China interpreted this assertion as a twofold scheme: first attempting to impede the peaceful unification of Taiwan with the mainland by selling weapons to Taiwan, and then using the failure of peaceful unification as an excuse for continuing US arms sales.[8]

The perceived changes in the international environment was another important factor contributing to China's independent foreign policy. Here the Soviet "strategic difficulty" was a salient topic. According to the *Beijing Review* articles, the Soviet national economy was steadily declining, and it was entering its most difficult period since the end of the World War II. The Soviet economic problem was further aggravated by Soviet expansionist

[8] See "Taiwan Issue" in Appendix C.

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policy. The Soviet Union needed to spend US$ 10,000 million annually for its interference in Afghanistan and its assistance to Vietnam and Cuba. It had to use about 13-14% of its GNP to maintain its current military spending. All these military expenditures constituted an intolerable burden on the Soviet economy.[9]

Maintaining a peaceful international environment to protect China's economic development became the cornerstone of Chinese foreign policy in the early 1980s. Many *Beijing Review* articles reflected this new government priority. As an antithesis to the Maoist concept that economics should be subordinate to politics, China now propounded that economics should determine politics in China's foreign relations. To defend the shift in policy, *Beijing Review* portrayed the new priority as a genuine Marxist policy, and contended that international economic cooperation was an inevitable result of social progress. Under the new rule that diplomacy should serve economic interests, economic consideration became an important determinant in foreign policy restructuring.[10]

Explanations for the Unconfirmed Factors

There are several causal factors that have been identified by the case studies but cannot be confirmed in the text of *Beijing Review*. They are "Mao's dialectical world view" as a causal factor for the Sino-Soviet split;

[9] See "The Change in Trilateral Relations" in Appendix C.

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"Chinese domestic factionalism", "economic considerations" as the causal factors for Sino-American Rapprochement; and "Deng's Pragmatism" as a causal factor for China's independent foreign policy.

While an articulated factor in *Beijing Review* does provide additional evidence for the existence of that factor, the failure to find it in *Beijing Review* does not prove the non-existence of that factor. *Beijing Review* is an official publication tightly controlled by the government under an authoritarian regime. It can only publish those things that the government permits. Anything that contradicts either the government's existing policy or the government public image will not be published.

Thus, it is quite understandable that some causal factors are not found in *Beijing Review*. Chinese domestic factionalism as a party secret will never be revealed in a publication. There are two reasons for the absence of economic considerations as a causal factor for Sino-American rapprochement. First, economics was considered as secondary to other factors in the case study, because in 1972, after several years of political upheaval, China only began to restore normal economic activities. Economic considerations were far less important than they would be in later years when economic modernization became the party's top priority.

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[10] See "Economic Considerations" in Appendix C.

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Second, in Mao's lifetime, ideology always occupied an important position in China's politics. Given China's public image as a genuine Marxist state, it was politically difficult for the regime to publicly admit that the need for Western economic assistance determined one of its most important foreign policy decisions.

The absence of "Mao's world view" and "Deng's pragmatism" as causal factors in *Beijing Review* can also be explained within the context of Chinese domestic politics. Although China was a highly personalistic state in both Mao's and Deng's periods, the official Marxist doctrine required that any Chinese government policy appear as a result of collective decision. Thus, any personal opinion would not be published unless it had been adopted as a public policy approved by the party as a whole. Unlike Mao's three worlds theory, "Mao's nationalism" and "Deng's pragmatism" had never been publicly recognized as government policies. Thus, it is quite natural that they could not be found in an official publication.

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CHAPTER 8

CONCLUSION

Foreign policy theorists suggest a variety of sources to explain foreign policy restructuring. The range of the identified sources covers macro-level factors such as international structural changes to micro-level causes such as the psychological processes of decision-makers. Through theory building propelled by the level-of-analysis debate and foreign policy restructuring studies, a scholarly consensus has emerged that recognizes the need for using multiple sources to explain foreign policy restructuring.

Causal Factors for Chinese Restructuring

Using this theoretical guideline to study Chinese foreign policy, this dissertation identifies thirteen causal factors explaining the changes in the Chinese case. Five factors are responsible for the Sino-Soviet split. The emergence of a Soviet-US cooperative relationship in the late 1950s, especially with respect to nuclear arms test ban and non-proliferation, was interpreted by China as a serious threat to its national security. Khrushchev's de-Stalinzation movement plus "peaceful coexistence" and "peaceful transition" theories produced a Sino-Soviet ideological dispute. The Sino-Soviet different estimations

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of the possibility of a general war, which was derived from a "differential threshold" in favor of China vis-à-vis the Soviet Union in dealing with the US, tore apart Sino-Soviet policies toward local wars in the third world. The Great Leap Forward, an economic utopia attempting to strengthen communist legitimacy in China, spilled over to China's foreign policy and complicated Sino-Soviet relations. Finally, during the early 1960s, Mao's restless and dialectical thought moved in the direction of Chinese nationalism and became determined to challenge Soviet leadership in the socialist camp.

Four factors caused the Sino-American rapprochement. An immediate Soviet threat to China's national survival plus US retrenchment around China's periphery were primary in stimulating the de facto Sino-American strategic partnership. The downfall of Lin Biao in a Chinese domestic power struggle ended his "dual adversary" approach in China's foreign policy and legitimized Zhou Enlai's overtures to the US. Mao's updated intermediate zone and three worlds theses provided theoretical guidance for the formation of China's anti-Soviet united front. Mao's new preference also determined his endorsement of Zhou Enlai's pro-US approach. The need for economic development and Western technology was an additional reason for the Sino-American rapprochement, although it was of secondary

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importance compared to other factors.

Another four factors contributed to the PRC's "independent foreign policy". Taiwan was the immediate cause of the new restructuring in Chinese foreign policy. Changes in trilateral relations undermined the rationale behind China's pro-US and anti-Soviet policy. Economic considerations required China to obtain Soviet low and medium technology while maintaining access to US advanced technology. Finally, Deng's pragmatism dramatically downplayed the role of ideology in China's decision making, emphasized the priority of economics, and thus shaped a more flexible foreign policy to serve China's economic interest.

A Pattern of Chinese Restructuring

Multiple sources of foreign policy restructuring are found in this study. For example, "ideological dispute", "the Great Leap Forward", and "Chinese domestic factionalism" can be included in the unit or domestic level. Similarly, "Mao's dialectical world view" and "Deng's pragmatism" can be classified as individual or personal causes. Some theories are especially relevant in certain cases. For example, Hermann's (1990) argument that hypothesizes leaders' reconceptualization as the driving force for foreign policy change applies particularly well to the role of "Mao's reformulated theory" in the Sino-American rapprochement.

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Aside from the multiple sources of China's policy change, some unique characteristics found in this project constitute a general pattern in Chinese foreign policy restructuring. First of all, some causal factors are consistently present in all three Chinese foreign policy changes. Thus they can be regarded as "stable" causal factors in these Chinese cases. Three factors, namely "Soviet-US détente", "Soviet threat plus US retrenchment", and "changes in trilateral relations", can be broadly placed into realist security and structural analysis frameworks. They basically involve strategic changes in China's external environment to which Chinese foreign policy responded and adapted. These factors are not only present in all three case studies on Chinese foreign policy, but are also found in the text of *Beijing Review*. Thus, the structural realist argument seems to be particularly strong in explaining Chinese foreign policy restructuring.

Another "stable" category involves three individual factors: Mao's dialectical world view, Mao's reformulated theory, and Deng's pragmatism. They, too, are present in all three case studies. This is hardly surprising, given the fact that the Chinese regime is highly personalistic. In fact, both Rosenau's (1966) early theory and recent foreign policy restructuring research (Skidmore 1994; Volgy and Schwarz 1994) predict the importance of leaders' personal

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influence on foreign policy in authoritarian regimes. However, there is one difference between these individual factors and the strategic factors, that is, the individual factors are not confirmed in the text of *Beijing Review*. This is natural because individual factors are normally not acknowledged by the Chinese government to be sources of public policies. It is quite understandable for *Beijing Review*, a state-controlled publication, not to reveal those features not acknowledged by the government.[1]

In addition to these "stable" factors, there is a notable "declining" causal factor in Chinese foreign policy restructuring. This refers to the ideological sources for policy change. Ideology was an important reason for the Sino-Soviet split in the late 1950s and early 1960s. As a source for policy change it has been identified in both the case studies and the text of *Beijing Review*. But during the 1970s the ideological factor clearly was not a source for the Sino-American rapprochement. Although some scholars maintain that "Mao's reformulated theory" during that period was driven by his Marxist ideology, this seems to be a weak argument that is scarcely convincing.[2] Entering the 1980s, ideological factors were totally dropped by scholars to explain China's independent foreign policy. As a matter of

[1] For detailed discussion see "Explanations for the Unconfirmed Factors" in Chapter 7.
[2] Detailed discussion see Chapter 5, "Causal Factor III: Mao's Reformulated Theory".

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fact, most scholars regard the decline of ideology as one of the major changes in post-Mao Chinese foreign policy.

In contrast to ideological sources, economic considerations can be seen as a "rising" causal factor in Chinese foreign policy decision-making. Economics was certainly not a cause of the Sino-Soviet split in the 1960s. Rather than a cause, the economy was actually a victim of the split. The Chinese economy was seriously hurt by the withdrawal of Soviet experts and economic assistance. Thus, to some extent, the Sino-Soviet split was a product of the Chinese policy which subordinated economics to politics.

During the 1970s, however, economic considerations, such as the need for Western technology, began to emerge as a factor contributing to the Sino-American rapprochement. But compared to strategic concerns such as the Soviet threat, economics was definitely secondary in Chinese decisions during that period. Although the economy was regarded as a causal factor in the case study of the Sino-American rapprochement, its existence cannot be confirmed in the text of the 1972 *Beijing Review*. By contrast, during the 1980s, economic considerations became the defining character of post-Mao Chinese foreign policy. Economic issues are widely accepted as one of the most important reasons for the 1982 policy restructuring. They are present as a causal factor for China's independent foreign policy in both the

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case study and the *Beijing Review* text.[3]

The remainder of the identified factors, the different estimations of general war, the Great Leap Forward, Chinese domestic factionalism, and the Taiwan problem, can be finally classified as "sporadic" causal factors. These factors are present in some periods but absent in others without a pattern. For example, the Taiwan problem was a remarkable issue in Sino-American relations in the early 1980s, but it was purposely downplayed by China in its decision on the Sino-American rapprochement in the early 1970s. Chinese domestic factionalism was arguably a causal factor for the Sino-American détente, given the coincidence of the downfall of Lin Biao and the rapprochement between China and the US. But factionalism was irrelevant for the adoption of the independent foreign policy in the early 1980s, because Deng Xiaoping was in power both before and after the initiation of the independent policy. In fact, It was Deng who both handled the Sino-American normalization and presided over the independent foreign policy restructuring. Therefore, the "sporadic" factors, while they are all theoretically relevant, do not appear to be sources for change in each Chinese case. Their presence as causal factors is irregular and largely situation-determined.

[3] Economy was given the top priority in Deng's China. An extreme example of this new priority in foreign policy is China's arms sales in the third world. China sold billions of dollars worth of weapons to both Iran and Iraq during their war in the 1980s (Jian 1996, 89).

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Some Contributions

Historically, different foreign policy theories indicated different sources of foreign policy changes. Recent research, such as restructuring theory, recognize that foreign policy changes are usually caused by multiple sources. Chinese foreign policy analysts (Jian 1996; Robinson 1982; Shambaugh 1994) applied these theories to Chinese foreign policy restructuring. But their studies usually focused only on a particular change in Chinese foreign policy, and consequently failed to produce a general pattern for Chinese foreign policy restructuring.

By contrast, applying the "multiple sources" approach to a longer historical period covering all the major Chinese foreign policy changes, this dissertation finds the existence of a general pattern in Chinese foreign policy restructuring. This Chinese pattern demonstrates that, while multiple sources can be identified in Chinese foreign policy changes, the causal power of these sources are different. Strategic changes in the external environments and leaders' personalities appear to be the most stable causal factors in Chinese foreign policy changes. Ideology appears to be a declining causal factor, which becomes increasingly irrelevant in Chinese foreign policy decision making. By contrast, economic considerations appear to be a rising causal factor that becomes increasingly important in

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determining Chinese foreign policy changes.

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APPENDIX A

ARTICULATED FACTORS IN 1963 *BEIJING REVIEW*

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1. The Soviet-US Détente

"A Betrayal of the Soviet People!" (*Beijing Review*. August 9, 1963)

In concluding the partial nuclear test ban treaty the government of the Soviet Union in partnership with the governments of the United States and Britain has perpetrated a big fraud jeopardizing the interests of the peoples of the world and the cause of world peace. Now, the Soviet leaders and the Soviet press are doing their utmost to boost this treaty, in an attempt to increase the effect of this fraud and to lull and deceive still more the peoples of the world who oppose imperialism.

The Soviet leaders see only the US imperialists. They believe that everything would be plain sailing if only the US imperialists would give a nod and pat them on the shoulder. In their eyes, the other socialist countries and all other peace-loving countries are nothing. The Chairman of the council of Ministers of the USSR, Nikita S. Khrushchev, has publicly stated: "If peaceful, friendly relations were established between the United States and the USSR, it is doubtful whether anyone could complicate the international situation as he would have to reckon with the position of our two countries." He has also more than once called for "all-round cooperation" between the United States and the Soviet Union. This "all-round cooperation" appears

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to be what the Soviet leader has been going all out to obtain from Camp David to Vienna and from Vienna to Moscow. Now they have cooked up this treaty in Moscow with the United States and its partner-Britain, they want the more than 130 other countries to put their signatures to it. What is more, they have said that this as "a good start," which means that they intend to proceed along this path of US-Soviet cooperation to dominate the world.

It is most obvious that the tripartite treaty is aimed at tying China's hands. The US representative to the Moscow talks has said publicly that the United States, Britain and the Soviet Union were able to arrive at an agreement, because "we could work together to prevent China getting a nuclear capability." Recently, while fraternizing with US imperialism on the most intimate terms, the Soviet leader and the Soviet press have been gnashing their teeth in their bitter hatred towards socialist China. They use the same language as US imperialism in abusing China. This is an US-Soviet alliance against China pure and simple.

Inspired by Moscow, the West is giving publicity to the allegation that "a real 'redivision' of the world was taking place" (AFP). The US propaganda machine has even declared: "If Khrushchev only turns a fish eye at China--which he is inclined to do anyway for purposes of his own--we might go far to accommodate him"(*New York Times*). And the *Chicago Sun*

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Times was even more outspoken when it called for "a reversal of alliances" by the Soviet Union and said that Washington "is offering a red carpet welcome for a returning Soviet prodigal." Obviously the red carpet is being unrolled to welcome the returning prodigal.

"Statement by the Spokesman of the Chinese Government" (*Beijing Review.* August 16, 1963)

True, Soviet-US relations appear to be somewhat relaxed because the Soviet leaders, treating enemies as friends, have struck a political bargain with US imperialism which is entirely to the advantage of the United States.

But at what price is this kind of relaxation achieved? It is achieved at the price of the interests of the Soviet people, of the socialist camp and of the people of the whole world, and at the price of facilitating the nuclear superiority of US imperialism through its manufacture, development and proliferation of nuclear weapons.

It is not only at present that the Soviet leaders have begun to collude with US imperialism and attempt to manacle China.

As far back as June 20, 1959, when there was not yet the slightest sign of a treaty on stopping nuclear tests the Soviet government unilaterally tore up the agreement on new technology for national defense concluded between China and the Soviet Union on October 15,1957, and refused to provide

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China with a sample of an atomic bomb and technical data concerning its manufacture. This was done as a presentation gift at the time the Soviet leader went to the United States for talks with Eisenhower in September.

On August 25, 1962, two days before the United States and Britain put forward their draft on the partial halting of nuclear tests, the Soviet government notified China that US Secretary of State Rusk had proposed an agreement stipulating that, firstly, the nuclear powers should undertake to refrain from transferring nuclear weapons and technical information concerning their manufacture to non-nuclear countries, and that, secondly, the countries not in possession of nuclear weapons should undertake to refrain from manufacturing them, from seeking them from the nuclear powers or from accepting technical information concerning their manufacture. The Soviet government gave an affirmative reply to this proposal of Rusk's.

The Chinese government sent three memoranda to the Soviet Government. on September 3, 1962, October 20, 1962, and June 4, 1963, stating that it was a matter for the Soviet government whether it committed itself to the United States to refrain from transferring nuclear weapons and technical information concerning their manufacture to China; but that the Chinese government hoped the Soviet government would not infringe on China's sovereign rights and act for

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China in assuming an obligation to refrain from manufacturing nuclear weapons. We solemnly stated that we would not tolerate the conclusion, in disregard of China's opposition, of any sort of treaty between the Soviet government and the United States which aimed at depriving the Chinese people of their right to take steps to resist the nuclear threats of US imperialism, and that we would issue statements to make our position known.

We hoped that after such earnest counsel from us, the Soviet leaders would rein in before reaching the precipice and would not render matters irretrievable. Unfortunately, they did not pay the slightest attention to our counsel. They finally concluded the treaty on the partial halting of nuclear test with the United States and Britain, thereby attempting to bring pressure to bear China and force her into commitments.

The whole course of events amounts to this: First the Soviet government tried to subdue China and curry favor with US imperialism by discontinuing assistance to China. Then it put forward all sorts of untenable arguments in an attempt to induce China to abandon its solemn stand. Falling in all this, it has brazenly ganged up with the imperialist bandits in exerting pressure on China.

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"The Origin and Development of the Difference Between the Leadership of the CPSU and Ourselves" (*Beijing Review*. September 13, 1963)

In complete disregard of the common conclusion of the 1957 Declaration that US imperialism is the enemy of all the people of the world, the leadership of the CPSU passionately sought collaboration with US imperialism and the settlement of world problems by the heads of the Soviet Union and the United States. Particularly around the time of the Camp David Talks in September 1959, Khrushchev lauded Eisenhower to the skies, hailing him as a man who "enjoys the absolute confidence of the people" and who "also worries about ensuring peace just as we do". Moreover, comrades of the CPSU energetically advertised the so-called "spirit of Camp David", whose existence Eisenhower himself denied, alleging that it marked "a new era in international relations" and "a turning-point in history".

2. Ideological Dispute

"A Proposal Concerning the General Line of the International Communist Movement" (*Beijing Review*. July 26, 1963)

What are the revolutionary principles of the Declaration and the Statement? They may be summarized as follows: Workers of all countries, unite; workers of the world, unite with the oppressed peoples and oppressed nations; oppose imperialism and reaction in all countries;

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strive for world peace, national liberation, people's democracy and socialism; consolidate and expand the socialist camp; bring the proletarian world revolution step by step to complete victory; and establish a new world without imperialism, without capitalism and without the exploitation of man by man. This, in our view, is the general line of the international communist movement at the present stage.

If the general line of the international communist movement is one-sidely reduced to "peaceful coexistence", "peaceful competition" and "peaceful transition", this is to violate the revolutionary principles of the 1957 Declaration and the 1960 Statement, to discard the historical mission of proletarian world revolution, and to depart from the revolutionary teaching of Marxism-Leninism.

On the question of transition from capitalism to socialism, the proletarian party must proceed from the stand of class struggle and revolution and base itself on the Marxist-Leninist teaching concerning the proletarian revolution and the dictatorship of the proletariat.

Communists would always prefer to bring about the transition to socialism by peaceful means. But can peaceful transition be made into new worldwide strategic principles for the international communist movement? Absolutely not.

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Marxism-Leninism consistently holds that the fundamental question in all revolutions is that of state power. The 1957 Declaration and the 1960 Statement both clearly point out," Leninism teaches, and experience confirms, that the ruling classes never relinquish power voluntarily". The old government never topples even in a period of crisis, unless it is pushed. This is a universal law of class struggle. In specific historical conditions, Marx and Lenin did raise the possibility that revolution may develop peacefully. But, as Lenin pointed out, the peaceful development of revolution is an opportunity "very seldom to be met with in the history of revolutions". As a matter of fact, there is no historical precedent for peaceful transition from capitalism to socialism.

A few years ago certain persons suddenly claimed Lenin's policy of peaceful coexistence as their own great discovery. They maintain that they have the monopoly on the interpretation of this policy. They treat peaceful coexistence as if it were an all-inclusive, mystical book from heaven and attribute to it every success the people of the world achieve by struggle. What is more, they label all who disagree with their distortions of Lenin's view as opponents of peaceful coexistence, as people completely ignorant of Lenin and Leninism, and as heretics deserving to be burnt at the stake.

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How can the Chinese communists agree with this view and practice? They cannot, it is impossible. Lenin's principle of peaceful coexistence is very clear and readily comprehensible by ordinary people. Peaceful coexistence designates a relationship between countries with different social systems, and must not be interpreted as one pleases. It should never be extended to apply to the relations between oppressed and oppressor nations, between oppressed and oppressor countries or between oppressed and oppressor classes, and never be described as the main content of the transition from capitalism to socialism, still less should it be asserted that peaceful coexistence is mankind's road to socialism. The reason is that it is one thing to practice peaceful coexistence between countries with different social systems. It is absolutely impermissible and impossible for countries practicing peaceful coexistence to touch even a hair of each other's social system. The class struggle, the struggle for national liberation and the transition from capitalism to socialism in various countries are quite another thing. They are all bitter, life-and-death revolutionary struggles which aim at changing the social system. Peaceful coexistence cannot replace the revolutionary struggle of the people. The transition from capitalism to socialism in any country can only be brought

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about through the proletarian revolution and the dictatorship of the proletariat in that country.

The application of the policy of peaceful coexistence by the socialist countries is advantageous for achieving a peaceful international environment for socialist construction, for exposing the imperialist policies of aggression and war. But if the general line of the foreign policy of the socialist countries is confined to peaceful coexistence, then it is impossible to handle correctly either the relations between the socialist countries or those between the socialist countries and the oppressed peoples and nations. Therefore it is wrong to make peaceful coexistence the general line of the foreign policy of the socialist countries.

In our view, the general line of the foreign policy of the socialist countries should have the following content: to develop relations of friendship, mutual assistance and cooperation among the countries in the socialist camp in accordance with the principle of the proletarian internationalism; to strive for peaceful coexistence on the basis of the Five Principles with countries having different social systems and oppose the imperialist policies of aggression and war; and to support and assist the revolutionary struggles of all the oppressed peoples and

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nations. These three aspects are interrelated and indivisible, and not a single one can be omitted.

"The Origin and Development of the Differences between the Leadership of the CPSU and Ourselves" (*Beijing Review*. September 13, 1963)

From the very outset we held that a number of views advanced at the 20th Congress concerning the contemporary international struggle and the international communist movement were wrong, were violations of Marxism-Leninism. In particular, the complete negation of Stalin on the pretext of "combating the personality cult" and the thesis of peaceful transition to socialism by "the parliamentary road" are gross errors of principle.

Stalin's life was that of a great Marxist-Leninist, a great proletarian revolutionary. For thirty years after Lenin's death, Stalin was the foremost leader of the CPSU and the Soviet government, as well as the recognized leader of the international communist movement and the standard-bearer of the world revolution. During his lifetime, Stalin made some serious mistakes, but compared to his great and meritorious deeds his mistakes are only secondary.

It was necessary to criticize Stalin's mistakes. But in his secret report to the 20th Congress, Comrade Khrushchev completely negated Stalin, and in doing so defamed the dictatorship of the proletariat, defamed the socialist

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system, the great CPSU, the great Soviet Union and the international communist movement.

In his report to the 20th Congress, under the pretext that "radical changes" had taken place in the world situation, Khrushchev put forward the thesis of "peaceful transition". He said that the road of the October Revolution was "the only correct road in those historical conditions," but that as the situation has changed, it had become possible to effect the transition from capitalism to socialism "through the parliamentary road". In essence, this erroneous thesis is a clear revision of the Marxist-Leninist teachings on the state and revolution and a clear denial of the universal significance of the road of the October Revolution.

In his report, under the same pretext that "radical changes" had taken place in the world situation, Khrushchev also questioned the continued validity of Lenin's teachings on imperialism and on war and peace, and in fact tampered with Lenin's teachings.

Distorting Lenin's correct principle of peaceful coexistence between countries with different social systems, Khrushchev declared that peaceful coexistence was the "general line of the foreign policy" of the USSR. This amounted to excluding from the general line of the foreign policy of socialist countries their mutual assistance and

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cooperation as well as assistance by them to the revolutionary struggles of the oppressed peoples and nations, or to subordinating all this to the policy of so-called "peaceful coexistence".

3. The Possibility of the General War

"A Proposal Concerning the General Line of the International Communist Movement" (*Beijing Review*. July 26, 1963)

The national-liberation movements of Asia, Africa and Latin America and the revolutionary movements of the people in the capitalist countries are a strong support to the socialist country. It is completely wrong to deny this.

The only attitude for socialist countries to adopt towards the revolutionary struggles of the oppressed peoples and nations is one of warm sympathy and active support; they must not adopt a perfunctory attitude, or one of national selfishness or of great-power chauvinism.

Certain person says that revolutions are entirely possible without war. Now which type of war are they referring to--is it a war of national liberation or a revolutionary civil war, or is it a world war?

If they are referring to a war of national liberation or a revolutionary civil war, then this formulation is, in effect, opposed to revolutionary wars and to revolution.

If they are referring to a world war, then they are shooting at a non-existent target. Although Marxist-

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Leninists have point out, on the basis of the history of the two world wars, that world war inevitably lead to revolution, no Marxist-Leninist ever has held or ever will hold that revolution must be made through world war.

In recent years, certain persons have been spreading the argument that a single spark from a war of national liberation or from a revolutionary people's war will lead to a world conflagration destroying the whole mankind. What are the facts? Contrary to what these persons say, the wars of national liberation and the revolutionary people's war that have occurred since World War II have not led to world war. The victory of these revolutionary wars has directly weakened the forces of imperialism and greatly strengthened the forces which prevent the imperialists from launching a world war and which defend world peace. Do not the facts demonstrate the absurdity of this argument?

"Statement by the Spokesman of the Chinese Government" (*Beijing Review*. September 6, 1963)

The Soviet leaders hold that "no problem of the revolutionary movement of the working class or the national liberation movement can now be considered in isolation from the struggle to preserve the peace and avert a world thermonuclear war."

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The Soviet leaders hold that "local war" in our time are very dangerous, for any small "local war" might spark off the conflagration of a word war."

The Soviet leaders hold that if the people of any country dare to wage a revolutionary war against imperialism, all they are doing is hankering after "dying beautifully" and engaging in a "movement for piling up corpses."

The Soviet leader hold that if a nuclear war should break out, "in the case of many peoples the question of socialism would be eliminated altogether, because they would have disappeared bodily from our planet."

The view of the Soviet leaders referred to above are a total betrayal of Marxism-Leninism and are completely contradicted by the facts of history since the end of World War II.

While the US imperialists still had a monopoly of nuclear weapons, the Chinese people achieved the great victory of their revolution in defiance of US imperialist blackmail and intimidation.

While the US imperialists still retained their nuclear superiority, they were not able to prevent the defeat of their war of aggression in Korea. In November 1950, after the US imperialists had met with serious reverses on the Korean battlefield, Truman, then President of the United

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States, cried for the use of atomic bombs, and this immediately aroused indignant protests from the people of the whole world and also general panic and opposition from the allies of the United States. Furthermore, US military personnel did not believe that the use of atomic weapons in the Korean battlefield would actually be effective. As a result, throughout the Korean War the US imperialists never dared to use atomic weapons.

Following the armistice in Korea, the People of Vietnam were victorious in their revolutionary war against French imperialism. Even though it held atomic weapons, US imperialism was unable to realize its plan of increasing its intervention in the war in Vietnam.

After more than seven years of hard and bitter struggle, the people of Algeria were victorious in their war for national independence.

At the very gate of US imperialism, the people of Cuba won victory in the revolution through armed struggle. US imperialism has never dared to declare that it would use nuclear weapons against the Cuban people.

The people's armed forces in southern Vietnam are now carrying on a victorious struggle against the US imperialists and their lackey, the Ngo Dinh Diem clique. Although the US imperialists have employed a great variety of new weapons, they have not dared to use nuclear weapons.

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US imperialism cannot stop the people's revolutionary struggles in various countries by means of nuclear weapons. The reason is that, politically, recourse to this kind of weapon would place US imperialism in a position of extreme isolation and, militarily, the massive destructiveness of nuclear weapons limits their use, for in civil wars and wars of national independence, where the lines are zigzag and the fighting is at close range, the use of nuclear weapons of mass destruction would inflict damage on both belligerents.

In a speech delivered on December 16, 1959, Kennedy admitted the US nuclear strength "cannot be used in so-called 'brush-fire' peripheral war. It was not used in Korea, Indo-China, Hungary, Suez, Lebanon, Quemoy, Tibet or Laos. In short, it cannot prevent communists from gradually nibbling away at the fringe of the free world's territory and strength, until our security is being steadily eroded in piecemeal fashion..."

It is therefore evident that, provided the revolutionary people are not afraid of the imperialists' nuclear blackmail and persevere in their just struggles, they can gain victories in their revolutions. Such struggles and victories have not led to world war, but have constantly weakened and effectively restrained imperialism, and thus have reduced the danger of the imperialists' launching a world war and safeguarded world peace.

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"Two Different Lines on the Question of War and Peace" (*Beijing Review*. November 22, 1963)

They hold that with the appearance of nuclear weapons the oppressed peoples and nations must abandon revolution and refrain from waging just popular revolutionary wars and wars of national liberation, or else such wars would lead to the destruction of mankind. They say, "any small 'local war' might spark off the conflagration of a world war" and "today, any sort of war, though it may break out as an ordinary non-nuclear war, is likely to develop into a destructive nuclear-missile conflagration". Thus, "We will destroy our Noah's Ark--the globe".

They assert that by advocating support for the people's war of national liberation and revolutionary civil wars the Communist Party of China wants to provoke a nuclear world war. This is a curious lie. The Communist Party of China has always held that the socialist countries should actively support the people's revolutionary struggles, including wars of national liberation and revolutionary civil wars. To fail to do so would be to renounce their proletarian internationalist duty. At the same time, we hold that the oppressed peoples and nations can achieve liberation only by their own resolute revolutionary struggle and that no one else can do it for them.

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We have always maintained that socialist countries must not use nuclear weapons to support the people's wars of national liberation and revolutionary civil wars and have no need to do so.

World peace can be won only through struggle by the people of all countries and not by begging the imperialists for it. Peace can be effectively safeguarded only by relying on the masses of the people and waging a tit-for-tat struggle against imperialist policies of aggression and war. This is the correct policy.

International tension is the product of the imperialist policies of aggression and war. The peoples should of course wage a firm struggle against imperialist aggression and threats. Facts have shown that only through struggle can imperialism be compelled to retreat and a genuine relaxation of international tension be achieved. Constant retreat before the imperialists cannot lead to genuine relaxation but will encourage their aggression.

4. The Great Leap Forward

"The Origin and Development of the Difference Between the Leadership of the CPSU and Ourselves" (*Beijing Review*. September 13, 1963)

The leadership and Soviet publications also leveled many virulent attacks on the domestic and foreign policies of the Chinese Communist Party. These attacks were almost

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invariably led by Khrushchev in person. He insinuated that China's socialist construction was "skipping over a stage" and was "equalitarian communism" and that China's people's communes were "in essence reactionary".

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APPENDIX B

ARTICULATED FACTORS IN 1972 *BEIJING REVIEW*

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1. Soviet Threat and US Decline

"Refuting Y.A. Malik" (*Beijing Review*. January 21, 1972)

For Malik to advocate the so-called "peace and international cooperation" is really a great irony. How can one pose himself as a peace-upholding angel when he has brazenly supported the Indian aggressors and undermined peace in the South Asian subcontinent? What right has he to prate about "international cooperation" when he has arbitrarily acted against the demand of the most countries to stop aggression and safeguard state sovereignty and territory integrity?

We cannot agree to a world disarmament conference the Soviet Union has proposed to convene, which has neither set a clear aim nor put forward practical steps for its attainment. The Chairman of the Chinese Delegation had questioned the Soviet representative at the 26th Session of the UN General Assembly whether or not he dared to declare that at no time and in no circumstances will the Soviet Union be the first to use the nuclear weapons and that it will dismantle all nuclear bases and withdraw all nuclear weapons and means of delivery from abroad. To date, the Soviet government dares not say a word about this question. Who is really taking a "negative position" on disarmament? Is it not crystal clear that you are carrying out sham disarmament but real arms expansion?

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"New Plot of US Imperialism to Drag Others into the Mire" (*Beijing Review*. January 21, 1972)

Beset with internal and external difficulties, US imperialism is also having a very hard time because its financial and economic crises have become graver and graver as a result of its disastrous defeats in the aggression in Indochina.

"Year of decline for US Imperialism" (*Beijing Review*. January 21, 1972)

Since World War II, US imperialism has become bogged down deeper and deeper in the quagmire of economic crisis. It has become subject to a malignant growth of inflation, a steady dwindling of markets, successive years of deficits in its balance of payments, a drastic decline in gold reserves and continual increases in its financial deficits.

The US position today is a sharp contrast with that of more than 20 years ago. As the first postwar US President, Harry Truman once blandly boasted: The United States had the permanent responsibility of leading the world, which was unrivaled by any of those of emperors in the history of the world. He carried on like an overlord. When John F. Kennedy took power in the early 60s, he had to cry out in alarm: "Each day the crises multiply. Each day their solution grows more difficult. In each of these principal areas of crisis, the tide of events has been running out and time has not

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been our friends." But he still tried to pretend to be calm, saying he did not believe that the tide of history was on the side of the world's people. "I do believe," he shouted, "that history is not moving against us, but in the long run is moving with us." Then in the late 60s and early 70s, Richard Nixon came to power. He could not but bemoan, "In coping with a cycle of recurrent crises," the United States exhausts its "resources, both physical and moral," and that it was in "the most difficult time in history." Deploring the situation in the United States today, he said it reminded him of the decline of ancient Greece and the Roman Empire, and that "the United States is now reaching that period." The three different tunes sung by three representative figures of the United States in three decades indicate how rapidly US imperialism is declining.

The decline of the United States is also a result of the law of uneven development in the entire capitalist world. By stretching its hands out to all parts of the world in frenzied aggression and expansion as the self-appointed world gendarme, US imperialism has place a heavy load on its own back and seriously weakened itself financially and economically. In the meantime, Japan, West European countries and other capitalist countries, by taking advantage of this, have swiftly restored and developed their strength. The profound change in the balance of forces

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between the United States and these countries has inevitably sharpened their contradictions and competition. In the past few years, social-imperialism has also been fiercely contending with US imperialism for world hegemony. All this has posed the United States with its toughest postwar challenge.

"Soviet Social-Imperialism's Attempt to Further Control South Asian Subcontinent Exposed" (*Beijing Review*. September 1. 1972)

It is necessary to point out here that in recent years Soviet social-imperialism has played and is still playing a most insidious role in the development of the situation on the south Asian subcontinent. Last August the Soviet government concluded with the Indian government a so-called treaty of peace, friendship and cooperation, which is in essence an aggressive treaty of military alliance, whereby the Indian government has finally and openly stripped off its cloak of "non-alignment." Subsequently, the Soviet government directly instigated and supported India in launching a war of aggression against Pakistan. After the cease-fire, it has worked hard to obstruct a reasonable solution to the relationship between the parties concerned on the south Asian subcontinent in an attempt to aggravate their division and antagonism. The sole purpose of Soviet social-imperialism in so doing is to utilize the

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contradictions it has created single-handedly to further control India and "Bangla Desh" and infiltrate into the regions of the Indian Ocean and the south Asian subcontinent so as to expand its spheres of influence and contend for hegemony. The aggressive design of social-imperialism knows no bounds. Today it can bully Pakistan at will, and the next day it can use its old trick against other countries of the subcontinent. Such talk as devotion to the "normalization" of the situation on the south Asian subcontinent and "relations of cooperation" and fostering "a brotherly atmosphere" are sheer hoax.

Today they push their "secure boundaries" to the Indian Ocean and the Mediterranean, and the next day they can press further into the Pacific and the Atlantic. It is known to all what they have done to some of their "allies", and we will not dwell on it here. In recent years, with honey in mouth and dagger in heart, they have committed aggression, subversion, control and interference in the name of support and assistance against a series of the third world countries, including countries in Africa and the Middle East. Is there any lack of evidence in this respect? Some of their schemes have already been revealed, and some are being revealed. The acts and deeds of social-imperialism have opened the eyes of the people.

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"Chairman of Chinese Delegation Chiao Kuan-hua's Speech at 27th UN General Assembly Session" (*Beijing Review*. October 13, 1972)

We have publicly declared that at no time and in no circumstances will China be the first to use nuclear weapons. This fully shows that China is developing nuclear weapons for defensive purposes and with the aim of breaking the nuclear monopoly and proceeding from there to eliminate nuclear weapons. If the Soviet Union entertains the same defensive purposes, as it has claimed, why does the Soviet representative not dare to come up to this rostrum and make a similar declaration? How can it make people believe its big talk for the permanent prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons to be sincere when it, while mouthing such prohibition, is constantly brandishing the nuclear weapons, obdurately opposing the possession and development of nuclear weapons by countries with few or no nuclear weapons, feverishly improving and developing its own nuclear weapons and deploying them at the gates of other countries? Big talk is useless. The proposal of the Soviet government, no matter how much it is couched in diplomatic language, has the real intent of making all oppressed nations and peoples tamely submit to the nuclear threat of the one or two superpowers.

In order truly to do away with nuclear threat, it is necessary to completely prohibit and thoroughly destroy

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nuclear weapons. Yet the Soviet government dares neither to undertake not to be the first to use nuclear weapons nor to touch on the question of complete prohibition and through destruction of nuclear weapons but advocates the cessation of all nuclear tests. Why? As everybody knows, the Soviet Union has made hundreds of nuclear tests. When it had made enough tests in the atmosphere, it proposed the partial ban on nuclear tests. Now when it has made enough underground tests, it calls for a ban on all nuclear tests. Actually this means that the Soviet Union could make any kind of tests when it had the need, and that when it no longer has the need the others are not permitted to make any test. This is another trap blatantly designed to maintain its nuclear monopoly, following the partial nuclear test ban treaty and the treaty on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. China absolutely will not fall into this trap. At no time and in no circumstances, will China recognize such a right for the Soviet Union or any other nuclear power. No one but they alone are permitted to develop nuclear weapons; they may threaten others but others are not allowed to exercise the right of self-defense. Can there be such reason on earth? At present, a mere cessation of all nuclear tests without complete prohibition and through destruction of nuclear weapons can only hinder countries with few or no nuclear weapons from developing their nuclear capabilities for self-

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defense but will not affect in the least the nuclear hegemony of the superpowers. The real purpose of the proposal of the Soviet government is to maintain its nuclear monopoly and nuclear superiority by capitalizing on many countries' legitimate desire for peace, so that it can have a free hand to carry out its nuclear threat and nuclear blackmail against countries with few or no nuclear weapons. "Soviet Disarmament Proposal is a Fraud" (*Beijing Review*. November 17, 1972)

The Soviet leaders are acting like overlords and doing whatever they please throughout the world, and yet they come to the United Nations to play the benevolent goddess of mercy giving earnest admonitions and rescuing the wretched. The Soviet leaders have tried by every possible means to make people believe that they have laid down their butcher's knives and become Buddhas at once. In 1968, the Soviet Union brazenly dispatched hundreds of thousands of troops, hundreds of planes and thousands of tanks to invade and occupy one of its East European allies. Yet in 1969, the Soviet representative came to this rostrum and put forward a proposal on what he called strengthening international peace and security. In 1971, the Soviet Union flagrantly abetted and supported the armed aggression against, and dismemberment of, Pakistan, And now in 1972 the Soviet representative has again come to this hall and put forward a

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proposal on the so-called non-use of force in international relations and permanent prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons. But empty talk about peace, after all, cannot cover up the true features of an expansionist. Dear Mr. Soviet representative, why can't you just withdraw your troops and dismantle your bases from the People's Republic of Mongolia instead of unabashedly uttering empty words about the renunciation of the use of all force? Wouldn't that better prove that you really have the intention for the non-use of force? The stark facts have shown that the Soviet leaders have neither laid down their butcher's knives nor will they become Buddhas. The Soviet proposal is a downright fraud. The Chinese Delegation firmly opposes it.

"An Inglorious Performance" (*Beijing Review*. November 17, 1972)

The new Soviet resolution boils down to the fact that while paying lip-service to the prohibition of all kinds of weapons, they actually possess and energetically expand all kinds of weapons, particularly nuclear weapons, for carrying out unbridled nuclear threat and nuclear blackmail against countries with little or no nuclear armament. This is a typical example of the scheme of sham relaxation of tension but actual expansion carried out by Soviet revisionist social-imperialism in international affairs today.

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"Challenge to Superpowers' Power Politics" (*Beijing Review*. December 29, 1972)

The Chinese Delegation in many speeches at the session analyzed the essence of the Soviet expansionist policy and its double-faced maneuvers, and exposed its fraud of sham disarmament but real arms expansion. The Chinese representatives had time and again raised the following questions: Since the Soviet Union was so anxious to convene a "world disarmament conference", why couldn't it take some concrete steps to create conditions for the convening of such a conference? Why couldn't it guarantee not to be the first to use unclear weapons, especially not to use nuclear weapons against the non-nuclear states? Why couldn't it withdraw its armed forces stationed abroad and dismantle its military bases on foreign soil? If the Soviet Union really stood for the non-use of force in international relations, why did it use force everywhere? Why couldn't it withdraw its massive armed forces from the Mongolian People's Republic? If the Soviet Union really wanted to ban for ever the use of nuclear weapons, why didn't it propose the complete prohibition and through destruction of nuclear weapons?

2. Mao's Three Worlds Theory

"Refuting Y.A. Malik" (*Beijing Review*. January 21, 1972)

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By taking part in the work of the United Nations, the Chinese Delegation, together with a great number of medium-sized and small countries, as well as with all the peace-loving and justice-upholding countries, has made positive efforts in opposing imperialism, expansionism, colonialism and neo-colonialism, and in safeguarding the national independence and state sovereignty of various countries, safeguarding world peace, and promoting the cause of progress of mankind. This is really unfavorable to the two superpowers in their manipulation and monopolization of the affairs of the United Nations. The trend of medium-sized and small countries uniting to oppose the hegemony of the two superpowers as reflected in the United Nations is irresistible.

"Medium-Sized and Small Nations United to Oppose Two Superpowers' Hegemony" (*Beijing Review*. January 28, 1972)

An important trend has emerged in the international situation in the 1970s. An increasing number of medium-sized and small countries are uniting in various ways into a broad united front to oppose hegemony and power politics by the two superpowers, to safeguard national independence and state sovereignty and to fight for equality in international relations.

World progress and historical developments are invariably achieved through the struggles of the oppressed

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nations and peoples. US imperialism and Soviet social-imperialism always subject other countries to aggression, subversion, intervention, plunder, control and bullying. The two superpowers are contending and at the same time colluding to monopolize international affairs and practice hegemony. The common experience and demands of the medium-sized and small countries have aroused the bulk of these countries to unite in struggle.

"Chairman of Chinese Delegation Chiao Kuan-hua's Speech at 27th UN General Assembly Session" (*Beijing Review*. October 13, 1972)

It is fully understandable that the people of the European countries, who have gone through two world wars, are all concerned for the peace and security of Europe. Twenty-seven years have passed since the end of World War II, and yet many European countries are still under the military control of one superpower or the other, with large numbers of foreign troops stationed on their territories. Making use of the confrontation of the two military blocs, each of the two superpowers is trying hard to keep its allies under control and undermine the opposite side. In these circumstances, how can one speak of genuine peace and security for the people of the European countries? What calls for attention is the fact that there are some people who, capitalizing on the European people's eager desire for

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peace, are trying hard by various tactics to cover up the reality that European peace and security are still under threat, and to create the false impression of a European détente and "all quite on the Western front", so as to attain their ulterior purposes. The fact that a superpower could, when it considered it necessary, launch a surprise attack to occupy an ally with massive troops shows that such a "military alliance" is no guarantee for peace at all. Security is out of the question for any country when it is under virtual occupation.

As a developing country, China, from her own experience, fully sympathizes with the deep aspirations of the Asian, African and Latin American countries for the defense of their national independence, the protection of their resources and the development of their national economy. We resolutely support the Latin American countries in their struggle to defend their 200 nautical-mile maritime rights. We resolutely support the petroleum--and other raw material--exporting countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America in their struggle against plunder by foreign forces. We resolutely support the small and medium-sized countries in their struggle against big powers plundering their fishery resources.

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APPENDIX C

ARTICULATED FACTORS IN 1982 *BEIJING REVIEW*

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1. Taiwan Issue

"China Opposes Sales of Foreign Arms to Taiwan" (*Beijing Review*. January 11, 1982)

There is an obstacle to developing Sino-US relations, the issue of sales of US weapons to Taiwan. News reports from Washington indicate that the US government will not only continue to sell weapons to Taiwan, but is also contemplating an escalation in this respect, and it has even asserted once and again that the Chinese government has no right to make an issue of it.

China has always opposed sales of weapons to the Taiwan authorities by foreign countries. Those countries which maintain diplomatic relations with China should not sell any arms to the local authorities in China's Taiwan province, since they recognize that there is only one China, and recognize the government of the People's Republic of China as the sole legally constituted government of China. Those who insist on selling arms to Taiwan encroach upon China's sovereignty and interfere in its internal affairs. The United States is no exception.

China demands that the United States genuinely respect China's sovereignty and territorial integrity by not interfering in China's internal affairs. This demand is the very minimum for a sovereign state. The Chinese people have fought for independence and sovereignty for well over a

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century and at a very great cost in lives and blood. They have stood up today and will in no case tolerate any attempt by any foreign country to infringe upon their national sovereignty, divide their territory and interfere in their internal affairs. This is a matter of their national feeling. The Chinese government represents the will of the Chinese people and certainly will not adopt an attitude of unprincipled accommodation involving the country's territory and sovereignty.

"Where Does the Crux of the Sino-US Relationship Lie?" (*Beijing Review*. April 12, 1982)

The Joint Communiqué on the Establishment of Sino-US Diplomatic Relations states clearly that within the context of US recognition of the government of the People's Republic of China as the sole legal government of China, the American people will maintain "cultural, commercial and other unofficial relations" with the people on Taiwan. The arms sales to Taiwan obviously are not commercial exchanges between people. The US companies which sell arms to Taiwan have the approval of the US government. Those who purchase the weapons are by no means the common people on Taiwan.

Some say whether the United States is to stop selling weapons to Taiwan or not depends on the situation in the Taiwan Strait and that China must guarantee to settle the Taiwan issue by peaceful means. This obviously constitutes

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interference in China's internal affairs. Taiwan is an inseparable part of China and the unification of Taiwan with the motherland is entirely China's internal affairs. No foreign country has the right to interfere. The cessation of US arms sales to Taiwan should not have any preconditions. Those who preached the above argument are apparently actuated by their twofold needs: obstruct the Chinese people from settling the Taiwan question peacefully by selling weapons to Taiwan and in turn use the failure in reunifying Taiwan with the motherland as an excuse for continuing US arms sales to Taiwan.

Some people say that because China is backward and faces a Soviet military threat, it needs US assistance. They believe that so long as the United States adopts a hard-line towards the Soviet Union, China will swallow the bitter pill on the question of sovereignty and US arms sales to Taiwan. This is fallacious reasoning based on ignorance of the history of Sino-Soviet relations and the history of Sino-US relations. China began opposing Soviet hegemonism in the 1960s. At that time, Sino-US relations were still in a tense and antagonistic state, but China did not flinch from opposing Soviet hegemonism simply because of this.

"Create a New Situation in All Fields of Socialist Modernization" (*Beijing Review*. September 13, 1982)

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A cloud has all along hung over the relations between the two countries. This is because the United States, despite having recognize that the government of the People's Republic of China is China's sole legal government and that there is only one of China and Taiwan is part of China, has passed the Taiwan Relations Act which contravenes the principle embodied in the joint communiqué on the establishment of the diplomatic relations, and it continued to sell arms to Taiwan, treating Taiwan as an independent political entity. Sino-US relations can continue to develop soundly only if the principles of mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity and non-interference in each other's internal affairs are truly adhered to.

2. The Change in Trilateral Relations

"Is the Soviet Union Declining?" (*Beijing Review*. January 18, 1982)

Last year, Moscow put forward a "peace program" for the 1980s and adopted a seemingly low-key attitude in international affairs. Some people wonder if the Soviet Union has begun to soften because of its difficulties. Others are trying to determine the magnitude of its difficulties.

Some people are saying that the Soviets have entered a prolonged period of all-round "strategic difficulties". They are convinced that it is declining and, therefore, cannot

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afford any more military adventures and can only try to preserve what it has obtained.

The Soviet Union is clearly faced with a variety of problems. The Soviet national economy is steadily declining. Since Brezhnev took office, the average annual growth rate of Soviet national income and industrial output value has dropped to 6% or 7% for the 9th five-year plan (1971-75) from the rate of about 8% for the 8th five-year plan. It decreased to 4% for the 10th five-year plan. In 1981, the first year of the 11th Soviet five-year plan, the growth rate of national income and industrial output value is estimated at 3% to 3.4%.

Last year was the 10th lean year for grain production during the 17 years since Brezhnev's ascent to power. Grain output has dropped to 160 million tons from 273 million tons in the late 1970s, a decrease of 77 million tons.

There is also imbalance between agriculture, light and heavy industries. The Soviet Union has been giving priority to heavy industry for a long time, diverting more than 80% of its industrial investments to its development. This policy has resulted in an overdeveloped heavy industry and sluggishness in light industry and agriculture.

Its burdens have become increasingly heavy as a result of its policy of world expansion. Its intervention in Kampuchea and invasion of Afghanistan has invoked worldwide

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condemnation. It has to annually spend at least 10,000 million US dollars on Afghanistan, Cuba, Poland and several African and Middle Eastern countries.

"A Comment on Brezhnev's Tashkent Speech" (*Beijing Review.* April 5, 1982)

Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev recently announced that the USSR is ready to "improve" Sino-Soviet relations. Brezhnev made the announcement on March 24 in a speech at a mass rally in Tashkent. The Beijing press has noted that Brezhnev chose a troubled moment in Sino-US relations resulting from US arms sales to state the Soviet Union's opposition to the "concept of two Chinas", to present its "recognition of the sovereignty of the People's Republic of China over Taiwan island" and to profess his readiness to discuss "improvement" of Sino-Soviet relations.

"Create a New Situation in All Fields of Socialist Modernization" (*Beijing Review.* September 13, 1982)

We note that Soviet leaders have expressed more than once the desire to improve relations with China. But deeds, rather than words, are important. If the Soviet authorities really have a sincere desire to improve relations with China and take practical steps to lift their threat to the security of our country, it will be possible for Sino-Soviet relations to move towards normalization.

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"Some Observations on Soviet Détente" (*Beijing Review*. October 18, 1982)

The Soviet economy, developing at a visibly decreasing pace since the mid-1970s, has further slowed down in the early 80s, indeed to its lowest point since the war. The cause for this are legion but the most important one is that its expenditures on arms expansion and war preparations as well as its outlays on overseas expansion have put the Soviet economy under intolerable pressure. According to estimates by Western countries, the percentage of Soviet present military spending in the GNP has run to about 13-14%. If this spending continues at an annual rate of 4% in the next few years, it is expected that it will go up to 15% of its GNP in the mid-1980s. In addition, the Soviet Union is obliged to foot the bill for its adventures in Cuba, Vietnam and Afghanistan to the tune of nearly US$ 10,000 million annually. All this obviously has put a crushing burden on the Soviet economy.

3. Economic Considerations

"On China's Economic Relations with Foreign Countries" (Beijing Review. May 31, 1982)

Most countries attach great importance to developing economic relations with other countries. More than a century ago, Marx and Engels pointed out that, with the formation of the capitalist world market, mutual economic exchanges and

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mutual dependence among nations gradually replaced the age-old practice of closing a country to the outside world and pursuing self-sufficiency. During the past few decades, especially since World War II, still greater development has been achieved in this respect. This is an inevitable trend of social development.

A long-standing concept has it that economics should be subordinate to politics. This makes some sense, but it is far from perfect. According to the basic Marxist viewpoint, economics and politics influence each other, but in the final analysis, it is economics that determines politics. The same holds true for foreign relations. Given close economic relations with foreign countries, it will be easy for us to develop relations with them in the political field. But if we fail to forge close economic relationships, our diplomacy will also suffer in the political arena. While expanding our economic relations with other nations, we should earnestly study all advanced foreign scientific, cultural and management knowledge.

"China's Position on Disarmament" (*Beijing Review*. June 21, 1982)

China needs an extended period of stable and peaceful international environment in order to attain the lofty goal of her modernization program by the end of this century.

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Only in peace can our economic development go forward and our people's needs be satisfied.

"China's Policy on Absorption of Direct Investment from Foreign Countries" (*Beijing Review*. July 26, 1982)

We have roughly adopted three forms of utilizing foreign capital: first, direct investment, including joint ventures, cooperative enterprises, joint exploration and exploitation, compensatory trade, and so on; second, medium and long-term loans with middle and low interest rates provided by foreign governments and international financial institutions and various development funds; third, conventional commercial loans.

There are approximately 400,000 large, medium-sized and small enterprises in China. The bulk of them require technical transformation to be carried out by stages and in groups in accordance with the necessity and possibility in order to economize on energy and raw materials, reduce production cost and raise productivity. This is an arduous task which is being facilitated by foreign capital. The technology of the existing enterprises should be renovated and reformed in every possible way.

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